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ABSTRACT

AMOUNT RELATIVES REDUX
SEPTEMBER 2017
JON ANDER MENDIA
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Rajesh Bhatt and Professor Vincent Homer

This dissertation provides a novel analysis of Amount Relatives (Carlson 1977a, Heim
1987, Grosu and Landman 1998, Herdan 2008, Meier 2015, a.o). Amount Relatives are a
form of non-intersective relative clause that is usually associated with amount interpretations .
For example, the sentence it will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne they spilled
that evening is most naturally interpreted as referring to an amount of champagne, and not any
particular champagne. Previous accounts of Amount Relatives have converged in appealing
to degree semantics in order to extract an amount from the relative clause, suggesting that the
embedded CP denotes a property of degrees.
This dissertation advocates a more nuanced view of Amount Relatives across languages.
I propose that natural languages allow two diﬀerent strategies for deriving amount interpretations of relative clauses: a degree-based strategy and a degree-less strategy, where degree
semantics does not come into play at all. It is argued that while some languages employ both

ix

strategies, as is the case with Spanish, languages like English only have the degree-less strategy, contra much of the previous literature. Evidence for this division comes from the fact
that Amount Relatives in Spanish, but not English, pass independently-motivated diagnostics
of degree-related operations (e.g. degree-quantiﬁcation and degree-abstraction).
In the ﬁrst part of the dissertation, I propose a novel means of arriving at amount interpretations for relative clauses in languages like English, which lack the degree-based strategy to
derive such meanings. The account exploits the correlation between kind and amount readings
of relative clauses in English, ﬁrst noted by Carlson (1977a). Amount Relatives in English
will be argued to be a sub-case of kind-referring relative clauses and an analysis that derives
amounts from (sub)kinds is presented.
The second, more sizable portion of the dissertation examines Amount Relatives in Spanish, which can be shown to make use of a degree-based strategy for deriving amount readings,
as they do show all the hallmarks of degree constructions. Moreover, the language allows
amount interpretations more readily, in more environments and with more diverse forms than
languages like English. I will provide a compositional analysis of Spanish Amount Relatives
in their various forms, with the goal of understanding (i) what syntactic and semantic pieces
are implicated in extracting an amount from a relative clause structure and (ii) how diﬀerent
permutations of these pieces could result in semantic variation within and across languages.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Amount Relatives: relative clauses with quantity interpretations

This dissertation is concerned with Amount Relatives, relative clauses that receive quantityoriented interpretations (Carlson 1977a, Heim 1987, Grosu and Landman 1998, 2017, Herdan 2008, McNally 2008, Meier 2015, a.o). Consider the following example, from Heim
(1987, p.38).
(1)

It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne they spilled that evening.

The sentence in (1) is ambiguous. On its ordinary interpretation, the relative clause simply
picks out the particular champagne that was spilled that evening, and the sentence on the
whole is about the time it will take to drink that spilled champagne. This is the meaning
we arrive at when, following the traditional analysis (Quine 1960, Partee 1973), we interpret
the relative clause by intersecting the predicate denoted by the head noun with the predicate
denoted by the that-clause. The resulting meaning is of the form “x is champagne and x was
spilled that evening”. This corresponds to what is known as the intersective interpretation of
relative clauses.
But this is not the most accessible interpretation of the sentence. On its most salient reading, (1) refers to the task of drinking the amount of champagne that was spilled that evening.
In this case, the particular champagne that was spilled is not the object of the drinking, rather
any champagne in the same amount will suﬃce. This interpretation of (1) is more straightforwardly captured by both of the following paraphrases.
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(2) a. It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the amount of champagne they spilled
that evening.
b. It will take us the rest of our lives to drink as much champagne as they spilled that
evening.
The examples below provide similar cases. Under the relevant interpretation, they all make a
claim about an amount, not about an individual.
(3) a. Mary saw the birds in thirty minutes that John saw in a day.

[Meier 2015]

↝ Mary saw the number of birds that John saw
b. We lost the battle because we lacked the soldiers our enemy had. [McNally 2008]
↝ We lacked the amount of soldiers that our enemy had
c. The money it cost could have fed many people.

[Grosu and Landman to appear]

↝ The amount of money it cost
Because of their semantic ability to refer to amounts, these relative clauses were named
“Amount Relatives” by Carlson (1977a). I will continue this tradition in this dissertation,
henceforth using the acronym AR to refer to Amount Relatives.

1.2
1.2.1

Why Amount Relatives?
A family of three

Ordinary relative clauses usually refer to individuals. ARs like (1) and (3) got this name
from Carlson (1977a) because, at an intuitive level, they seem to refer to an amount or quantity
rather than to particular entities. In addition to the ordinary-looking relative clauses in (1)/(3),
Carlson (1977a) argued that ARs come (at least) in two additional syntactic frames: (i) in
relative clauses where relativization occurs out of there-be existential sentences, as in (4a),
and (ii) in Antecedent Contained Deletion constructions, where the trace of the head of the
relative clause is contained within an elided phrase, as in (4b).
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(4) a. There wasn’t the water in the sink that there was in the bathtub.
↝ the amount of water

[attributed to Lisa Selkirk]

b. Marv put everything he could in his pocket.
↝ the amount of things that he could put

[Carlson 1977a]

Observe that both sentences in (4) are ambiguous; in addition to the amount interpretation,
the ordinary intersective interpretation is also available. In the case of (4a), this intersective
interpretation yields a truism, namely, that the water in the sink is not the water in the bathtub.
On its most natural interpretation, however, it refers to diﬀerent amounts of water. Similarly,
on the ordinary intersective interpretation of the relative clause in (4b), for every x such that
Marv could put x in his pocket, Marv did put x in his pocket. However, the most accessible
interpretation of (4b) is one in which Marv got a pocketful of things, without necessarily
putting in his pocket all the objects that would have otherwise ﬁt in it individually.
Thus, on Carlson’s (1977a) account, there are three varieties of ARs, all of which involve
a special sort of relativization that yields the quantity interpretation.
(5) Three types of ARs
a. Ordinary Relative Clauses
It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne they spilled that evening.
b. Existential Relative Clauses
There wasn’t the water in the sink that there was in the bathtub.
c. ACD Relative Clauses
Marv put everything he could in his pocket.
Support for the idea of ARs as a homogeneous phenomenon has come from a number of
authors since Carlson, including Heim (1987), von Fintel (1999), Grosu and Landman (1998,
2017) and Meier (2015). But there are dissenting voices as well: for instance, Herdan (2008)
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and McNally (2008) are defendants of the position that not all ARs described by Carlson
belong to the same class.
Carlson’s (1977a) original arguments in favor of treating the three constructions in (5) in a
uniform fashion relied on certain syntactic similarities among the three. For instance, relative
clauses yielding a quantity interpretation seem to show selectional restrictions on the relative
pronoun. As Heim (1987) observed, the availability of the amount interpretation of sentences
like (6) below depends on the presence of the null/that complementizer.1 The use of which
in (6a), at least for most speakers, leads to the clause only receiving an ordinary intersective
interpretation. In the case of existential relative clauses and those involving ACD, the use of
which results in ungrammaticality.2
(6) a. It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne {∅ / that / which} they
spilled at the party.
b. There wasn’t the water in the sink {∅ / that / *which} there was in the bathtub.
c. Marv put in his pocket everything {∅ / that / *which} he could.
Another well-known property of ARs that diﬀerentiates them from garden-variety restrictive relative clauses is that ARs require deﬁnite or universal determiners. Consequently, the
sentences in (7), involving existentially quantiﬁed head nouns lack amount readings.
(7) a. It will take us the rest of our lives to drink some champagne they spilled that evening.
b. Marv put many things he could in his pocket.
c. * I took {some / many} books that there were on the table.
1

There are conﬂicting judgments in Carlson (1977a) and Saﬁr (1982); see Heim (1987) for discussion.

2

These judgments are more clear when relative clauses are headed by nouns that are more commonly interpreted as referring to amounts (examples from McNally 2008).
(i)

a. * The money which costs makes no diﬀerence
b. *There wasn’t the money in the wallet which there was on the table.
c. *Marv put every pound of sand which he could in the truck.
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The fact that the three constructions in (5) pattern alike and unlike ordinary relative clauses
led Carlson (1977a) to suggest that they all form a uniform class, diﬀerent from ordinary
restrictive relatives.
1.2.2

Diﬀerent interpretations of relative clauses

Of course, beyond these syntactic constraints, the three types of constructions in (5) are
uniﬁed by the semantic fact that they can refer to quantities or amounts. As it happens, the
syntactic tests alone are sometimes misleading. It is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd relative clauses with the
syntactic properties noted by Carlson (1977a) that do not in fact refer to amounts. Consider:
(8) I took the books that there were on the table.
The sentence in (8) is an AR by the syntactic measures usually taken in the literature to characterize ARs (Carlson 1977a, Heim 1987, von Fintel 1999, Grosu and Landman 1998). However, (8) can only be true if I took the particular books that were lying on the table. That is,
a situation in which I took a diﬀerent set of books, but equal in amount, to the books on the
table cannot verify (8). In short, despite qualifying as an Amount Relative, (8) cannot refer
to amounts.
For reasons like this, it is useful to diﬀerentiate between ARs–as they have been classiﬁed
in the literature–and relative clauses that refer to amounts. The goal is simply to provide a
descriptive, analysis independent way to refer to diﬀerent interpretations of relative clauses.
Thus, I diﬀerentiate between three main diﬀerent interpretations that relative clauses may give
rise to:

,

and

interpretations. (I will follow the typographical convention

of using small caps when referring to these interpretations.) The following relative clauses
illustrate the diﬀerences (with minimal changes to promote the intended interpretation).
(9) It will take us the rest of our lives to…
a. O

↝ the particular champagne

interpretation:

…pay for the champagne they spilled that evening.
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b. A

↝ the amount of champagne

interpretation:

…drink the champagne they spilled that evening.
c. K

↝ the type of champagne

interpretation:

…ﬁnd the champagne they spilled that evening.
The

interpretation corresponds simply to the intersective interpretation of the relative

clause, and it refers to individual objects or tokens. The

interpretation corresponds

to an interpretation where the relative clause makes reference to an amount of objects, and
not to any particular object. Lastly, the

interpretation also does not refer to a particular

token of champagne; rather, it refers to some kind of champagne.3
1.2.3

Goal of the dissertation

The overarching goal of this dissertation is to shed light on how seemingly ordinarylooking relative clauses receive

interpretations. I will be concerned here only with

relative clauses like (1), (3) and (5a) above, and will not be examining existential or ACD relative clauses.4 Answering this question requires, in essence, resolving a compositional problem.
For reasons that will become obvious shortly, I take a cross-linguistic approach to this compositional problem, addressing another question along the way: how does the availability and
composition of ARs vary across languages? As it happens, two languages that both allow ARs
may still vary in what environments and how readily they allow them. Here, I take Spanish
3
Notice that
interpretations may seem to entail both
and
readings of relative clauses.
If I took all the books there were on the table, I certainly took the same amount of books as there were books
on the table. Similarly, if I found a bottle of Dom Pérignon then I certainly found a certain kind of wine (in
this case one that belongs to an assemblage of Pinot Noir and Chardonnay grapes). This apparent entailment
falls out from world knowledge: we cannot prevent pluralities of books from constituting an amount, nor can we
avoid wines from belonging to a certain kind. In contrast,
interpretations directly refer to an amount of
objects, irrespective of the particular objects that sum up to constitute said amount–and same with kind-referring
relative clauses.
4
Although there has not been much discussion about these two other constructions, McNally (2008) (for
existential relative clauses) and Herdan (2008) (for ACD relative clauses) provide good arguments that neither
of them should be treated on par with ARs–understood as relative clauses with
interpretations. The idea
that not all ARs described by Carlson belong to the same class has not, to my knowledge, been pursued further.
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and English as my case studies. As will be described in the following sections, Spanish diﬀers
interpretations (i) more readily, (ii) in more syntactic en-

from English in allowing

vironments, and (iii) with diﬀerent types of relative clauses. Thus, the diﬀerences between
English-like and Spanish-like languages bear on the compositional puzzle presented above
by suggesting that there is more than one strategy available in natural languages to generate
interpretations in relative clauses.

1.3

Rethinking

interpretations

The ﬁrst question of interest to us is: how do ordinary-looking relative clauses provide
interpretations? From the point of view of classical analyses to (intersective) relative
clauses (e.g. Quine 1960, Partee 1973), the availability of

interpretations is puzzling.

For instance, the intersective interpretation of the relative clause the champagne they spilled
that evening would simply denote the set of (instances of things) that (i) are champagne and
(ii) they spilled that evening.
(10) {x ∶ x is champagne} ∩ {y ∶ they spilled y that evening}
But this, of course, corresponds to the

interpretation of the relative clause. Thus, in

order to fully understand what the compositional challenge is, we should ﬁrst look into the
main semantic properties of these interpretations.
1.3.1

Semantic properties of

interpretations

Pre-theoretically, there are three main semantic properties of
set them apart from

interpretations that

interpretations. Their ﬁrst and most notorious property is that

they do not refer to individuals, but to “amounts”. This observation, albeit obvious, is far
from innocent: it comes with the non-trivial consequence that, in spite of being of the form
the NP,

interpretations do not refer to that NP. In other words, using our example in

(9), the deﬁnitiness of the deﬁnite determiner the does not apply to the NP champagne, but to
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an amount; in this case, the deﬁnite amount of champagne that they spilled that evening (e.g.
two liters, or perhaps two bottles).
The ﬂip-side of this property is that the NP champagne cannot be interpreted as a deﬁnite,
but as an indeﬁnite. In (9), there is no single individual object-level champagne that would
take us long to drink; in fact, any champagne in the relevant amount suﬃces. This behavior
of the head of the relative clause is puzzling, again, the head noun, on the surface, is a deﬁnite
NP (the champagne).
The last distinguishing property of

interpretations is that they always involve a

comparison of two amounts of the same stuﬀ. To appreciate this requirement better, consider
ﬁrst a classiﬁer relative clause with an overt noun amount.
(11) It would take us years to drink the amount of champagne that you drank of wine.
What (11) shows is that relative clauses headed by the noun amount allow the comparison
of two diﬀerent sets/instances of stuﬀ; in this case, the comparison is between an amount of
champagne and amount of wine. The same, however, is not possible with ordinary looking
relative clauses.
(12) * It would take us years to drink the champagne that you drank wine.
To be sure, the unavailability of

interpretations that involve comparing amounts of

diﬀerent stuﬀ does not rest on independent syntactic constraints. Consider for example a
context where I drank two liters of champagne in 3 hours, and you drank two liters of wine
in 30 minutes. In this context, (13) is false.
(13) It took me 3 hours to drink the champagne that you drank in 30 minutes.
Despite its grammaticality, the availability of an

interpretation and the supporting

context, (13) is doomed to be false in this scenario. This points out that comparing amounts
of diﬀerent stuﬀ, although a natural option for classiﬁer relatives like (11), is not possible with
interpretations of relative clauses.
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Summing up, any theory of ARs should be able to capture these three empirical facts
about

interpretations of relative clauses. I summarize them below.

(14) Desiderata for

interpretations

a. Deﬁniteness: A

interpretations refer to a deﬁnite amount.

b. Indeﬁniteness: The head of the relative clause in interpreted as an indeﬁnite.
c. Identity: A

interpretations require a comparison of two amounts of same

stuﬀ.
A helpful paraphrase to help appreciate the particularities of

interpretations is the

following:
(15) ⟦It would take us years to drink the champagne that they spilled that evening⟧
⇔ ⟦It would take us years to drink champagne in that amount⟧
[where that amount = the amount of champagne that they spilled that evening]
As stated in (14), the relative clause is interpreted as referring to a deﬁnite amount of champagne: the speciﬁc amount of champagne that they spilled that evening. However, the noun
champagne must be interpreted as an indeﬁnite: there is no particular champagne that it
would take us long to drink. Finally, the referred amount must be an amount of champagne,
not of anything else.
1.3.2

But not just

These properties of

s!
interpretations have been known since Carlson’s (1977a,b).

However, he had already noted that the properties in (14) are not unique to amount interpretations. For instance, consider the sentence in (9c), repeated below.
(9c) It will take us the rest of our lives to ﬁnd the champagne they spilled that evening.
On its most salient interpretation, (9c) receives a form of

interpretation. For instance,

it could be that the champagne is diﬃcult to ﬁnd because it is very rare. This is only one of

9

many possible reasons; it could also be that there is a high demand of that particular kind of
champagne, that it is not usually imported to our country, etc.5 All these interpretations have
the same properties of

interpretations described in (14). For one, the sentence does

not refer to a particular champagne, despite being overtly of the form the champagne that….
This is precisely the condition on indeﬁniteness of the head of the relative clause described
in (14). Similarly, the sentence refers to a deﬁnite kind of champagne, the precise kind of
champagne that they spilled that evening. This is, again, fully parallel to the condition on
deﬁniteness described in (14). Finally, notice that we are not at liberty to choose what is the
thing that would take us the rest of our lives to ﬁnd; it must be champagne. This is the same
identity restriction that we observed in (14) for
parallelism between

and

interpretations. To appreciate the

interpretations in full, consider the following equivalent

of the paraphrase in (15).
(16) ⟦It would take us years to ﬁnd the champagne that they spilled that evening⟧
⇔ ⟦It would take us years to ﬁnd champagne of that kind⟧
[where that kind = the kind of champagne that they spilled that evening]
The conclusion to be drawn is clear: we should not take the facts in (14) to be signatures
of

interpretations alone. We have at least two types of interpretations,

s and

s, showing the same type of semantic eﬀects. This state of aﬀairs raises a question: are we justiﬁed in appealing to degree semantics to account for

interpretations?

To my knowledge, this is not a question that has been explicitly addressed in the literature.
Historically, analyses of ARs have simply assumed–largely without discussion–that degree semantics should be invoked, in some form of other, in order to derive

interpretations

of relative clauses. Picking up on Carlson’s idea that the work of extracting an amount should
be done at the CP level, the received view has it that in ARs the embedded CP is a degree
5
Because this type of interpretation goes beyond what we usually think of taxonomic kinds, it is sometimes
referred to as an “extent” interpretation of the noun phrase. I will continue to call it simply a
interpretation
for consistency, but it should be clear that this interpretation is in fact richer than a well-established
.

10

expression, denoting either a set of degrees or a maximalized degree (Heim 1987, von Fintel
1999, Grosu and Landman 1998, 2017, Herdan 2008, Meier 2015).6 That is, according to
this view, the CP in (17) should be treated as a degree predicate. For instance:
(17)

It would take us years to drink the champagne [ that they spilled that evening]
⟦CP⟧ = λd . they spilled d-

champagne that evening

While this is an entirely plausible option, we seem to be missing a generalization, namely, that
and

interpretations share the key semantic properties that make ARs stand out

and behave unlike intersective relative clauses.
1.3.3

A

s without degrees

It was Carlson (1977a,b) who ﬁrst observed that

and

interpretations of rel-

ative clauses go hand in hand. Following his lead, this dissertation presents a uniﬁcation of
these two interpretations. While there have been attempts to unify the semantics of kinds
and degrees/amounts (Anderson and Morzycki 2015, Scontras 2017), here I take a diﬀerent
angle: I argue that

interpretations of relative clauses are a form of

So far we have seen that English allows

interpretation.

interpretations of relative clauses. In this

sense, ARs exist in English. The challenge is to determine whether this

interpreta-

tion requires a dedicated “Amount Construction”, i.e. a construction speciﬁcally designed to
obtain

interpretations. Previous accounts have answered this question in the posi-

tive, by assuming, as in (17) above, that the embedded CP in ARs must be interpreted as a
property of degrees. This dissertation argues against this conclusion by subsuming
interpretations in English under

interpretations. Consequently, (i) there is no degree

abstraction/quantiﬁcation involved, and (ii) whenever a relative clause admits an
terpretation it also necessarily allows a

in-

interpretation.

6

This is usually achieved with the aid of some null measuring predicate
form the literature on comparatives and mesure phrases.
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/

, like the ones familiar

There a number of reasons to believe that such uniﬁcation is not only possible, but desirable. Here I will only mention two; I refer the reader to §2 for further arguments and the
full analysis. First,

interpretations of relative clauses do not necessarily rely on the

presence of a relative clause. That is, provided that we have enough contextual support, the
relative clause might be dropped altogether. The examples in (18) show that both
and

interpretations are possible with nouns modiﬁed by PPs.

(18) A

/K

interpretations with PPs

a. We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers of the Imperial Army.
b. We used to organize a soccer team, but we don’t have the students in the department
anymore.
For instance, the sentence (18a) might refer to the fact that the reason for losing the battle
was that we did not have as many soldiers as the Imperial Army did. This is the
interpretation. Alternatively, it could be that despite having more soldiers than the Imperial
Army, ours are poorly trained, lack motivation, etc. This is the

interpretation. Thus,

we observe that the relationship between the availability of both interpretations is preserved.
More importantly, however, under an account of

interpretations were we rely on

degree operators and degree abstraction at the CP level, the availability of

in (18a) is

left unexplained. Similar interpretations are available with bare DPs as well.
(19) A

/K

interpretations with bare DPs

a. We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers.
b. We used to organize a soccer team, but don’t have the students anymore.
Again, a degree-based analysis has nothing to say about why

interpretations are pos-

sible in (19).
The second argument rests on the fact that

interpretations of relative clauses do

not show the hallmarks of bona ﬁde degree constructions. For instance, the interaction be-
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tween degree operators and negative operators is well known in the literature of comparative constructions (e.g. von Stechow 1984). Under Rullmann’s (1995) popular view, the
ill-formedness of the (20) examples below are attributed to the impossibility of maximalizing
a set of degrees that contain a negative operator in it’s scope.
(20) a. * How many soldiers doesn’t the Imperial Army have?
b. * We have more soldiers than the Imperial Army doesn’t have.
c. * We have as many soldiers as the Imperial Army doesn’t have.
The explanation of this ill-formedness goes as follows: the embedded CPs must be closed by
a maximality operator which, as commonly deﬁned, presupposes a maximal degree among all
the degrees in the set that it ranges over (see deﬁnitions of

in §4.3.2.1 and §5.3.1). In the

absence of such maximal degree, the expression is undeﬁned, resulting in ungrammaticality–
in the sense of Gajewski (2002). That is, in the examples above, there cannot be a maximal
number of soldiers that the Imperial Army did not have, and thus the maximalization of the
set of degrees corresponding to the Imperial army has d-many soldiers is undeﬁned.
These types of island violations, however, do not arise in cases where the extractee denotes
an individual, as with the wh-words which and what.
(21) Which soldiers doesn’t the Imperial Army have?
If we look at relative clauses with
(21) and unlike (20). The

interpretations, we observe that they pattern like
interpretation of (22) states that our soldiers exceeded in

number those of the Imperial Army. (Out of the blue, the

interpretation of (22) is also

available.)
(22) We won the battle because we had the soldiers that the Imperial Army didn’t have.
The problem for degree-based analysis of ARs is obvious: if the burden of extracting an
is located on a degree operator, we would expect ARs to pattern with (20) and not
with (21), contrary to what we observe.
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1.3.4

Conclusion

As I hope was made clear from the above discussion, there are good reasons to believe that
the

interpretations of relative clauses in English should not be analyzed by appealing

to degree semantics. A reductionist approach that subsumes

interpretations under

interpretations looks more promising, as it is able to capture: (i) the inherent vagueness
of these relative clauses (see §1.3.1 and §1.3.2), (ii) the fact that they do not depend on the
presence of a relative clause, and (iii) the fact that they are not subject to the restrictions that
other degree constructions are. Chapter 2 discusses all this in greater detail.

1.4

ARs as degree expressions

Most investigations about ARs in general have focused on English, and the question of
how languages may vary with respect to the distribution and availability of

relative

clauses has seldom arisen. An important part of this dissertation is focused on Spanish and
on its ability to produce relative clauses with

interpretations in environments where

English cannot, and using forms unavailable in English.
1.4.1

A contrast between English and Spanish

The theoretical discussion of ARs began with an exploration of English ARs, and the efforts to derive the availability of English relative clauses to denote
are the conditions under which English relative clauses do not allow

s. More mysterious
interpretations.

For instance, the following sentence in English can only be false.
(23) Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.
Here, the falsity of the sentence hinges on the fact that Pedro could not have written the same
individual books as Tolstoy did. This is an
contrast, an

(intersective) interpretation of (23). In

interpretation would be perfectly sensible. For reasons that are not well-

understood, however, (23) cannot express that Pedro has written as many books as Tolstoy.
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This restriction is useful because it reveals a surprising contrast with the same sentence in
Spanish. Consider:
(24) Pedro ha
Pedro

escrito los libros que Tolstoy escribió.
written the books that Tolstoy wrote

‘Pedro has written as many books as Tolstoy wrote’
Unlike with its English counterpart, in (24) the

interpretation is perfectly natural, and

it can be used out of the blue to express that Pedro wrote as many books as Tolstoy. This state
of aﬀairs raises questions about cross-linguistic variation in the availability of

inter-

pretations: what is the source of the contrast between (23) and (24)? The following are two
more examples where the English variants are false, signaling that the

interpretations

are not available.
(25) [Context: The same number of friends attended both our birthday parties, but they were
diﬀerent friends.]
a. The friends that came to your party came to my party.

F

b. A mi ﬁesta vinieron los amigos que vinieron a la tuya.

T

to my party came

the friends that came

to the yours

‘The number of friends that came to your party came to my party’
(26) [Context: There were 3 books on the table, and I read 3 books from the shelf.]
a. I read the books that there were on the table.

F

b. He leído los libros que había en la mesa

T

read the books that were on the table
‘I read the amount of books that there were on the table’
In this dissertation, I argue that the source of the diﬀerent availability between the two languages is the diﬀerent strategies they employ to generate
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interpretations. While in

English relative clauses can only express

s via

interpretations, Spanish does pos-

sess a dedicated Amount Construction whose exclusive role is to provide

interpreta-

tions.
Evidence for the presence of a dedicated Amount Constructions in Spanish rests on data of
the sort discussed above and others. As will be demonstrated shortly, none of the arguments
I provided in §1.3 in support of a degree-less analysis of English ARs hold for these Spanish
examples. The conclusion, therefore, is that English ARs and their Spanish counterparts are
constructed in fundamentally diﬀerent ways.
1.4.1.1

No dependency on

Section 1.3 showed that

interpretations
and

interpretations of relative clauses go hand in

hand. In the Spanish examples above, however, this is not the case. For example, (24),
repeated below, only the (false)

interpretation and the more sensible

interpre-

tation.
(24) Pedro ha
Pedro

escrito los libros que Tolstoy escribió.
written the books that Tolstoy wrote

↝ ‘Pedro has written as many books as that Tolstoy wrote’
↝̸ ‘Pedro has written the same kind of books that Tolstoy wrote’
Thus, the sentence cannot mean, for instance, that, like Tolstoy, Pedro also wrote novels,
novellas and plays but not biographies, or that Pedro also wrote Russian novels, or novels that
were as long as Tolstoy’s. The same is true of (26):
(26) He leído los libros que había en la mesa.
read the books that were on the table
↝ ‘I read the amount of books that there were on the table’
↝̸ ‘I read the kind of books that there were on the table’
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1.4.1.2

Obligatoriness of the relative clause

The Spanish examples also contrast with English in that the relative clause is obligatory:
it cannot be dropped or substituted by a PP (cf. (18) and (19)). When the relative clause
is dropped, both the

and the

interpretations disappear, and only the

interpretation of the NP is available.
(27) Pedro ha
Pedro

escrito los libros ( de Tolstoy ).
written the books

of Tosltoy

↝ ‘Pedro has written some particular books.’
↝̸ ‘Pedro has written some amount of books .’
(28) He leído los libros ( de la mesa ).
read the books

of the table

↝ ‘I read some particular books’
↝̸ ‘I read some amount of books’
Thus, the Spanish examples contrast with the English facts discussed in §1.3.3 above, where
interpretations were accessible also in the absence of a relative clause.
1.4.1.3

Obeys restrictions on islands

The ﬁnal datapoint to suggest that the Spanish examples at hand truly involve degree operators comes from island-sensitivity. As in the case of English (see §1.3.3), negative operators
embedded inside degree constructions, like how many questions, comparatives and equatives,
result in an island-violation in Spanish. This is shown in (29),
(29) a. * Cuántos

libros no has escrito?

how many books not

written

‘How many books you have not written?’

17

b. * Pedro escribió más libros que Tolstoy no escribió.
Pedro wrote

more books that Tolstoy not wrote

‘Pedro wrote more books than Tolsoty didn’t write’
c. * Pedro escribió tantos libros como Tolstoy no escribió.
Pedro wrote

many books as

Tolstoy not wrote

‘Pedro wrote as many books as Tolstoy didn’t write’
Again, Spanish patterns with English in that these island violations do not arise in cases where
the extractee denotes an individual. For instance, (30) is a sensible question that one may
ask to George R.R. Martin about his saga A song of ice and ﬁre (whose culmination seems
uncertain as of 2017).
(30) Qué libros no has escrito?
what books not

written

‘What books have you not written?’
The diﬀerence, however, is these Spanish ARs are sensitive to negative islands: in (31), the
variant of (24) with the crucial diﬀerence that the embedded CP contains a negative operator,
the

interpretation is unavailable (the

interpretation unsurprisingly remains).

(31) Pedro escribió los libros que Tolstoy no escribió.
Pedro wrote

the books that Tolstoy not wrote

↝ ‘Pedro wrote some particular books that Tolstoy didn’t write’
↝̸ ‘Pedro wrote an amount of books that Tolstoy didn’t write’
The conclusion that I extract from these diﬀerent behavior of

relative clauses in

English and Spanish is that they involve two diﬀerent types of derivations. In particular, I
suggest the following:
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(32) Available strategies to generate

interpretations by language

via

via degrees

Spanish

3

3

English

3

8

Notice that nothing precludes Spanish from deriving

interpretations via

English does. This is a welcome result: if a relative clause allows a
the properties observed for English
(33) A

/K

s, as

intepretation, then

interpretations hold of Spanish as well:

vagueness

a. The Imperial Army has some soldiers that are {good/big/well trained} and although
we have more soldiers, they always win.
b. Perdimos la batalla porque no teníamos los soldados que tenía la Armada
lost

the battle because not have

the soldiers that had the Army

Imperial.
Imperial
‘We lost the ﬁght because we didn’t have the kind of soldiers that the Imperial Army
had’
(34) No relative clause
a. PP modiﬁer
Perdimos la
lost

batalla porque no teníamos los soldados de la

the battle because not have

Armada

the soldiers of the Army

Imperial.
Imperial
‘We lost the ﬁght because we didn’t have the amount of soldiers of the Imperial
Army’
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b. Bare DP
Perdimos la batalla porque no teníamos los soldados.
lost

the battle because not have

the soldiers.

‘We lost the ﬁght because we didn’t have the amount of soldiers’
(35) No islands
a. Ganamos la batalla porque teníamos los soldados que no tenía la Armada
won

the battle because have

the soldiers that not had the Army

Imperial.
Imperial.
‘We won the battlw because we had the amount of soldiers that the Imperial Army
didn’t have’
Thus, it is only by looking at cases where (i)
fore, (ii) do not allow

interpretations are not available and, there-

interpretations in English, that we can identify the Spanish

cases that showcase the true dedicated Amount Construction.
1.4.2

More ARs in Spanish

In this section I introduce the full family of ARs in Spanish. In this language, not only
are ARs more readily available than in English, we also ﬁnd them in more environments and
in diﬀerent forms than in English. The richness of the AR constructions in Spanish provides
further support to the idea that Spanish has dedicated machinery for extracting

s in

relative clause constructions.
1.4.2.1

Nominal ARs

So far, we have only considered ARs with

interpretations that appear in positions

typically occupied by (entity-denoting) arguments. For this reason, I will refer to them as
“Nominal ARs”. The distinguishing property of Spanish, as we have observed in the previous
section, is that it shows a greater degree of freedom in the construction of nominal ARs, and
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allows them in environments where they seem to be impossible in English (see the contrasts
in §1.4.1).
Furthermore, Spanish nominal ARs are semantically parallel to their counterparts with
wh-pronouns. Spanish has the ability to form quantity free relatives, which are not crosslinguistically very common. Quantity free relatives are free relatives formed with the quantity
relative pronoun cuanto (“how many”).
(36) a. He visto cuantos

pájaros has visto tú.

aux seen how many.
b. Pedro ha
Pedro

.

birds

seen you

escrito cuantos

libros escribió Tolstoy.

written how many.

.

books wrote

Tolstoy

Nominal ARs in Spanish are the object of Chapter 3.
1.4.2.2

Propositional ARs

In Spanish ARs can appear as complements to wh-embedding predicates, predicates that
typically select for either interrogative or exclamative complements. I refer to this type of
ARs as “Propositional ARs”. The interest of propositional ARs lies in the fact that they seem
to be DPs that are selected for by predicates that usually select interrogative complements,
like wonder. In cases of predicates like know, propositional ARs are grammatical even when
the corresponding bare DP is not.
(37) a.

Me

pregunto las

I.

ask

the.

manzanas que trajo
.

apples

Pedro.

that brought Pedro

‘I wonder how many apples Pedro brought’
b.

Sé

las

know the.

manzanas (* que trajo
.

apples

Pedro ).

that brought Pedro

‘I know how many apples Pedro brought’
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Semantically, the sentences in (37) have an interpretation that is equivalent to a subordinate
question with the wh-pronoun how many.7
(38) a.

Me

pregunto cuántas

manzanas trajo

I.

wonder how many.

.

apples

Pedro.

brought Pedro

‘I wonder how many apples Pedro brought’
b.

Sé

cuántas

know how many.

manzanas trajo
.

apples

Pedro

brought Pedro

‘I know how many apples Pedro brought’
Propositional ARs are thus similar to the ARs discussed in the literature in being about an
amount rather than about an individual. But the syntactic distribution of the ARs in English
is radically diﬀerent; unlike the counterparts of (38), the English variants of (37) are either
ungrammatical or lack an
(39) a.
b.

interpretation.

I wonder {*the apples that / how many apples} Pedro brought.
I know {#the apples that / how many apples} Pedro brought.

Chapter 4 discusses these constructions at length.
1.4.2.3

Degree Neuter Relatives

The last construction of Spanish considered in this dissertation are the so-called Degree
Neuter Relatives. These are relative clauses headed by a gradable predicate and the form lo
(translated here as the deﬁnite determiner the; see footnote 1 in Chapter 5).
(40) a. Jose admiró lo alto
Jose admired the tall.

que es el ediﬁcio.
.

that is the building.

‘Jose admired how tall the building is’

7

But this is not the only interpretation; see Chapter 4 for full discussion.
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.

b. Jose no entendió

lo hermosa

que era la novela

Jose not understood the beautiful.

.

that was the novel.

.

‘Jose did not undestand how beautiful the novel was’
Intuitively, the examples in (40) are not about amounts, but about degrees or extents.8 These
relative clauses also have counterparts with wh-pronouns that are semantically equivalent.
(41) a. Jose admiró cuán alto
Jose admired how tall.
b. Jose no entendió

es el ediﬁcio.
.

is the building.

cuán hermosa

Jose not understood how beautiful.

.

era la novela
.

was the novel.

.

In Chapter 5 I argue that Degree Neuter Relatives are in fact a subtype of AR.
1.4.3

The analytical puzzle

Identifying the locus of the diﬀerence between English-like and Spanish-like languages
is only the beginning. If we concede, following previous accounts of English ARs, that the
embedded CP is interpreted as a property of degrees, the question arises as to how to continue
from the CP level on. If the CP is degree-denoting, the CP and the head-noun cannot be
analyzed in terms of intersective properties: the denotations of the CPs (type ⟨dt⟩) and the
head noun (type ⟨et⟩) are sortally mismatched, and so their intersection should be empty. The
more pressing issue we face is whether the corresponding DP (e.g. the books that Tolstoy
wrote) should be taken to denote an individual (of type e) or a degree (of type d). Both routes
have been explored in the literature, and so I brieﬂy comment on each of them below.9
8

Sometimes I will refer to sentences like (40) as having
interpretations rather than
interpretations. This is done for clarity alone; after all, in the degree semantics assumed in this dissertation, amounts
are but one of many degree expressions.
9

To be sure, these problems have been discussed in the literature in the context of English ARs. In my view,
however, this puzzle only arises in Spanish; see §1.3.3.
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1.4.3.1

ARs denote individuals

The ﬁrst option involves developing a structure where the head of the relative clause is
interpreted twice, inside and outside the relative clause. Take (24) again.
(24) Pedro ha

escrito los libros que Tolstoy escribió.

Pedro

written the books that wrote

Tolstoy

‘Pedro has written the amount of books that Tolstoy wrote.’
In order to express the

interpretation of (24), we cannot simply appeal to a single

instance of the noun books in the logical form, because the books that Pedro wrote and the
books that Tolstoy wrote are not the same. One way around this is to adopt a matching structure for the relative clause (see Bhatt 2002, Sauerland 2004, Hulsey and Sauerland 2006).10
For instance:
(42) Logical Form of e-denoting ARs
match

[ the [

1

d-

books [ [

2

books ]j [ that Tolstoy wrote tj ]]]]

d-

Consider now the interpretation of NP1:
(43) Interpretation of NP1 in (42)
λy . books(y) ∧ ∣y∣ =

(λd . ∃x[books(x) ∧ Tolstoy-wrote(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d])

The biggest issue, from a semantic standpoint, is that the deﬁnite determiner cannot be interpreted. Were we to close the lambda abstract in (43) with an iota or epsilon operator–common
denotations assumed for the deﬁnite determiner in Spanish–the resulting expression would
denote a deﬁnite description entailing the existence of the books x, such that x is equal in
cardinality to the number of books y that Tolstoy wrote. That this is problematic is easier to
see with a slight variant of (24) above:

10

The presentation here is an amalgam of ideas present in Carlson (1977a), Heim (1987) and von Fintel
(1999).
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(24) Pedro escribirá los libros que Tolstoy escribió.
Pedro write.

the books that wrote

Tolstoy

‘Pedro will write the amount of books that Tolstoy wrote’
Here the books x equal in number to the books y that Tolstoy wrote need not exist; in fact,
they should not exist, since this is not what

interpretations are about. Moreover, there

is no one single deﬁnite plurality of books x that Pedro will write: for the sentence to be true
all it is required is that he writes any books in an amount equal to those written by Tolstoy,
not just the particular books x. Diﬀerent variants of this approach all lead to the same issue:
if the ﬁnal denotation of the AR is to be an individual and not a degree, the deﬁnite article
cannot be interpreted. But, of course, this is quite mysterious given the fact that ARs require
the deﬁnite article (see (7) above).
1.4.3.2

ARs denote degrees

The second option involves a derivation on which the full DP denotes a degree (Grosu and
Landman 1998, Scontras 2017). Consider the syntactic structure below, in this case involving
a raising analysis of relative clauses (e.g. Kayne 1994; Bianchi 1999 a.o.).
(44) Logical Form of d-denoting ARs
[ the [ books ]j [ [ d-

tj ]i that Tolstoy wrote ti ]]]

In this case, we can interpret the deﬁnite determiner: it simply returns the greatest degree d
such that Tolstoy wrote d-many books.
(45) Interpretation of the DP in (44)
⟦ ⟧=

(λd . ∃x[books(x) ∧ Tolstoy-wrote(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d])

The issue now is that we have to resolve the sortal mismatch between the resulting d-type
object and verbs taking e-type arguments. As an illustration, I will describe the solution
provided Grosu and Landman (1998) (for a diﬀerent solution, see Scontras 2017). In essence,
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the authors propose to reevaluate our conception of degrees. They suggest that degrees should
not consist of particulars, but as bundles of information keeping track of what degrees are
degrees of. They suggest that degrees are functions that take a plural individual X and map
X to a tuple consisting of (i) a cardinality corresponding to X, (ii) a sortal predicate P that
corresponds to what the degree is a degree of, and (iii) the plural individual X.
(46) Structured degrees in Grosu and Landman (1998)
For all plural individuals X:

P (X)

= ⟨∣X∣, P, X⟩

Thus, under this conception, degrees are used to store information about the entity they are
measuring. This allows the authors to deﬁne a function that “extracts” individuals from a
degree denoting expression whenever necessary.
(

(47)

(CP)) = {x ∶ ⟨∣x∣, P, x⟩ ∈

The operator

(CP)}

is deﬁned so that given a degree triple, it returns its third coordinate,

the maximal individual. Applying

to the meaning obtained in (45), we obtain

a type e element, thus resolving the sortal mismatch and making it possible for the AR to
combine with regular verbal predicates. Grosu and Landman (1998) develop this analysis as
a general theory of relativization in natural languages. Thus,
derives the ordinary

is designed so that it

(intersective) interpretation of relative clauses.

The issue in this case is that we cannot have our cake and eat it too: the desired
interpretation rests on not applying

, but if so the semantic sortal mismatch is left

unresolved. If, instead, we apply

, we solve the sortal mismatch by providing an

e-type denotation to the relative clause, but at the expense of losing the
for an

interpretation. The conundrum is that we need to apply

interpretation
(for solving

the sortal mismatch) but at the same time we cannot apply it (for thus we would loose the
interpretation).
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In sum, the analytical puzzles that we face have to do with the division of labor among
the diﬀerent pieces that participate in

interpretations of relative clauses. The for-

mal diﬃculties in accounting for the three main properties of

interpretations in (14)

above–deﬁniteness of a degree, indeﬁniteness of the nominal in head position and identity–are
reﬂective of a more general question: do relative clauses with

interpretations denote

individuals or degrees? The answer in this dissertation is that the underlying semantic nature
of these ARs is language–or construction–dependent. Thus, two solutions are oﬀered: the
ﬁrst, which accounts for the English ARs discussed here, is the object of Chapter 2. The
second solution, based oﬀ of (certain) Spanish ARs, is oﬀered in Chapters 4, 3 and 5.

1.5
1.5.1

Overview of the dissertation
Main claims

The main contribution of this dissertation is to demonstrate that natural language allows
for at least two diﬀerent means of conveying

interpretations with relative clauses.

Languages like Spanish make use of dedicated Amount Constructions, whereas those like
English, lacking such constructions, arrive at

readings via a more general

read-

ing. A secondary goal is to address non-uniformity within a single language. I will argue that
all three Spanish constructions in §1.4.2 are related and constitute minimal variations over
a natural class of relative clauses. Speciﬁcally, all are genuine degree constructions, which
involve syntactic and interpretive means ear-marked for constructing degree or amount expressions.
As it was pointed out earlier, previous research considered ARs only through the lens of
degree semantics. In this respect, this dissertation makes two new contributions. First, it
provides a new solution to the analytical puzzle described in (1.4.3). Second, it shows that
taking ARs to be degree expressions is a language and construction dependent consideration,
and it does not apply to all

interpretations we may encounter across the board. That
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is to say that, although previous research was right in pointing to degree-based analyses of
interpretations, these should apply to languages like Spanish, but not English.
1.5.2

Summary of chapters

• Chapter 2 In this chapter I oﬀer a new perspective on

interpretations of rel-

ative clauses in English that does not appeal to degree semantics. I defend the idea
that in English

interpretations are in fact a sub-case of a more general

interpretation. I show that such an analysis is desirable for two reasons: (i) to account
for the fact that whenever an

reading is available, so is a

reading, and

(ii) to account for the fact that these constructions do not show any of the hallmarks of
ordinary degree constructions.
• Chapter 3 This chapter and subsequent ones discuss Spanish. In this chapter, the goal
is to show that Spanish truly possesses a mechanism to deliver amounts that is absent
in English. The source of the diﬀerence between the two languages lies in the ability
of Spanish to construct relative clauses that denote deﬁnite descriptions of degrees (or
maximimalized sets of degrees), that can in turn be used to build Measure Phrases.
• Chapter 4 This chapter turns to propositional ARs. It is argued that these constructions have the external distribution and show syntactic properties of wh-constructions,
like subordinate questions and exclamatives. I defend a syntactic analysis that accounts
for the “hybrid” nature of these propositional relatives by treating them as involving an
interrogative core and a nominal functional layer above this interrogative CP. This syntactic proposal is supplemented by a compositional semantic analysis of the structure.
The structure of these propositional ARs diﬀers only minimally from those of nominal
ARs, making the two constructions related in ways reminiscent of the more familiar
parallels between interrogatives and free relatives.
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• Chapter 5 The last chapter provides an analysis of Degree Neuter Relatives as a kind
of ARs, and show that they, too, come in two varieties. The analyses proposed for
propositional and nominal ARs in the previous chapters is shown to extend straightforwardly to account for Degree Neuter Relatives in the two environments in which we
ﬁnd them.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ROAD TO AMOUNTS THROUGH KINDS

Previous analyses of ARs, in some way or other, have looked at this construction through
the lens of degree semantics. The goal of this chapter is to present an analysis of these constructions that does not appeal to degree semantics. Instead, I will defend an analysis of
so-called ARs in English where they are understood as a sub-case of a more general
interpretation. I show that such an analysis is desirable for two reasons: (i) to account for the
fact that whenever an

reading is available, so is a

reading, and (ii) to account

for the fact that these constructions do not show any of the hallmarks of bona ﬁde degree
constructions. Thus, the defended analysis is not only more parsimonious, but it is also empirically more adequate.

2.1

A new perspective

Though the theoretical discussion of ARs began with an exploration of English ARs, English relative clauses are much more restricted in when they allow

readings. As it

was pointed out in the introduction (see §1.4.2), besides disallowing

interpretations

in embedded positions altogether, English speakers do not readily access

readings

in many unembedded environments, either. But, in any case, we are tasked with providing
an explanation for the fact that English relatives can give rise to

interpretations in

at least some cases. How do these come about? This chapter oﬀers a novel perspective on
this problem and on ARs generally, where they are not “ARs” in the technical sense at all
(i.e. they do not appeal to degree semantics; Heim 1987, von Fintel 1999, etc.). Rather, they
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involve a kind-referring head noun and a relative clause that identiﬁes some relevant property
possessed by the kind, which may very well be “being of a certain amount or quantity”.
Though the author did not discuss it in much detail, Carlson (1977a) had already observed
that relative clauses that have

interpretations in English also have

readings. My

goal is to pursue a uniﬁcation of these two readings. While there have been attempts to
unify the semantics of kinds and degrees/amounts (Anderson and Morzycki 2015, Scontras
2017), the hypothesis that I am exploring takes this reductionist agenda further:
interpretations of ARs are a form of kind interpretation. Consequently, whenever a relative
clause admits an

interpretation it also necessarily allows a

interpretation. This

hypothesis is spelled by the following generalization.1
(1) The

⊆

generalization:

Amount interpretations of relative clauses are parasitic on kind readings.
The general intuition is, in a nutshell, that

readings of relative clauses highlight some

relevant property that holds of the referent of the relative clause, which may well be about an
amount.
(2) a. It would take us years to drink the champagne that we spilled last night.
↝ It would take us years to drink champagne with some relevant property of the
champagne we spilled last night
b. the champagne that we spilled last night ↭ champagne with property P
[where “the champagne that we spilled last night” is a realization of P]
For the moment, interpret the squiggly double arrow “↭” in (2b) as “somehow conveys”.
The absence of the deﬁnite article in the paraphrase is intentional:

interpretations

of ARs have existential import, as we will see shortly (see Scontras 2017). For the moment
1

It is important not interpret this relation as a biconditional; it may very well be that sometimes only kind
readings are be possible. Why this should be the case is a question that I leave open for future research.
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what counts as the relevant property P is left unspeciﬁed, it can be any property, including
both gradable properties like be d-dry as well as non-gradable properties, like be produced in
Alsace.
To show that in English

interpretations of relative clauses are in fact

pretations I build the argument in three steps. First I show that

inter-

readings and

interpretations share a number of properties. Then I show that these commonalities extend to
the behavior of the nouns kind and amount as well. Finally I show that so-called ARs are not
subject to the same constraints that aﬀect other run-of-the-mill degree constructions.

2.2

The

-

connection

Carlson (1977a,b) originally observed that there seems to be a connection between
and

interpretations. In short, he noted that relative clauses with

tions in English may also have

interpreta-

interpretations. The preference in the literature to use

degree semantics to analyze ARs has somewhat hidden this connection, however.2 Thus, in
what follows I provide a number of observations supporting the similarities between
and

interpretations.

2.2.1

Context dependency

Generally, a sentence that gives rise to an

interpretation can also have a

reading. Contextual and lexical factors can favor one reading or other, either by manipulating
the context or by small changes in the sentence (e.g. picking lexical verbs that favor one
reading for independent world-knowledge related reasons). Consider:
(3) Context manipulation
a. We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers that the Imperial Army had.
2
In recent work, Anderson and Morzycki (2015) and Scontras (2017) have provided new conceptions of
degrees that bring them closer to kinds. While this may be a good thing at the end of the day, my goal here is
simply to show that we can reduce
interpretations to
s without having to worry about the ontology
of degrees.
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b. A

:

We are ﬁghting against the Imperial Army, who have a massive army, and they always
bring many more soldiers than we do to the battleﬁeld.
c. K

:

The Imperial Army has some soldiers that are {good/big/well trained} and although
we have more soldiers, they always win.
The context in (3b) facilitates the

interpretation of (3a). But (3a) is felicitous and

true if it were uttered in a context like (3c). In this case, what the sentence conveys is not that
the Imperial Army possessed more soldiers than us, but that they did possess soldiers with
some other relevant quality.
Herdan (2008), a defender of the degree abstraction approach, explicitly argues against
this extreme context dependency. She points out that adjusting the context is not always
suﬃcient to switch from an

to a

reading. The evidence she presents is reported

below.
(4) Last night I was in my cellar deciding which of the many ﬁne wines to drink. In the end,
I drank in one hour the wine that Marv can drink in one day.
↝̸ I drank in one hour as ﬁne a wine as Marv can drink in one day.
The underlined sentence contains a relative clause that cannot be true of diﬀerent degrees of
wine quality. This much is true. The context provided by the author, however, is not very
conductive to a non-

interpretation. Notice that the combination of a verb like drink

with temporal PPs suggests quite strongly a how much you can drink in x time type of reading. Thus, by “context” we cannot mean simply “linguistic context”, for merely mentioning a
possible property that the champagne may have had does not suﬃce to arrive at the relevant
interpretation. Instead, the role of the contextual manipulation must be to add plausibility
to the intended interpretation. Moreover, since it is context-dependency that is a stake, what
we have to show is that the relevant reading is present in those contexts that do facilitate it.
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Showing that there are contexts where the relevant interpretation is absent teaches us little
about the distribution of

interpretations with relative clauses. With these consider-

ations in mind, let us give another try to examples similar to (4). Below are two examples
where the

, quality-oriented reading of the relative clause is possible even with temporal

modiﬁers. Take a chess problem solving contest, where what matters is the diﬃculty of the
problems and the time it takes to solve them. In this situation, (5a) reports that I could not
solve in one hour problems as diﬃcult as the one that Marv solved in just 30 minutes. Similar
observations hold of (5b) as well.
(5) a. I didn’t solve in one hour the chess problems that Marv solved in 30’.
b. I couldn’t run in one hour the trails that Marv runs in 30’.
In addition to simple contextual manipulations, lexical changes can also ﬂip the bias towards one or other interpretation. Thus, from Heim’s (1987) classical example, Anderson
and Morzycki (2015) give us (6a), where the

interpretation is much more salient.

(6) Lexical manipulation
a. K

:

It will take us the rest of our lives to ﬁnd the champagne that they had that evening
b. A

:

It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne that they had that evening.
Here again the source of the diﬀerence in accessibility of the two readings also comes down
to plausibility. Whereas drinking a particular kind of champagne is not obviously a task of
considerable diﬃculty, ﬁnding a particular kind–if it were rare enough–may be.
2.2.2
A

A

interpretations without relative clauses
interpretations, just like

interpretations, do not necessarily rely on the pres-

ence of a relative clause. That is, provided that we have enough contextual support, the relative

34

clause might be dropped altogether. The examples in (7) show that both

and

interpretations are possible with nouns modiﬁed by PPs.
(7) A

/K

interpretations with PPs

a. We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers of the Imperial Army.
b. We used to organize a soccer team, but we don’t have the students in the department
anymore.
For instance, the sentence (7b) might refer to the fact that in the department we do not have
enough students to set up a team anymore, or it could be that the students we have are not
willing to participate. Similar interpretations are available for (8b) as well, with bare DPs.
(8) A

/K

interpretations with bare DPs

a. We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers.
b. We used to organize a soccer team, but don’t have the students anymore.
While the availability of
presence of

interpretations might not come as a surprise in these cases, the

interpretations is puzzling from a perspective where they require a degree

variable originating in a subordinate position.
2.2.3
K

The role of the deﬁnite article
and

interpretations are also related by the fact that they involve deﬁnite

articles that fail to do their usual job. Notice that neither sentence in (9) is about some deﬁnite
object-level champagne. That is, when we are talking about kinds of champagne or about
amounts of champagne, we are not referring to any particular instance of champagne.
(9) a. K
b. A

: …to ﬁnd (*the) [champagne of the kind that we spilled last night]
: …to drink (*the) [champagne in the amount that we spilled last night]

What these sentences convey is an existential statement, namely, that there is some champagne of some kind or in some amount such that we spilled that kind/amount of champagne.
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The deﬁniteness is therefore not about the champagne, but about a kind or an amount. The
following paraphrases are more explicit about this.
(10) a. K

: …to ﬁnd the kind of champagne of that we spilled.

b. A
(11) a. K

: …to drink the amount of champagne that we spilled.
: …to ﬁnd that kind.

b. A

: …to drink that amount of champagne.

This type of interpretation seems to be a particularity of the deﬁnite article. In fact, as Carlson
(1977a) and Grosu and Landman (1998) noted, the deﬁnite article seems to be necessary in
all these examples.
(12) a. K

:

It will take us the rest of our lives to ﬁnd {the / *a / *some / *few / *two} champagne
that there was at the party that evening.
b. A

:

It will take us the rest of our lives to drink {the / *a / *some / *few / *two} champagne that there was at the party that evening.
In addition, these readings are generally incompatible with the complementizer which, as
demonstrated by (13).
(13) a. K

:

It will take us the rest of our lives to ﬁnd the champagne {that / ∅ / *which} there
was at the party.
b. A

:

It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne {that / ∅ / *which} there
was at the party.
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2.2.4

A connection with exclamatives

Relative clauses are not the only construction where it is possible to get both

and

interpretations: it is also present in nominal exclamatives, which are superﬁcially
identical to restrictive relative clauses. This is true of matrix as well as subordinate exclamatives.
(14) a. It’s amazing the cars he owns.
b. The cars he owns!
(15) a. K

: what’s remarkable/surprising is the kinds of cars he owns.

b. A

: what’s remarkable/surprising is how many cars he owns.

For completeness, notice that the same syntactic constraints we saw above with relative clauses
apply to these exclamatives.
(16) a. * It’s amazing {some / few / many} cars he owns!
b. * {Some / Few / Many} cars he owns!
(17) a. * It’s amazing the cars {that / ∅ / #which} he owns!
b. * The cars {that / ∅ / #which} he owns!

2.2.5

Wrap-up

The similarities between

and

interpretations of relative clauses suggest that

a satisfactory analysis should be able to account for the observed correspondence between the
availability of the two types of interpretation. It is a more parsimonious perspective and we
would otherwise lose a robust generalization.3 The next step is to explore some corollaries of
3

Bear in mind that one could still maintain that only the
reading requires a special treatment, and the
rest of the readings are just interpretations allowed by the deﬁnite article. The fact that
interpretations
require the deﬁnite article makes this claim hard to disprove, and I will not consider it.
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the generalization in (1). First, if
no relative clause that permits
Second, if

readings are really parasitic on

interpretations,

readings should do so to the exclusion of a

interpretations are reducible to

reading.

interpretations in some capacity, we

should not be surprised to observe similarities in the behavior of the nouns kind and amount.
And third, since

readings do not involve degree abstraction and are not subject to the same

syntactic and semantic restrictions that degree constructions are, it is predicted that relative
clauses with

interpretations do not show any of the hallmarks of degree abstraction.

I examine these questions in turn.

2.3
If

Distribution of the nouns amount and kind
and

readings of relative clauses are related in any way, we should not be

surprised to ﬁnd similarities between the semantic behavior of the nouns kind and amount
when they appear in constructions like the kind/amount of. Below I provide six arguments in
favor of this connection.
Argument 1

Both nouns only allow existential readings when they appear with demonstra-

tive pronouns like this and that. The examples below show that both nouns are unable to refer
to particular objects (but see Scontras 2017 for a contrary opinion about amount and footnote
5 for discussion).
(18) I want [that amount of apples].
a. 8O
b. 3A

: I want [those apples there (pointing at them)]
: I want [apples in the indicated amount]

(19) I want [that kind of apples].
a. 8O
b. 3K

: I want [those apples there (pointing at them)]
: I want [apples of the indicated kind]

38

Argument 2

Both nouns impose constraints on how they refer to kinds (Carlson 1977a,

p.212). For example, the noun kind can be used to talk about diﬀerent subkinds, as in two
kinds of dogs, which refers to two diﬀerent subkinds of dogs, like bull-dogs and beagles.
However, when used this way (typically as the restrictor of some quantiﬁer), kind can only
refer to subkinds whose realizations are disjoint. As an example, consider (20) below. Fido
is a border collie (a kind of dog) and a watch-dog (another kind of dog). And yet (20) cannot
be used to describe a situation as in (20b) where only Fido is sitting in the next room, despite
the fact that Fido instantiates both subkinds in the real world. From this Carlson concludes
that using the noun kind to quantify or count subkinds requires that the objects that instantiate
these subkinds be disjoint.
(20) Two kinds of dogs are sitting in the next room.
a. 3There are three bull-dogs and two beagles.
b. 8There is only Fido, who is a border collie and a watch-dog.
Similar observations hold of nouns like amount and quantity (see Scontras 2017 as well).
Some speakers accept expressions like amounts of apples–or perhaps quantities of apples–in
(21) to mean that there are two diﬀerent quantities of apples on the table, e.g., one weighing
two kilos and another one weighing four. However, take a situation now where there is a single
pile of apples whose amount has been determined by weight (three kilos of apples) and by
numbering the apples (twelve apples). Just like in (20) above, (21) cannot be used to refer
to these two these two amounts (three kilos and twelve in number), even though the pile of
apples on the table is both an amount of three kilos of apples and an amount of twelve apples.
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(21) There are two { ?amounts / quantities } of apples on the table.
a. 3There are two piles of apples.

[only for some speakers]

b. 8There is one pile of 12 apples weighting 3 kilos.
We can attribute the infelicity of this sentence in a situation like (21b) to the same reason
that Carlson proposed for (20) above: when we reference to amounts, each object can only be
counted/measured once.
Argument 3

Carlson (1977b) noted that pseudo-partitive constructions with measure nouns

have the ability to relativize, be questioned and pronominalize. The following are his examples:
(22) Pseudo-partitives
a. Those are the beans that Bob ate three {pounds / bags} of.
b. What did Bill see two {pounds / bags} of?
c. Bob saw three {pounds / bags} of {them / it} yesterday.
The nouns kind and amount can also be used to form kind- and amount-referring expressions in a similar syntactic frame as pseudo-partitives. However, as Carlson (1977b, p.341)
showed, kind of constructions diﬀer from examples like (22) in their ability to allow these
three syntactic operations.
(23) Kind nouns
a. ?? Those are the beans that Bob ate three kinds of.
b. ??What did Bill see two kinds of?
c. ?? Bob saw three kinds of {them / it} yesterday.
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Amount of constructions show the same patterns as kind of constructions in disallowing these
operations (Scontras 2017).4
(24) Amount nouns
a. ?? Those are the beans that Bob ate three {amounts/quantities} of.
b. ??What did Bill see two {amounts/quantities} of?
c. ?? Bob saw three {amounts/quantities} of {them / it} yesterday.
Argument 4

The two nouns behave alike in contexts that typically induce Deﬁniteness

Eﬀects. As originally pointed out by Milsark (1974), there-be existential constructions in
English seem to be reserved for indeﬁnites, bare plurals and other weak DPs. But unlike
ordinary deﬁnite DPs, deﬁnites with the nouns kind and amount are allowed in this position.
(25) a. * There are those {books / apples} in the library.
b. There are {books / apples} in the library.
(26) a. There are those kinds of books in the library.
b. There is that amount of apples in the kitchen.
Argument 5

Both nouns are possible in superﬁcially transitive and intransitive forms, with

no apparent shift in meaning (Wilkinson 1995); compare to other pseudo-partitives in (29).
4

Barbara Partee (pc.) notes that the implausibility of (23) and (24), at least with respect to their ability to
relativize and be questioned, might not be a formal anomaly. For instance, the following are much improved:
(i)

a. Which beverages does that place have the most kind of?
b. What did he order small quantities of?

(ii) a. That’s the beverage that the store has three kinds of.
b. That’s the whiskey that she ordered small quantities of.
(iii) He ordered small quantities/amounts of it/them every week.
It could be, then, that the apparent ungrammaticality of these constructions is simply a reﬂection of the diﬃculty
to ﬁnd appropriate contexts for them.
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(27) a. That kind of animal is sitting on my lawn.
b. An animal of that kind is sitting on my lawn.
(28) a. That amount of water is too much.
b. Water in that amount is too much.
(29) a.

Those { bags / ?pounds } of potatoes are too much.

b. * Potatoes in those { bags / pounds } are too much.
Argument 6

Another aspect where amount and kind nouns behave like indeﬁnites is re-

vealed by adverbs of quantiﬁcation. Below both sentences in (30) are interpreted as involving
quantiﬁcation over times/situations.
(30) a. Equations of that kind rarely have two diﬀerent solutions.
b. An equation of that kind rarely has two diﬀerent solutions.
Wilkinson (1995) observes that the same is true of the intransitive variant of the noun kind.
Despite being headed by a deﬁnite determiner, a demonstrative, (31) below has an identical
interpretation to (30a) and (30b).
(31)

That kind of equation rarely has two diﬀerent solutions.

As we have observed throughout this section, amount patterns once again like kind (Scontras
2014, 133), and both sentences below are interpreted alike.
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(32) a. That amount of apples rarely busts the bags.
b. Apples in that amount rarely bust the bags.
Summing up, there is an undeniable similarity between the syntactic and semantic behavior of the nouns kind and amount.5 These similarities along with the fact that

and

relatives show parallel behavior even in the absence of the relevant nouns, speaks in
favor of an analysis of the two constructions where one is derived from the other.

2.4

Degree abstraction or lack of thereof

The evidence we have seen so far indicates a tight connection between the behavior of
the nouns kind and amount and the availability of the corresponding interpretations with restrictive relative clauses. In this section I present arguments against a degree based approach
for relative clauses with an

reading, which makes an alternative, non-degree based

analysis necessary. The alternative analysis presented below will capitalize on the similarities
between kind and amount reference seen in the previous sections.
5

There is one place where a potential diﬀerence between the two words may arise. According to Scontras
(2017), amount (also quantity but neither number nor kind) is able to refer to deﬁnite objects.
(i)

a.

I want that {amount / quantity} of apples over there

↝ those particular apples

b. #I want that number of apples over there

↝̸ those particular apples

c. #I want that kind of apple over there

↝̸ those particular apples

I have some reservations about the availability of this interpretation for amount. Many of speakers I have consulted disagree with the judgment. Maybe the relevant reading requires an interpretation of amount more in
the line with pile or perhaps quantity, which seem to allow deﬁnite readings more easily. I can think of two
reasons why we might prefer not to allow deﬁnite readings of the noun amount. First, if amount can refer to
deﬁnite objects, we lose an explanation for the ungrammaticality of examples like (24c) above, since nothing
would preclude pronominals to refer back to that entity (but see footnote 4). Second, if amount were able to
refer to deﬁnite objects rather than amounts, the following dialog would be predicted to be felicitous, contrary
to intuitions.
(ii) In the fruit store they have diﬀerent containers as samples to illustrate how much fruit they can ﬁt. I
point at one of those sampling containers that is full of strawberries and I say: “I want that amount of
strawberries”. The seller then proceeds to ﬁll in an identical empty container with fresh strawberries and I
complain: “Why are you doing that? I said I wanted THAT amount of strawberries.”
In this dialog, given my ﬁrst utterance, I am not entitled to any complaint because the vendor could not possibly
interpret that amount of strawberries as referring to any particular strawberries.
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2.4.1

Contextual support

The ﬁrst, perhaps on-the-surface fact that makes us question the presence of a degree
operator is the observation that

interpretations are accessible even in the absence of

a relative clause (e.g., replaced by a PP or dropped altogether). This suggests that we need
not depend on the presence of a degree operator in a subordinate CP position in order to get
at the

interpretation. The following examples are repeated from above.

(7a) We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers of the Imperial Army.
(8a) We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers.

2.4.2

Sub-deletion

The process known as sub-deletion is considered a hallmark of degree abstraction (Kennedy
1997, 2002). For instance, comparatives and equatives all allow sub-deletion.
(33) a. I brought more bananas than you brought apples.
b. I brought as many bananas as you brought apples.
Classiﬁer Relatives too diﬀer from other pseudo-partitives and from kind of relatives in that
they allow sub-deletion.
(34) a.

I brought the { amount / quantity } of bananas that you brought of apples.

b. * I brought the pounds of bananas that you brought of apples.
c. * I brought the kind of water that you brought of stones.
In contrast, relative clauses with

interpretations never allow sub-deletion.

(35) * It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne that they spilled wine that
evening.

44

The lack of sub-deletion properties of (35) points towards a fundamental diﬀerence in how
interpretations arise in (33) and (34a) on the one hand and ARs on the other.6

the
2.4.3

Islands

The last argument, the one that I ﬁnd more compelling, is the lack of island eﬀects with
relative clauses that permit an

interpretation. There is a subset of syntactic islands, the

so-called weak or sensitive islands, which only allow extraction of certain kind of grammatical
expressions. It is more or less agreed that words and expressions that range over individual
entities are good extractees, as opposed to words that range over other domains, like degrees,
times, manners, etc., which often incur so-called island violations.
The form of the argument that I present here is the following. If relative clauses require
degree abstraction to obtain

interpretations, they should pattern together with other

constructions that involve the same operation in showing weak-island sensitivity, much like
comparatives, equatives and how many questions. By the same token, relative clauses with
an

interpretation should contrast with individual who questions, which involve ab-

straction over individuals, and are able to be extracted from weak islands. Below, I examine
the behavior of e-denoting vs. d-denoting wh-words in weak-island contexts as our baseline,
and compare this with the behavior of comparatives, equatives and relative clauses. Note,
of course, that the arguments can only go through if the relative clauses retain the
interpretation.
6

The contrasts above are damaging for degree based accounts in a variety of ways, depending on the particular
implementation of each analysis. For instance, Scontras (2017) assumes a raising syntax for Classiﬁer Relatives
which, taking (34a) at face value, seems like a non-starter. But adopting a matching-style analysis without further
ado would still not do, since then the impossibility of sub-deletion in (35) would remain unaccounted for. Grosu
and Landman (2017), on the other hand, equate Classiﬁer Relatives to pseudo-partitive constructions and only
by adding some stipulations can they account for the contrast between (34a) and (34b).
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2.4.3.1

Negative islands

The interaction between degree operators and negative and other downward entailing operators was noted early on the works that pioneered degree semantics for the study of comparative constructions (see von Stechow 1984). An inﬂuential view popularized by Rullmann
(1995) attributes the ill-formedness of the (36) examples below to the impossibility of maximalizing a set of degrees that contain a negative operator in its scope.
(36) a. * How many soldiers doesn’t the Imperial Army have?
b. * We have more soldiers than the Imperial Army doesn’t have.
c. * We have as many soldiers as the Imperial Army doesn’t have.
In short, the issue is that the maximality operator, as commonly deﬁned, presupposes a maximal degree among all the degrees in the set that it ranges over (see deﬁnitions of

in

§4.3.2.1 and §5.3.1). In the absence of such maximal degree, the expression is undeﬁned,
yielding ungrammaticality (in the sense of Gajewski 2002; see Abrusán 2014 and Rett 2015
for discussion). Thus, in the examples above, there is no maximal number of soldiers that the
Imperial Army did not have, since presumably that number is inﬁnite, and thus the result of
the maximalizatization operation is undeﬁned.
The ungrammaticality of the previous examples contrasts with the grammaticality of cases
where the extractee lives in the domain of individuals, such as which and what.
(37) Which soldiers doesn’t the Imperial Army have?
Now, if we look at relative clauses with

interpretations, we observe that they pattern

like (37) and unlike the examples in (36) above. Many speakers admit an

reading of

(38) without further ado: it amounts to saying that our soldiers exceeded in number those of
the Imperial Army. (Out of the blue, the

interpretation of (38) is also available.)
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(38) We won the battle because we had the soldiers that the Imperial Army didn’t have.
Some speakers may need some more contextual support. Suppose that our school is competing against other neighboring schools to get some fellowship. Crucially, in order to get
the fellowship there are certain stringent constraints on how many students schools may have,
such that having a certain number of students may maximize your chances of obtaining the
fellowship. In this case, (39) expresses that we had an amount of students such that your
school did not have as many students.
(39) Our school got the fellowship because we had the students that yours didn’t have.

2.4.3.2

Tenseless wh-islands

The case of tenseless wh-islands presents a similar contrast in English. First we observe
that there is indeed a diﬀerence in acceptability between extracting an entity denoting element
and a degree denoting element from a position embedded within a tenseless verbal phrase.
(Some speakers might feel less of a contrast in this case because, while inﬁnitival wh-islands
are only weak islands in English, tensed wh-islands are strong islands.)
(40) a. * How many soldiers are you wondering whether to hire to ﬁght the Imperial Army?
b.

Which soldiers are you wondering whether to hire to ﬁght the Imperial Army?

As before, other degree constructions pattern with (40a) as well.
(41) a. * We hired more soldiers than you wondered whether to hire to ﬁght Imperial Army.
b. * We hired as many soldiers as you wondered whether to hire to ﬁght Imperial Army.
In contrast with (40a) and (41), the relative clause in (42) is grammatical and felicitous under
an

interpretation, even though the head of the relative clause is extracted from a

tenseless verb phrase. Consider, for instance, a situation where two generals are discussing
how many soldiers they should hire to ﬁght against the Imperial Army. While one of them
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is indecisive about hiring a certain number, the second one goes ahead and hires that many
soldiers. In this case, (42) is true and felicitous.
(42) We won the battle because we had the soldiers that you wondered whether to hire to
ﬁght the Imperial Army.

2.4.3.3

Presuppositional islands

Presuppositional islands are induced by extracting material out of linguistic contexts that
carry some kind of presupposition. There are various types of presuppositional islands, and
we will review three here. Generally speaking, it is assumed that movement of a wh-operator
from under a factive predicate is bad if the gapped embedded clause denotes a unique element
(see Szabolcsi and Zwarts 1993, Schwarz and Simonenko 2016 a.o.). This accounts for the
observed diﬀerence between the following two questions:
(43) a.

To whom do you regret having shown this letter?

b. * From whom do you regret having gotten this letter?
Diﬀerent accounts oﬀer diﬀerent perspectives as to why and how this should be the case,
but for our purposes we can assume the following simpliﬁed picture. The culprit of the illformedness of (43b) is the presupposition of the verb regret, where x regrets that p presupposes
that x believes that p. Following the characterization in Abrusán (2014), a question like (43a)
presupposes that you have shown the letter to the relevant number of people in the domain.
That is, the presupposition of regret is argued to project universally: for every x in the given
domain, the speaker believes you have shown the letter to x. This presupposition is unproblematic. However, (43b) will likewise presuppose that you have gotten this letter from a
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number of people, and this presupposition cannot ever be met by one-time-only predicates.7
With this general schema in mind, we can now look into particular cases.
2.4.3.3.1

Factive verbs Factive islands are created by factive (negative) predicates like

regret, as in (43) above (Szabolcsi and Zwarts 1993). Under a classical approach to degree
questions (e.g. von Stechow 1984), a question like (44a) in interpreted as For what degree d
did John regret that he spilled d-much wine at the party? If regret projects its presupposition
universally, (44a) should presuppose that John believes that he spilled an inﬁnite amount of
wine: for every degree d, John believes that the amount of wine that he spilled is at least d.
This corresponds to the maximal degree in the scale, which in this case is undeﬁned.
In general, degree questions of the form ?d[φp (d)] where φp (d) is an expression presupposing p(d) are predicted to presuppose that p(d) holds to the maximal degree on the scale
required by the gradable predicate, which is undeﬁned in the case of quantity predicates and
open scale adjetives.8 However, in the case of identity questions like (44b), no such infelicity
arises: the presupposition of (44b) simply states that John has spilled a number of things at
the party (and that he believes so).
(44) a. * How much wine has John regretted that he spilled at the party?
b.

What does John regret that he spilled at the party?

That the infelicity of (44a) is related to the presence of degrees is conﬁrmed by the illformedness of (45), with a comparative and an equative construction.
7

This is, in a nutshell, Abrusán’s (2014) theory of presuppositional islands created by degree extraction as
well: the resulting expressions carry a presupposition that is contradictory, and so no context will be able to
satisfy it.
8

This is in fact one of the main criticisms by Fox and Hackl (2007) and Abrusán (2014) to classical approaches
to degree questions, since the prediction is that degree questions should be felicitous with closed scale adjectives,
contrary to fact: *How empty did John discover that his account was? Solutions to the puzzle include the proposal
that all scales that natural grammar employs are dense (Fox and Hackl 2007) or some version of the interval
theory of degrees (Schwarzschild and Wilkinson 2002, Heim 2006).
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(45) a. * We drank more wine than John regretted that he spilled at the party.
b. * We drank as much wine as John regretted that he spilled at the party.
As before, we observe that the same is not true of relative clauses:

readings of sen-

tences like (46) survive extraction of the head of the relative clause from a position inside the
factive islands. As discussed by Grosu and Landman (1998) and Meier (2015) modal verbs
can sometimes facilitate the

interpretation, so readers having diﬃculty to get at the

relevant interpretation with (46a) can try (46b) instead.
(46) a. We drank the wine that John regretted that he spilled at the party.
b. We can easily drink the wine that John regretted that he spilled at the party.
2.4.3.3.2

Other factives Honcoop (1998) observed that certain factive nouns and adjec-

tives that take propositional complements also induce weak islands. For instance, while the
noun suprise in a construction like it was a surprise that p presupposes that (the speaker believes
that p, adjectives like possible do not. Correspondingly, only surprise-type nouns induce weak
islands. Below the contrast is illustrated with the adjective scandalous and the noun possible.
(47) a. * How much whiskey was it scandalous that John drank at the age of 16?
b.

How much whiskey is it possible that John drank at the age of 16?

As expected, weak islands can be obviated by extracting entity denoting wh-words instead of
wh-words ranging over degrees, as witnessed by the contrast between (47a) and (48) below.
(48) What was it scandalous that John drank at the age of 16?
Looking at the comparative and equative counterparts of (47a), we observe that the same kind
of contrast is reproduced here as well. Extraction out of comparatives and equatives is also
banned with surprise-type nouns, but no so with possible-type ones.
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(49) a. ??We drank more whiskey than it was scandalous that John drank at the age of 16.
b. ??We drank as much whiskey as it was scandalous that John drank at the age of 16.
(50) a.
b.

We drank more whiskey than it is possible that John drank at the age of 16.
We drank as much whiskey as it is possible that John drank at the age of 16.

In contrast, (51) demonstrates that the

reading of a relative clause is retained in those

environments where genuine degree constructions are ill-formed. The sentences below may
be used to express that what we drank is the amount of whiskey such that it was scandalous
that John would drink that amount of whiskey at the age of 16.
(51) a. We drank the whiskey that it was scandalous that John drank at the age of 16.
b. We can easily drink the whiskey that it was scandalous that John drank at the age
of 16.
2.4.3.3.3

Response stance verbs Response stance verbs like deny, verify, admit, etc. are

presuppositional in the sense that they “presuppose that their complements express assumptions or claims held by someone possibly other than the speaker which are part of the common
ground” (Honcoop 1998, 167). In the case of deny, x denied that p presupposes that it is assumed by someone that p. The presuppositional status of this family of verbs is not as clear
cut as that of factives, and in fact for many speakers there is little–if any–contrast between
the two examples in (52) below.
(52) a. * How much wine has John denied that he spilled at the party?
b.

What does John deny that he spilled at the party?

For those speakers that are not so willing to accept island violations like (52a) with deny,
however, the same contrasts can be reproduced by looking a comparatives/equatives on the
one hand and relative clauses with

interpretations on the other.

51

(53) a. * We drank more wine than John denied that he spilled at the party.
b. * We drank as much wine as John denied that he spilled at the party.
(54) We drank the wine that John denied that he spilled at the party.

2.4.4

Interim summary and conclusion

We have shown that the connection between

and

interpretations is quite per-

vasive. Moreover, we have seen that there are reasons to cast doubt on the presence of degree
abstraction in relative clauses, even when they permit an
together, these two facts suggest that subsuming

interpretation. Coupled

interpretations under

interpre-

tations is not only defensible, but desirable.
The rest of the chapter is devoted to spell out this intuition in concrete terms. First, I
show that amount and (sub)kinds share suﬃcient structural properties so as to understood
the former in terms of the latter. Then, I show what it means to be a subkind and why the
relative clause is critical. Finally, I provide a compositional analysis of subkind predication
that taken in tandem with the previous conclusions, accounts for

interpretations of

English relative clauses.

2.5

Getting from kinds to amounts

We started oﬀ the chapter by providing an intuitive paraphrase of

readings of rel-

ative clauses that reﬂected the fact, extensively discussed in the previous sections, that relative
clauses that allow

interpretations also allow

interpretations. Here it is repeated

again:
(2) a. It would take us years to drink the champagne that we spilled last night.
↝ It would take us years to drink champagne with some relevant property of the
champagne we spilled last night
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b. the champagne that we spilled last night ↭ champagne with property P
[where “the champagne that we spilled last night” is a realization of P]
This way of paraphrasing the relevant interpretation of the relative clause aims at reﬂecting
both the nature of the head noun as well as the role of the relative clause. In a nutshell, I
would like to argue that these relative clauses make reference to subkinds. More speciﬁcally,
in (2), the head noun champagne provides the name of a kind that we can then reference and
attribute properties to. The role of the relative clause is to determine a relevant subkind from
the kind-level object provided by the head noun, by highlighting some property that holds of
its referent. This property P may be underspeciﬁed and context-dependent. For instance, for
the sentence above, we could any have any of the following:
(55) a. ⟦P⟧c = ⟦be x kind⟧

b. ⟦P⟧c = ⟦be d-dry⟧

c. ⟦P⟧c = ⟦be d-much⟧

d. ⟦P⟧c = ⟦be d-expensive⟧

This way of looking at sentences like (2a) captures their overall vagueness–the champagne
that was spilled could have any number of properties bearing on the time it would take us
to drink an equivalent champagne. The key unifying factor, however, is that the property
contributes a way of narrowing down the space of possibilities for the subkind in question.
In what follows, I will ﬁrst provide some background on subkinds before discussing how
readings may be thought of as a species of subkind reference.
2.5.1
2.5.1.1

On subkinds
The deﬁnite article and ad hoc subkinds

As is well known, kind-referring terms in English generally have to be bare plurals. Definite DPs in generic statements, as in (56), lead to ungrammaticality or oddness.9
9

The restriction is not absolute, however. In certain contexts, sentences like (56) become better.
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(56) a. (#The) lions are widespread.
b. (#The) whales are extinct.
However, there are speciﬁc environments where the deﬁnite article can be used to make reference to a kind. Consider (57), where a kind-referring term is further restricted by the use
of an anaphoric demonstrative or a relative clause.
(57) Basic paradigm with kind
a.

[based on Zamparelli (1998)]

Anaphoric demonstratives
i. This kind of lion is widespread.
ii. This kind of whale is extinct.

b.

Relative clauses
i. The kind of lion that eats people is widespread.
ii. The kind of whale that had horns is extinct.

The pattern is the same even when the head noun kind is dropped, suggesting that the deﬁnite
article is not altogether ruled out in bare kind-referring terms.
(58) Reduced paradigm without kind
a.

Plural anaphoric demonstratives
i. These lions are widespread.
ii. These whales are extinct.

b.

Relative clauses
i. The lions that eat people are widespread.
ii. The whales that had horns are extinct.

(i)

a.

Unlike other types of big cats, (the) lions come in several varieties.

b. (The) dinosaurs became extinct at various points in time.
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[Barbara Partee, pc.]
[Dayal 2004]

Crucially, (57) and (58) refer to subkinds of lions and whales, as opposed to the natural kinds
on the whole.10 Moreover, subkind-referring expressions like those in (57) and (58) need not
be natural or well-established; they can be ad-hoc. This is easily seen in (58b): the lions that
eat people, for instance, do not form a natural class; in fact, they may comprise of individual
lions in several subspecies of lion and exclude others in the same subspecies.
Chierchia (1998b, 348) thought of kinds as regularities that occur in nature, whose only
property is that “we can impute to them a suﬃciently regular behavior”. Ad hoc subkinds allow us to do something similar in real time, that is, impute a regular behavior to some subset of
a kind without prior agreement as to whether the behavior in question actually qualiﬁes as sufﬁciently regular. This is a very useful mechanism if, with Chierchia (1998b), we believe that
what counts as kind is not set by the grammar, but amounts instead to conventional (shared)
knowledge of a community of speakers. It allows us to talk and ask questions about very
speciﬁc kinds. As an illustration, the following examples were retrieved from the internet.
(59) a. Are you the kind of student who relishes an academic challenge, is intellectually
curious, seeks out opportunities to help others, and wants to lead others to impact
change in your local community, our environment and the world?
b. He’s the kind of man who can work two jobs in his sleep, always has a side-hustle
in mind to earn more money, and guards his savings with his life.
To summarize, we saw that while simple deﬁnite descriptions (without the noun kind) do
not generally make good kind-referring terms in English, they can be used to pick out salient
subkinds in certain restricted contexts. Moreover, these subkinds may be ad hoc. Thus, we
need two things to form an ad hoc subkind: (i) a semantic sortal–something to be a kind
of–, and (ii) some means to identify what the relevant subkind is. (i) is provided by a kind10

I am assuming no ontological diﬀerence between kinds and subkinds. Others do make a diﬀerence between “well established” kinds and “non-well established” kinds, which Pelletier and Schubert (1989) refer to
as “formal” kinds and Krifka (1995) calls “concepts”. Given the diﬃculties to deﬁne the notion of being “well
established”, I will not assume such distinction. (Simply saying that it amounts to a taxonomic distinction won’t
do; for discussion, see Chierchia (1998b).)
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referring noun. Anaphoric demonstratives, relative clauses (and sometimes PPs and other
modiﬁers like adjectives) can accomplish (ii).
The analysis I defend here capitalizes on the possibility of constructing ad hoc subkinds
and the grammaticality of the deﬁnite article when making reference to such subkinds. Before
turning to this analysis, however, we must discuss a restriction on forming subkinds.
2.5.1.2

The disjointness condition

Forming subkinds, ad hoc or not, is not completely free. Carlson (1977a) noted that when
referring to diﬀerent subkinds, the subkinds must be disjoint, they cannot share realizations.
We saw this before: a sentence like (20), repeated below, cannot be veriﬁed by a situation
where only Fido is sitting in the next room, even though Fido in fact belongs to more than
one kind of dog (assume that he is a watch dog and a border collie in the real world, thus
eﬀectively belonging to these two diﬀerent subkinds of dogs).
(20) Two kinds of dogs are sitting in the next room.
Carlson (1977b) spelled out the constraint as follows (adapted from Carlson 1977b, 213):
(60) D

C

A kind-referring expression can only refer to a contextually deﬁned subset of all the
possible subkinds that the noun is true of, such that:
i. the subkinds in this subset are disjoint and share no realizations,
ii. the subkinds collectively cover all the space of realizations of the kind.
This condition is fundamental in understanding how

interpretations can arise qua ad

hoc subkinds, and will be discussed in further detail below.
2.5.2

What amounts and kinds have in common

In order to make the connection between ad hoc subkinds and

interpretations

maximally salient, I will recast Carlson’s (1977b) disjointness condition in terms of partitions.
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More speciﬁcally, reference to subkinds must be mediated by an equivalence relation that
induces a partition on the denotation of its relevant superkind. How this equivalence relation
is determined is context dependent; as a consequence, part of the task when interpreting an ad
hoc subkind referring expression involves retrieving this equivalence relation from the context.
Following Cresswell (1976), Klein (1980) and many others, degrees can be understood as
equivalence classes of ordinary objects. That is, the degree of my height can be deﬁned by
the set of all people who are the same height as me, an amount of champagne as the set of all
portions of liquid of equal volume, etc. Because interpreting ad hoc subkinds involves ﬁguring
out what the equivalence relations is, and because some equivalence relations can serve to
deﬁne degrees, there is no reason why ad hoc subkinds should not make reference to portions
of equal amounts, just like the refer to sets of entities. Coming back to the example in (2)
above, we could say that the equivalence relation be the same kind as would give us a partition
of champagne individuals according to their kind (e.g. blanc de noirs, blanc de blancs, rosé
champagne…). The equivalence relation be as sweet as would partition the diﬀerent types of
champagne in terms of their sweetness (extra brut, brut, extra dry…), whereas an equivalence
relation be as much as would partition the denotation of champagne in diﬀerent amounts (1L,
2L, 3L…or perhaps 1 bottle, 2 bottles, 3 bottles…).
In what follows I elaborate on the details of this account.
2.5.2.1

Partitions

We ﬁrst introduce the notions of equivalence relation and equivalence class. An equivalence relation is a reﬂexive, symmetric and transitive relation that determines whether any two
subsets are suﬃciently equal with respect to some measure.
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(61) Relations: Let A be a non-empty set and R a relation in A. Then:
a. R is reﬂexive iﬀ ∀a ∈ A[R(a, a)]
b. R is symmetric iﬀ ∀a, b ∈ A[R(a, b) → R(b, a)]
c. R is transitive iﬀ ∀a, b, c ∈ A[R(a, b) ∧ R(b, c) → R(a, c)]
For instance, the equivalence relation be as old as holds of all twins, but it does not hold of
any parent–child pairs.
(62) Equivalence Relation: Let R be an equivalence relation. Then:
a ≃R b iﬀ ∀x[(R(a, x) ↔ R(b, x)) ∧ (R(x, a) ↔ R(x, b))]
An equivalence class collects in a set all the elements that are equal with respect to some
equivalence relation. In our previous example, it would return the set of all things that have
the same age.
(63) Equivalence Class: Let [ ]R be a function from a domain D to POW(D) such that:
∀x ∈ D[[x]R = {y ∶ y ∈ D ∧ x ≃R y}]
If R is an equivalence relation, [x]R represents the equivalence class containing x. Thus, if y
is also a member of [x]R , then [x]R = [y]R . Equivalence relations are useful for us because
they can induce a partition.
(64) Partition: Let A be a non-empty set. A partition is a collection of subsets of A iﬀ (i)
for any two subsets X and Y, X ∩ Y = ∅ and (ii) the union of all subsets of A equals A.
Each subset that is a member of some partition is called a cell. An equivalence relation R is
able to induce a partition on a set A, because any two members x and y can only be in the
same cell if (and only if) they are related by R. Similarly, the collection of all the equivalence
classes on A with respect to R forms a partition: every member of each equivalence class [x]
is related to every other member of [x] via R and not related to any member of any other set.
Thus, a partition is simply a collection of all equivalence classes arising from some equivalence
relation.
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(65) Collection of Equivalence Classes on D: {X ⊆ D ∶ ∃x ∈ DR [X = [x]R ]}
As an illustration, let us return to Fido in (20). Given the equivalence relation be the same
breed as, Fido is a member of the cell containing border collies, the equivalence class [F]breed .
By the same token, if the equivalence relation were have the same role as, Fido would be in
the cell containing watch dogs, [F]role . Given the properties of partitions, Fido cannot live
in two cells at the same time, and so we have to chose one or the other equivalence relation.
Hence the ill-formedness of (20).
2.5.2.2
2.5.2.2.1

Degrees as equivalence classes
Foundations The agenda of reducing degrees to existing objects that are better

understood and less abstract goes back to Cresswell (1976), but see also Klein (1980, 1991),
Hoeksema (1983), Rullmann (1995) and more recently Bale (2006, 2008). The basic tenet
in Cresswell (1976) is to view degrees as equivalence classes of individuals.11
I illustrate the main idea with an adjective A. Associated with any gradable predicate (an
adjective, adverb, verb, etc.) there is a two-place relation ⪰A , and a set DA . The set DA is a
subset of the universe of discourse containing all and only those objects of which the adjective
can be sensibly predicated. This is just a lexical requirement to make sure that a set like Dtall
contains people, mountains, etc., but not ideas or colors, since the latter cannot be sensibly
attributed a height.
The relation ⪰A is reﬂective of our conceptual ability to determine, from any two individuals, which has more of a certain quality than another. From this intuition, Cresswell (1976)
suggested to deﬁne ⪰A as follows:
(66) ⟨Dtall , {⟨x, y⟩ ∶ x, y ∈ Dtall and x is as tall as y}⟩
11

In the rest of the chapter I make use of this notion, but in a slightly diﬀerent way from Cresswell’s (1976):
rather than taking degrees to be equivalence classes, it suﬃces to assume that it is possible, for any one degree
d, to determine the set A of things of which d holds. Similarly, any plural individual x will have a natural
corresponding degree d stating its cardinality. This is reminiscent of the mappings existing between kinds and
properties (e.g. Chierchia 1998b). Thus, this should not be understood as radically switching conceptions of
degrees; there is still room for simplex degrees in the ontology.
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The relation ⪰A has certain properties. First, it is reﬂexive. Given any one individual x, x is as
tall as x. Second, it is transitive. For any three individuals x, y and z, if x is as tall as y and y
is as tall as z, then x as tall as z (i.e. if ⟨x, y⟩ and ⟨y, z⟩ are members of the relation, then so is
⟨x, z⟩). And third, the relation is connected. If any individuals x and y are in Dtall , then either
⟨x, y⟩ or ⟨y, x⟩ is in the relation. The resulting relation is weaker than a partition, it only ﬁts
the criteria for being a pre-order (or connected quasi-order).
One of Cresswell’s (1976) main contributions was to show that it is possible to build a
scale from an underlying pre-order. The process requires two basic steps–although only the
ﬁrst one concerns us here. First, one must partition the domain of individuals in the pre-order.
Then, the resulting equivalence classes are ordered with respect to each other by a relation that
is congruent with the underlying pre-order.12 In this case, we can easily deﬁne an equivalence
relation from ⪰A as follows.
(67) x ≃A y ↔ x ⪰A y ∧ y ⪰A x
Now we can partition a domain according to ≃A as we did before. The degree of A-ness of an
object x, say degA (x) can be deﬁned as the set of all objects that stand in the ≃A relation to x:
(68) degA (x) = {y ∈ DA ∶ x ≃A y}
As a consequence, the degree to which Liz is tall, degtall (Liz) can now be identiﬁed with the
set of all objects that are exactly as tall as Liz. Proceeding alike for all the individuals in DA
we can get the set DEGA , the set of all equivalence classes into which DA is partitioned by ≃A .
DEGA is now a partition, since ≃A is reﬂexive, transitive and symmetric (and non-connected,
by virtue of equivalence classes being disjoint sets).
12

There a number of ways we can order equivalence classes. Rullmann (1995), following Klein (1991),
provides a simple one. The relation ⪰A may induce a relation ≥A on the members of DEGA such that degA (x) ≥A
degA (y) iﬀ x ⪰A y ∧ y ⪰̸A x. It can be shown that ≥A takes the equivalence classes in DEGA (i.e. the degrees) and
induces a linear (total) order–a relation that is reﬂexive, transitive, connected, and antisymmetric. For discussion
and proofs, see Cresswell (1976), Klein (1991) and Bale (2006).
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(69) a. Reﬂexivity: ∀d, d′ ∈ DEGA [d ≃A d′ ]
b. Transitivity: ∀d, d′ , d′′ ∈ DEGA [[d ≃A d′ ∧ d′ ≃A d′′ ] → d ≃A d′′ ]
c. Symmetry: ∀d, d′ ∈ DEGA [d ≃A d′ → d′ ≃A d]
In this view, each degree d corresponds to one of the cells in the partition DEGA induced on
the set DA . For instance, in the case of DEGtall (and a very reduced domain) we may have:13
(70) Representation of DEGtall as a partition
d.f : John, Sue Liz
d.f :

Mary, Al

df :

Mike, Helen

d.f :

Hilary

2.5.2.2.2

Cardinalities The details of how to establish partitions from pluralities require

some discussion of what individuals we consider with respect to the partition. Suppose we
induce a partition over a set A via the equivalence relation “be the same cardinality as”. Now
take a plurality of two people a ⊕ b. Claiming without further ado that both a and b live in
the cell corresponding to those pluralities of cardinality  might get us in trouble, because the
same individuals a and b might team up with a third individual c to be part of a second cell in
the partition, the one corresponding to pluralities of cardinality . Intuitively this seems to go
against the disjointness condition.
The solution is to adopt a Link (1983) style approach to pluralities (see §4.3.1.1 and footnote 11 in Chapter 4 as well). According to Link, plural entities are just sums of individuals
(and not sets), as concrete as the individuals that serve to deﬁne them and of the same logical
type. Plural morphology signals the presence of a pluralization operation ∗ which generates
13

Notice that the thresholds of the degrees should be overtly determined, so that there is no vagueness whatsoever as to where exactly every individual belongs in the partition. In the example above the cut-oﬀ point was
the nearest inch, so the actual equivalence relation should read be as tall as, to the nearest inch.
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all the individual sums of members of the extension of any 1-place predicate. This operation forms a complete join-subsemilattice in the domain D of individuals that ∗ generates
by operating over atoms. That is, D is closed under the join operation, and a ⊕ b is the
“individual-sum” of a and b. This gives us the following structure on D:
(71) Denotation of ∗ D where D = {a, b, c}:
a⊕b⊕c
a⊕b a⊕c b⊕c
b.

a

c

If a mapping exists between degrees and sets of individuals, as discussed above, each level in
the Linkian structure above can be seen as an equivalence class. Assuming that cardinalities
are simply degrees, as it is common practice, we can create a partition DEGcard on D by the
equivalence relation ≃card .
(72) a. x ≃card y ↔ x ⪰card y ∧ y ⪰card x

[where ⪰card = a cardinality as big as]

b. degcard (x) = {y ∈ ∗ D ∶ x ≃A y}
The result is a partition of the domain of plural individuals according to their cardinality.
(73) Partition DEGcard on ∗ D:
a⊕b⊕c
a ⊕ b, a ⊕ c, b ⊕ c
a, b, c
The equivalence class [a ⊕ b]card corresponds to all plural individuals of cardinality  in the
domain, such that [a ⊕ b]card = [a ⊕ c]card = [b ⊕ c]card . Because plural individuals are individuals with full rights, we need not look into their composing parts. That is, a and b only belong
to the bottom cell in (73); the fact that a ⊕ b is a member of a diﬀerent cell is inconsequential
in this respect.
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2.5.2.2.3

And back to ad hoc subkinds

Let us turn back now to ad hoc subkinds. We

started by asking about the connection between ad hoc subkinds and

interpretations

of relative clauses. My answer here is that we can arrive at both interpretations by appealing to
partitions. Concretely, both constructions require a suitable equivalence relation that projects
the partition. In the case of ad hoc subkinds, we saw evidence for this in Carlson’s (1977b)
disjointness condition, which I have reproduced in the language of partitions. In the case of
interpretations, we have seen that amounts, and degrees at large, can also be deﬁned
as equivalence classes, as sets of individuals, which in turn can induce a relevant partition.
In order to make the connection between ad hoc subkinds and

interpretations of

relative clauses explicit, we have to look a bit further into ad hoc subkinds. Ad hoc subkinds
are inherently vague referring expressions. Although they refer to subkinds, they do not do so
in a direct way. Compare:
(74) a. The blue whale is becoming extinct.
b. The whales that you like so much are becoming extinct.
One can refer to a subkind by directly mentioning its name. In this case, blue whale stands for
a (taxonomic) subkind of whale. But not all subkinds have names; in fact, very few do. For
all we know, the kind of whales that you like so much could be blue whales, but it could as
well be almost any collection of whales that you fancy. That is, the subkind whales that you
like so much are a subkind just by virtue of your liking them so much. In this case, then, the
only “suﬃciently regular behavior” that we may impute them is precisely that you like them
so much.
I suggest that the sole role of the relative clause in ad hoc subkind reference constructions
is to provide information that helps determine what the relevant suﬃciently regular behavior
is. How exactly does the relative clause fulﬁll this role? It does so by restricting, in more or
less the usual way, the denotation of the kind-denoting NP, e.g. whale in (74b), to a subset of
whales. Crucially, this subset must be a member of one cell in a partition of whale subkinds.
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Given the nature of partitions, information about one cell can help us form at least a bipartition,
for instance, lumping together in one cell the individual whales that you like, and all the ones
that do not belong in this cell occupying the sole other cell of the partition. Of course, the
more information we might have about your preferences, the richer the partition could be.
Under this view, a critical part of resolving ad hoc subkind reference is being able to
determine an equivalence relation that puts all the whales that you like in a single cell. This is
not always as straightforward as it may seem and, sometimes, vagueness is rampant. Consider
again:
(2a) It would take us years to drink the champagne that we spilled last night.
In this example, the champagne that we spilled last night is referring to an ad hoc subkind
of champagne. If we go with the taxonomic interpretation of the sentence, we partition the
domain of champagne into its diﬀerent subkinds, and we assume that the particular champagne
that the spilled last night lives in one of the cells. For instance, if we spilled a very rare kind
of prestige cuvée:
(75) Champagne partitioned by taxonomic kinds
Prestige cuvée

↝ the champagne that we spilled last night was a prestige cuvée.

Blanc de noirs
Blanc de blancs
Rosé Champagne
Each one of the cells above contains the individual instances of champagne that correspond
to each kind. (In this respect, the table above is just a shortcut to the actual partition, whose
members are always individuals, not kinds.) Carlson’s (1977b) disjointness condition is met
by resorting to an equivalence relation like be the same type as. Now, it could be that the
reason why it would take us so long to ﬁnd the champagne that we spilled last night is because
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it was much sweater than usual. In that case, we can generate the relevant partition from an
equivalence relation like be as sweet as.14
(76) Champagne partitioned by sweetness in gr. of sugar per litre
d < gr
. < d < 
. < d < 
. < d < 
. < d < 
d ≥ 

↝ the champagne that we spilled last night was d-sweet.

To reiterate: subkind reference must be mediated by a partition to ensure that the domain
is covered by non-overlapping sets. This partitioning is carried out by an equivalence relation
that is only contextually determined. In the case of ad hoc subkind reference, the only condition that the equivalence relation must meet is that it assigns the denotation of the full modiﬁed
NP (together with the relative clause or PP modiﬁer) to a single cell in the partition. As long
as this is observed, any equivalence relation might do. Thus, the only diﬀerence between (75)
and (76) above is that diﬀerent equivalence relations are picked in diﬀerent contexts.
At this point, it is straightforward to extend the same reasoning to the classical AR examples and

interpretations. Since we know that cardinalities can be deﬁned in terms of

equivalence classes, there is no reason why the required equivalence relation cannot be of the
form be as much as. For instance, for the classical champagne example (2a), we could envision a partition like (77) (although partitions with diﬀerent levels of granularity are possible,
including partitions where champagne is measured by numbers of bottles).

14

These are not arbitrary, see http://www.nytimes.com////dining/iht-wine.html.
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(77) Champagne partitioned by volume
0L ≤ d < 1L
1.1L < d < 2L
2.1L < d < 3L
3.1L < d < 4L
4.1L < d < 5L ↝ the champagne that we spilled last night was d-much.
…
If this rationale is correct,

interpretations of relative clauses are simply a case of ad

hoc subkind reference. Thus, the only analysis we need is one that derives ad hoc subkind
reference, and no appeal to degree semantics is necessary.
2.5.3

Interim conclusion

Making reference to subkinds requires structuring the domain in a certain way. I have
argued that one way of capturing this requirement is by partitioning the relevant domain.
Once this step is taken, a parsimonious account of

interpretations of ordinary rel-

ative clauses is made available. Assuming degrees to be deﬁnable in terms of equivalence
classes, we can exploit the idiosyncracies of ad hoc subkind reference to induce a partition
of the domain introduced by the relevant kind term established via an equivalence relation
that is in turn based on quantities or amounts. Given the evidence reported in sections §2.2
through §2.4 above, this account oﬀers a number of advantages: (i) it accounts for the pervasive similarities between expressions that can refer to kinds and amounts in terms of their
the syntactic/semantic properties, (ii) it accounts for the lack of evidence for degree abstraction, and (iii) it relies on mechanisms that are independently needed for the interpretation of
subkind-referring expressions as well as mappings between degrees and equivalence relations
independently argued for in the literature about degrees.
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2.6

Compositional implementation

The ﬁnal task of this chapter is to provide a compositional analysis of ad hoc subkinds.
In the reductionist approach advocated here there is no need for degree-speciﬁc machinery
to account for

interpretations of ARs, since these do not involve degrees in the usual

sense. They only involve degrees insofar degrees are one way of many to attribute the sufﬁciently regular behavior required to refer to subkinds. The compositional derivation that I
present below, therefore, is a derivation of ad hoc subkind interpretations.
2.6.1

Basic semantics of kinds

In laying out my assumptions about kind reference I am following Chierchia (1998b) for
the most part. The topic of kind reference is much richer than I can do justice here, and
nothing of consequence for the derivation of

interpretations bears on the particular

implementation that I oﬀer below. There is one novelty in the analysis that I will spell out:
the use of a particular kind of mapping between kinds and subkinds, but this may be easily
adapted to any other theory of kind reference (e.g., Carlson 1977b, Wilkinson 1995, Krifka
1995, Borer 2005, etc.).15
What is a kind? Kinds are individuals whose spatiotemporal manifestations are discontinuous. In this sense, they are like plural individuals, which do not form a whole. Kinds can
be regarded as the totality of individuals that belong to it; the kind dog can be identiﬁed as the
sum of all individual dogs, which can then be modelled as the largest member of the plural
individual comprising all dogs.
15

The discussion that follows is simpliﬁed at least in two respects: First, I will gloss over the fact that kinds are
intensional objects, and thus they require the use of world/situation variables; otherwise we could not distinguish
kinds whose extensions are identical in the actual world (as with the tyrannousaurus and the brontosaurus).
Second, the ontology assumed by Chierchia (1984, 1998b) requires particular versions of set theory that I will
not discuss here. In short, in Chierchia’s (1984) system, the domain U is assumed to be a join semilattice, and
kinds K are assumed to be both a subset of the atomic individuals in U as well as a subset of the intension of
U, Us . The issue is that the cardinality of Us is greater than U and so we have to make sure that K is not so big
that it does not ﬁt into U. See Chierchia and Turner (1988) for discussion and a solution in terms of Property
Theory.

67

For any property, like the property of being a dog, there is a corresponding kind, the dogkind. Conversely, natural kinds have a corresponding property (the property of belonging to
that kind). This correspondence suggests that there must be mappings from one to another.
In Chierchia’s (1984) system, properties may be systematically mapped to their individual
correlates via a nominalization function, the “down” operator ∩ . Likewise, individuals may be
mapped to their corresponding properties via the inverse of

∩,

the “up” operator

∪.

That is,

while the down operator is a “nominalizer”, the up operator is a “predicativizer”.
(78) Property–kind mappings
a. Predicativization
Let d be a kind. Then for any world/situation s, ∪ d = λx.x ≤ ds , if d is deﬁned,
false otherwise (where ds is the plural individual that comprises all of the atomic
members of the kind).
b. Nominalization
For any property P and world/situation s, ∩ P = λs.ιPs if λs.ιPs is in K; else undeﬁned
(where Ps is the extension of P in s and K is the set of kinds).
The mappings in (78) are useful because they permit us to go back and forth between properties and their corresponding kinds. The system now provides two diﬀerent ways to look at
properties. Kinds qua predicable entities are essentially incomplete or “unsaturated” (pretty
much like run-of-the-mill properties). However, just like properties (e.g. run), kinds can
be nominalized and so turned from predicative into argumental objects (e.g the running). In
eﬀect, this means that kinds have a second live as individuals. This individual objects are usually referred to as the individual counterparts of kinds. In Chierchia’s (1984, 54–55) words,
“properties have two modes of being: one as ‘intrinsically functional’ entities, the other as
individuals systematically correlated to those entities”.
At this point it helps to lay out the two relevant subsets of the domain D, along with
the variables I will use for each type. Kinds are individuals with their own rights, and so they
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belong to their own domain Dk , a subset of D. In order to represent kinds and object variables,
I follow the convention, after Carlson (1977b), of using the subscripts k for kind level and o
for object level variables. Thus, we can talk about the domain of object-individuals Do , to the
exclusion of the domain of kind individuals, Dk .
Given that we have mappings between properties and kinds, it is useful to look at some
correspondences. Following the usual convention, I use small caps to name a kind, such
that

is the dog-kind. Then, the dog-kind

is equivalent to the nominalization of the

property of being a dog, (79a). In turn, the property of being a dog is equivalent to the
predicativization of

= ∩ λx.∗dog(x)

(79) a.
b.

.

∪

= λx.∗dog(x) =

∪∩ λx

. ∗dog(x)

Let us now look at how kinds enter into the semantic computation. Kinds have the possibility
to combine both with kind-level and with object-level predicates. In the ﬁrst case, kinds are
attributed some property directly by the main predicate. In the second case, most commonly
with episodic sentences, we encounter a mismatch between a kind denoting argument and an
predicate that lexically selects for non-kind predicates.
(80) a. Dogs are {widespread/extinct/common}.
b. Dogs are barking outside my window.
In (80a) we encounter a case of direct-kind reference: the dog-kind, the individual correlate
of the property of being a dog, is taken directly as an argument by a verb that selects for
kinds.16 To derive this interpretation, we simply take the plural property denoting the totality
of dogs (λx. ∗ dog(x)) and apply the down operator to retrieve its individual correlate.
(81) ⟦(80a)⟧ = extinct(∩ λx.∗dog(x))
16

If, instead, we try to combine a kind level predicate with an individual-denoting object, the result is semantically ill-formed. For instance, Fido cannot be extinct.
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The example in (80b) is diﬀerent in that now the dog-kind serves as an argument to an
individual-selecting predicate. In this case, the predicate does not attribute properties to the
dog-kind, but to object-level instances of the dog-kind; (80b) asserts the existence of some
individual dog that is barking. In other words, the sentences existentially quantiﬁes over individuals that belong to the dog-kind and attributes them the property of being barking outside
my window. To achieve this result, Chierchia (1998b) proposes a new rule of composition:
(82) Derived Kind Predication (DKP):
If P applies to objects and k denotes a property, then P(k) = ∃x[∪ k(x) ∧ P(x)]
The rule DKP solves two problems: it provides a means to solve the sortal mismatch and
introduces existential quantiﬁcation over instances of a kind.
(83) ⟦barking-outside-my-window⟧(⟦dogs⟧) =
∃x[∪∩ λx.∗dog(x) ∧ barking-outside-my-window(x)]
Notice that, given the deﬁnitions in (78) above, we can further unpack (83) in (84), which
may be more transparent:
(84) ⟦barking-outside-my-window⟧(⟦dogs⟧) =
∃x[x ≤

∧ barking-outside-my-window(x)]

In prose, there is some individual specimen of

(some particular dog) that is barking

outside my window.
2.6.2

From kinds to subkinds

The next and ﬁnal step to arrive at the desired ad hoc subkind interpretations involves a
mapping from kinds to subkinds. There are a number of mappings in the literature between
kinds and subkinds (e.g. Krifka et al. 1995, Wilkinson 1995, Zamparelli 1998), usually carried out by an operator, which is very similar in meaning to the noun kind in expressions like
kind of dog. In accordance to the discussion above, however, we need a mapping that will
partition kinds, not just any subkind extracting operation.
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From the discussion in §2.5.2.1 we know what those conditions are. A partition of a kind
K is a set G of subsets of

∪K

that covers

∪K

and where members of G do not share any

instantiating individuals.
(85) Cover: A set of subkinds G is a cover of a kind K iﬀ:
a. G is a set of non-empty subsets of ∪ K.
b. ∀xo [xo ≤ K → ∃yk ∈ G[xo ≤ yk ]]
In prose: for every object-level individual xo that realizes the kind K, there is a kind-individual
yk in G that xo is a realization of. This is only a necessary condition, but not suﬃcient, for no
individual can instantiate two distinct subkinds of G. We need to add a ban on overlapping
subkinds:
(86) No overlap:
∀xo [∃yk ∈ G[xo ≤ yk ] → ¬∃zk ∈ G[yk ≠ zk ∧ xo ≤ zk ]]
We can now simply deﬁne a partition function that meets these two criteria.17
(87) Kind partition funcion
A partition ∏ is a ⟨kt, kt⟩ function such that for any kind K, ∏(K) meets two conditions:
a. ∀xo [∃yk ∈ ∏(K)[xo ≤ yk ] → ¬∃zk ∈ ∏(K)[yk ≠ zk ∧ xo ≤ zk ]]
b. ∀xo [xo ≤ K → ∃yk ∈ ∏(K)[xo ≤ yk ]]
As an illustration, consider the case of K =

and G = {

Then condition (a) states that if xo is an instance of the kind

,

,

,

, . . .}.

, there is some subkind yk

in the set of subkinds G that xo is also an instance of. This conditions make sure that all particular dogs belong to some subkind, to some breed in this case. In turn, condition (b) states
that if xo is an instance of the subkind yk , there will be no additional subkind zk in G that xo
17

Here the partition function is deﬁned over kinds, but it can also be deﬁned over sums once a the relevant
part-whole properties of sum-individuals are made explicit; see Gillon (1987) and Schwarzschild (1996) for
discussion.
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also realizes. This is reﬂective of the fact that, if Fido is a beagle, he cannot be any other
breed. More generally, the function ensures that if we partition the dog-kinds by breed, all
border-collies will be in the same cell of the partition, and, say watch-dog border-collies will
not be able to occupy their own–despite being a subkind of dogs as well in the actual world.
2.6.2.1

Basic cases

Now we can move on and talk about how to derive subkinds. We ﬁrst induce a partition
of a kind into the set of the individual correlates of its subkinds. We can do this by deﬁning
a kind-to-subkind operator that makes use of the partition function:
(88) ⟦KSK⟧ = λxk .λyk . ∏(xk )(yk )
That is: KSK targets a kind, xk , and returns a set of kind-individuals that partition it. The
function returns the set of (individual correlates of) subkinds that are in the partition.
(89) ⟦KSK⟧(⟦

⟧) = λyk . ∏(

)(yk ) = λyk . ∏(λx.∗ dog(x))(yk )

= {∩ λx.∗ greyhound(x), ∩ λx.∗ collie(x), ∩ λx.∗ beagle(x), . . .}
={

,

,

, . . .}

If we want to account for its use with demonstratives (e.g., that dog), we may adopt the semantics of the anaphoric demonstrative provided by Scontras (2017):
(90) a. ⟦that⟧ = λP.ιxk [P(xk ) ∧ ∪ xk (thati )]

[where that i =

]

= ιxk [xk ∈ {∩ λ.∗ greyhound(x), ∩ λ.∗ collie(x), ∩ λ.∗ beagle(x), …} ∧ ∪ xk (

)]

b. ⟦that dog⟧ = ιxk [λyk . ∏(

= ιxk [xk ∈ {

,

)(yk )(xk ) ∧ ∪ xk (

,…} ∧ ∪ xk (

,

)]

)]

= ∩ λx.∗ beagle(x) =
Here the kind interpretation of that dog simply returns whatever subkind of dog is retrieved
by the anaphor, in this case the individual-correlate of the

subkind. Unless we provide

more criteria, however, the partition function does not have a way to determine what the
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subkinds need to be. In this sense, these results echo Krifka et al.’s (1995) taxonomic function,
which picks as its default a collection of natural or well-established subkinds.
2.6.2.2 Ad hoc subkinds
The ﬁnal step is to manipulate the criteria that determine how we partition a kind. Put
diﬀerently, in order to build ad hoc subkinds, we have to override the taxonomic default we
saw earlier. I suggest to enforce this in the following way. The kind is partitioned just like we
did above, but now the property contributed by the relative clause is used to further constraint
what the relevant subkinds might be.
(91) ⟦KSKah ⟧ = λxk .λP⟨et⟩ .λyk .∀zo [(∪ xk ⋂ P)(zo ) → zo ≤ ∏(xy )(yk )]
Let us unpack (91). KSKah is a function that takes a kind-individual xk and a property P and
returns a set of kind-individuals yk . This is a set of subkinds of xk . What is special about
this set of subkinds is that all lions that eat people must instantiate some subkind yk . That
is, all individuals zo that live in the intersection of (i) the property denoted by the relative
clause–expressed as P–, and (ii) the property correlate of the kind xk , must in turn realize
some subkind yk . Moreover, because yk is a subkind of xk in a partition of yk , all zo must
belong to the same subkind.
Let us work out an example. Consider:
(92) The lions that eat people
Lions that eat people do not conform to a natural class, so this is a task for KSKah and ad hoc
subkinds. Syntactically, assume a structure like the following.
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(93)

DP
D

NP1

the

NP2
KSKah

CP
NP3i

that ti eat people

By the time KSK gets to enter into the derivation, the NP already denotes a kind.18
(94) a. ⟦NP2⟧ = ⟦KSKah ⟧(⟦
= λP⟨et⟩ .λyk .∀zo [(∪
b. ⟦NP1⟧ = λyk .∀zo [(∪

⟧)
⋂ P)(zo ) → zo ≤ ∏(

)(yk )]

⋂ ⟦CP⟧)(zo ) → zo ≤ ∏(

= λyk .∀zo [lion(zo ) ∧ eat-people(zo ) → zo ≤ ∏(

)(yk )]
)(yk )]

The ﬁrst conjunct in the last line above returns a set of kind-individuals that forms a partition
of lions and where (iii) one of the cells of the partition contains lions that eat people. As a
consequence, non-people-eating lions will have to be in other cells in the partition. It follows,
then, that the cells in the partition cannot contain taxonomic subkinds anymore, since no
partition of lions in terms of their subspecies will contain the ad hoc subkind of lions that eat
people in one its cells. Thus, as desired, this method of referencing ad hoc subkinds overrides
the (taxonomic) default we alluded to above.
But how is then the rest of the partition completed? The most likely way is to ﬁnd a suitable equivalence relation that groups all people-eating lions in the same cell. An equivalence
relation eat the same as might do. With this equivalence relation we obtain a partition of lions
like the following.
18

There a number of ways of doing this within; for discussion see Carlson (1977b), Zamparelli (1998), Dayal
(2004), Kratzer (2005), Borer (2005) a.o. Bear in mind however that diﬀerent options entail diﬀerent views of
how nouns come to denote kinds.
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(95) {∩ λ.∗ lions that eat people, ∩ λ.∗ lions that eat carrion, ∩ λ.∗ lions that eat grass…}
={

,

,

…}

What matters most is that the modiﬁer, the relative clause in these case, is telling us what
one of the subkinds must be.19 Now the deﬁnite article can simply contribute an ι-operator:
⟦the P⟧ = the largest member of P, if there is one. It applies to the set of subkinds of lions that
eat people and returns its maximal element, lumping them together in the individual correlate
of the property be a people-eating lion.
(96) = ιyk .∀zo [lion(zo ) ∧ eat-people(zo ) → zo ≤ ∏(

)(yk )]

= ∩ λz.∗ lion(z) ∧ eat people(z)
We are almost done. The resulting DP can serve as an argument to non-kind-selecting predicates via Derived Kind Predication (see (82) above). The kind interpretation of a sentence
like (97a) is in (97b).
(97) a. You like the lions that eat people.
b. ∃y[∪ (∩ λz.∗ lion(z) ∧ eat people(z))(y) ∧ like(y)(you)]
That is, a sentence like (97a) asserts the existence of an instantiation of the ad hoc lion subkind
that eats people, and that you like those instantiations.
With this, we are done. A sentence like (98a) receives a single interpretation (under its
reading), stated in (98b).
(98) a. In thirty minutes Mary saw the birds that John saw in a day.
b. ∃y[∪ (∩ λx.∗ bird(x) ∧ saw-in-a-day(x)(John))(y) ∧ saw-in-thirty-minutes(y)(you)]
Notice that, practically speaking, (98b) may be interpreted in any number of ways. This is
because all the semantics of KSKah forces us to do is ﬁnd a partition of birds where the birds
19

Bear in mind that in order to avoid overlapping cells in the partition we have to be careful about the language
we use to express the relevant subkinds. Thus, if we want to consider lions that eat people and carrion as an
available subkind, we should diﬀerentiate between them and lions that only eat people.
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that John saw in a day live in one cell. What characterizes those birds is determined by the
context. For instance, it could be that John saw very strange birds, and that Mary saw birds
of comparable strangeness in a shorter span of time. This is a possible interpretation of (98a)
and is captured by (98b). Alternatively, it could be that John saw n-many birds in one day
and Mary saw as many in a shorter span of time. What particular criteria we adopt is set by
its plausibility in the context, provided that the partition requirement is satisﬁed.

2.7

Assessment and conclusion

The merits of looking at English so-called ARs this way are various. All the properties of
interpretations of ARs discussed in sections §2.2 through §2.4 follow without further
ado, namely, (i) it accounts for the

⊆

generalization in 1 above, which states that

interpretations of relative clauses are parasitic on kind interpretations; (ii) it provides
a new way to look into the connection between the words amount and kind (coincidentally with
recent results by Scontras 2017); (iii) it explains why

interpretations are not subject

to the typical restrictions that we observe with constructions that involve degree-abstraction
and degree-operators. Thus, if the results reported here are on the right track, ARs in English
may not exist as we knew them. This conclusion, however, only extends to the type of ARs
discussed in this dissertation, and not to other potential candidates (e.g. ACD ARs, etc.).
Before concluding, I must point out two issues on which the view that
tations are parasitic on

readings does not shed light on. The analysis presented here

does not make predictions about when or why
some contexts where

interpre-

interpretations are not available. In

interpretations are quite natural,

interpretations seem to

be unavailable, and no tinkering with the context will improve the situation. Complex demonstratives provide the clearest example. Take the two questions in (99) and the answer in (100).
Only the question in (99a) may receive an answer like (100).
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(99) a. How long have you been drinking Pinot Noir?
b. How long have you been drinking three bottles of wine every day?
3(99a); 8(99b)

(100) I’ve been drinking that wine for ten years now.

This means that although (100) is a good answer to a question asking about a taxonomic kind,
it is not a good answer to a question inquiring about amounts. Intuitively, the answer that
works for (99b) is the minimally diﬀerent (101).
8(99a); 3(99b)

(101) I’ve been drinking that much wine for ten years now.

A further potential issue of this account has to do with noun kind itself.20 If

inter-

pretations are really ad hoc subkind interpretations, then why is the noun kind incompatible
with the

interpretation? Consider:

(102) a. We didn’t have the soldiers that they had.
b. We didn’t have the kind of soldiers that they had.

3

;3

8

;3

Given the analysis provided here, the noun kind in (102b) is doing what the kind-to-subkind
operator KSKah is doing covertly in (102a). And yet the an

interpretation is out in

(102b). Perhaps, then, the operator KSKah does not fully parallel the English word kind, but
I do not have an answer yet as to why or how that should be.
Nothing of what we have said so far hints a solution for these two issues, and so I will
leave them open here.

20

I thank Seth Cable for pointing this out to me.
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CHAPTER 3
NOMINAL AMOUNT RELATIVES IN SPANISH

3.1

Initial considerations

The goal of this chapter is to analyze Spanish Amount Relatives when they appear as
complements to predicates that take nominal arguments. I will refer to these constructions
as nominal Amount Relatives, nominal ARs for short. From a semantic standpoint, nominal
ARs in Spanish seem to be no diﬀerent from their English counterparts. Thus, the classic
examples that we ﬁnd in the literature on ARs in English work with nominal ARs in Spanish
as well.
(1) a. Nos
us.

llevaría años beber el champán
take

que derramamos en la ﬁesta.

years drink the champagne that spilled

in the party

‘It would take us years to drink the champagne that we spilled at the party’
b. Perdimos la
lost

batalla porque no teníamos los soldados que tenía nuestro

the battle because not have

the soldiers that have our

enemigo.
enemy
‘We lost the battle because we didn’t have the soldiers that our enemy had’
The distinguishing property of Spanish is that it shows a greater degree of freedom in the
construction of nominal ARs, and allows them in environments where they seem to be impossible in English. Of the examples below, only the Spanish variants are reported to have
the relevant

interpretations out of the blue.
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(2) a. He visto los pájaros que tú
aux seen the birds

has visto.

that you aux. seen

‘I have seen the birds that you have seen.’
b. Pedro ha escrito los libros que escribió Tolstoy.
Pedro aux written the books that wrote

Tolstoy

‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.’
c. Juan ha traído

las manzanas que trajo

Juan aux brought the apples

Pedro el año pasado.

that brought Pedro the year past

‘Pedro has brought the apples that brought Pedro last year.’
In contrast, English speakers seem to require considerable more contextual support to accept
sentences like (2). For instance, take (2b) above: out of the blue, the English translation is
odd, presumably because nobody can write the same books that Tolstoy wrote. This oddness
is indicative of the lack of an

interpretation. But now consider the same example in

the following dialog.
(3) Emil Sinclair is an incredible young writer. I was reading about him today and, you won’t
believe it, he is only 30 and he has already written the books that Tolstoy wrote.
There is a contrast–at least for some speakers–between (2b) and (3): in (3) the
pretation is now easier to access. But the fact that Spanish allows
(2) quite eﬀortlessly raises the possibility that the source of the

inter-

interpretations in
interpretation in the

two languages is underlyingly diﬀerent.
The goal of this chapter is to argue that Spanish truly possesses a mechanism to deliver
amounts that is absent in English. In a nutshell, I locate the source of the diﬀerence between
the two languages in the ability of Spanish to construct relative clauses that denote deﬁnite
descriptions of degrees (maximimalized sets of degrees, to be precise), that can in turn be
used as Measure Phrases. Moreover, the syntactic structure that permits us to do so in Spanish
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diﬀers minimally from the analysis of propositional ARs that I will present in Chapter 4. The
resulting picture is one where propositional ARs and nominal ARs are related to each other
in the same exact way in which interrogatives clauses and free relative clauses relate to each
other.
From a semantic point of view, the analysis captures the three main properties of ARs at
large, as discussed in §1.3.1 and summarized below.
(4) Desiderata for
a. Deﬁniteness: A

interpretations
interpretations refer to a deﬁnite amount.

b. Indeﬁniteness: The head of the relative clause in interpreted as an indeﬁnite.
c. Identity: A

interpretations require a comparison of two amounts of same stuﬀ.

The chapter takes oﬀ by ﬁrst discussing the syntactic aspects of nominal ARs in Spanish,
which will be crucial to understanding the diﬀerences between English and Spanish. Then, I
propose a semantic analysis of Spanish nominal ARs and conclude with a general assessment.

3.2

Quantity free relatives in Spanish

3.2.1

Finding the pieces to build nominal ARs

Spanish has an independent ability to generate relative clauses with

interpreta-

tions in simple contexts similar to (2). Moreover, it can do so through either one of two
constructions: cuanto and lo que free relatives. Though these constructions do not superﬁcially match nominal ARs, we can identify in them all the pieces that are required to derive
the

interpretation for nominal ARs. In a nutshell, the way that I propose to look at

nominal ARs is the following. We start oﬀ with the observation that Spanish allows
interpretations where English does not (at least not readily). The burden of explaining this
contrast is placed on a particular syntactic structure which is available in Spanish but absent
from English. Evidence for this syntactic construal comes from relative constructions other
than nominal ARs, the already mentioned cuanto and lo que free relatives. It follows then
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that Spanish nominal ARs cannot be mere ordinary headed relative clauses, but something
else. Thus, I propose an analysis of Spanish nominal ARs where they are in fact very closely
related to propositional ARs, on the one hand, and free relatives, on the other, but crucially
diﬀerent from restrictive relative clauses.
Following this narrative, the syntactic make-up of nominal ARs depends on certain properties of Spanish free relatives that are absent from English. The ﬁrst such property is the
ability to form quantity free relatives. Quantity free relatives are free relatives formed with
the quantity relative pronoun cuanto, and are somewhat of a rarity even among Romance
languages. The examples in (2) all have variants with cuanto that have the relevant
interpretation.
(5) a. He visto cuantos

pájaros has visto tú.

aux seen how many.

.

birds

you aux seen

‘I have seen as many birds as you have seen.’
b. Pedro ha escrito cuantos

libros escribió Tolstoy.

Pedro aux written how many.

.

books wrote

Tolstoy

‘Pedro has written as many books as Tolstoy wrote.’
c. Juan ha traído

cuantas

Juan aux brought how many.

manzanas trajo
.

apples

Pedro el año pasado.

brought Pedro the year past

‘Juan has brought as many apples as Pedro brought last year.’
Free relatives formed with cuanto have the ability to pied-pipe an NP to the front of the
relative clause. Excluding -ever free relatives, this is not generally possible in English (see
also Caponigro 2002 and Cecchetto and Donati 2015 for a cross-linguistic assessment of this
generalization), nor in lo que free relatives in Spanish.1
1

At this point, I do not have an answer as to why English only allows how many free relatives with ever. There
are a number of semantic properties that distinguish the two types of free relatives, most notably that ever free
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(6) a. * I read what book you read.
b. * He leído lo
aux read the.

libro que tu

has leído.

book that you aux read

Thus, the ability to form quantity free relatives with cuanto constitutes the ﬁrst piece of evidence that Spanish has nominal wh-constructions that speciﬁcally deliver

interpre-

tations. Moreover, the lack of analogous constructions in English give us a ﬁrst point of
divergence between both languages.
The second piece of evidence comes from lo que free relatives. Spanish is a language that
cannot form free relatives with the relative pronoun que (“what”). Instead, a CP headed by
the complementizer que appears directly as the complement of the deﬁnite article.2
(7) Juan comió lo que Pedro cocinó
Juan ate

the that Pedro cooked

‘Juan ate what Pedro cooked’
The derivation of a lo que free relative involves a null wh-operator that raises from a CP
internal position to [Spec,CP], very much like in ordinary free relatives, as is clear from the
comparison of the two structures in (8) below (e.g. Gutiérrez-Rexach 2014).
(8) a. English free relative
[ D∅ [ whati [ C○ [+

] ∅ [ Pedro cooked ti ]]]]

b. Spanish lo que free relative
[ lo [ Opi [ C○ [+

] que [ Pedro cocinó ti ]]]]

relatives have a modal ﬂavor (Dayal 1997, von Fintel 2000 a.o.). However, it is not clear how the cross-linguistic
morphological generalizations observed by Caponigro (2004) bear on these semantic diﬀerences.
2

The consensus is that in lo que free relatives que is not a pronoun, just a complementizer. For discussion
see Brucart (1992a) and Arregi (1998) a.o.
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The structures are formally identical, diﬀering only in the pieces that each language realizes
overtly vs. covertly: Spanish shows overtly what English does covertly, and vice-versa.
Summing up, Spanish has both the ability to form free relatives with overt deﬁnite articles
and the ability to form free relatives with nominal heads that have quantity-oriented meanings.
These are the two pieces that I will use to build nominal ARs in Spanish.3
3.2.2

Semantic considerations

Now that we have laid out the syntactic considerations regarding cuanto and lo que free
relatives in Spanish, we ask how their structures are interpreted to give rise to

inter-

pretations. From a semantic point of view, it is obvious why cuanto free relatives are able to
deliver

interpretations, since it is part of the lexical content of cuanto (“how many”).

But lo que free relatives are ambiguous. The sentence in (9) has both an

and an

interpretation.
(9) Es imposible comer lo que Juan come.
is impossible eat

the that Juan eats

i. ‘It is impossible to eat what Juan eats’
ii. ‘It is impossible to eat as much as Juan eats’
This suggests that the null wh-operator Op in lo que free relatives like (8b) may optionally be
a variant of cuanto (“how many”) as well.
Now that we have seen the range of interpretations available for free relatives, we can
ask: what are the available interpretations of nominal ARs? As a testing ground, let us try
the verb escribir (“write”), which may take both interrogative and nominal complements (see
discussion in Chapter 4). This ﬂexibility allows us to tease apart the meanings that come
about with propositional ARs on the one hand, and nominal ARs, on the other. The relevant
sentence is (2b), repeated below.
3
It is important to notice that there are important diﬀerences in terms of word order restrictions between
nominal ARs and the propositional ARs discussed in the next Chapter (see §4.1.3).
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(2b) Pedro ha escrito los libros que escribió Tolstoy.
Pedro aux written the books that wrote

Tolstoy

‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.’
In §4.1.3.1 of the next chapter I discuss the relevance of Subject-Verb inversion in Spanish
propositional ARs. For the moment, it suﬃces to know that propositional ARs, unlike nominal
ARs, require SV inversion.4 In the case of (2b), the sentence contains a relative clause with
SV inversion (escribió precedes the subject Tolstoy). As a consequence, a propositional AR
parse is available: a parse where (2b) is interpreted as a subordinate question. In this particular
case, (2b) is ambiguous between two diﬀerent propositional ARs parses: one corresponding
to a subordinate identity of

question, the other corresponding to an identity of

question.
(10) a. Pedro ha escrito qué libros escribió Tolstoy.
Pedro aux written what books wrote

Tolstoy

‘Pedro has written what books Tolstoy wrote.’
b. Pedro ha escrito cuántos

libros escribió Tolstoy.

Pedro aux written how many books wrote

Tolstoy

‘Pedro has written how many books Tolstoy wrote.’
That is (2b) is true under a parse equivalent to (10a) if Pedro took a piece of paper and wrote
down a list with all of Tolstoy’s works (War & Peace, Anna Karenina, The death of Ivan
4

This is an old observation (e.g. Plann 1984 a.o.). As an illustration, consider the contrast between the two
variants below. Propositional ARs, which appear as complements to wh-embedding predicates like preguntarse
(“wonder”) below, are only grammatical with SV inversion.
(i)

Me pregunto las
manzanas que { comió Pedro / *Pedro comió }.
I.
wonder the. . apples
that ate
Pedro
‘I wonder {what/how many} apples Pedro ate’

The full discussion of these facts is provided in §4.1.3.1. For the moment, it suﬃces to take the requirement of
SV inversion with propositional ARs to tease them apart from nominal ARs, which are compatible with it, but
do not require it.
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Ilyich, etc.). Under a parse equivalent to (10b), the sentence is true if what Pedro wrote down
was the number of books that Tolstoy wrote (in this case, 12, counting novels and novellas).
Now let us take a look at what happens in the absence of SV inversion. Recall that, SV
inversion being a necessary requirement of propositional ARs, its absence guarantees that
the relative clause is not interpreted as a propositional AR (again the full discussion of this
restriction is discussed in §4.1.3.1). That is, (11) cannot have the same structure as the AR
in (2b).
(11)

Pedro ha escrito los libros que Tolstoy escribió.
Pedro aux written the books that wrote

Tolstoy

‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.’
This example has a number of available interpretations as well. The ordinary restrictive relative clause interpretation is available, but is of course false, for Pedro could not have possible
written War & Peace, Anna Karenina, etc. The identity of

question interpretation in

(10a) is still available, however. How so? In this case, because nothing precludes the relative clause in (11) to be interpreted as concealed question.5 Finally, the sentence also has an
interpretation, but one that is diﬀerent from (10b):
(12) Pedro ha escrito cuantos

libros Tolstoy escribió.

Pedro aux written how many books Tolstoy wrote
‘Pedro has written as many books as Tolstoy wrote.’
The diﬀerence between the two

interpretations in (10b) and (12) revolves around

what exactly Pedro wrote. In (10b), Pedro wrote a number, but in (12) he wrote books. The
following paraphrases may help in teasing the two interpretations apart.
5

This meaning can be derived as discussed in §4.5.
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(13) a. Paraphrase of (10b)
Pedro has written down the number corresponding to the number of books that
Tolstoy wrote.
[True iff Pedro wrote down the number 12]
b. Paraphrase of (12)
Pedro has written the same number of books that Tolstoy wrote.
[True iff Pedro wrote any 12 books]
Because SV inversion is optional for nominal ARs, the interpretation in (12) is also possible
for (2b). Interestingly, however, the identity of

interpretation in (10b) is absent from

(11). In §3.5.1, after I have spelled out the analysis, I explain why identity of
pretations are available in (11), and what precludes identity of

inter-

readings from arising

in this construction.

3.3

The syntax of nominal ARs

The upshot of the previous section is that unlike English, Spanish makes use of two different free relatives that denote amounts. How does this bear on nominal ARs? I argue that
nominal ARs in spanish are in fact free relatives, of a sort that is a cross between cuanto and
lo que free relatives. Like lo que relatives, nominal ARs have an overt deﬁnite article, and
like cuanto free relatives, they involve a quantity-denoting wh-operator that pied-pipes an NP.
Moreover, I suggest that this particular strain of free relatives are related to the propositional
ARs discussed in the next chapter much in the same way as free relatives and wh-constructions
are often taken to be related.
Given the surface similarity (and often string-identity) of free relatives and interrogatives
in languages like English, the two constructions are often taken to have a common core. However, given their radically diﬀerent external distribution, the two must also be fundamentally
diﬀerent in some way. One way to characterize this key diﬀerence is to think of free relatives
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as requiring an argumental type meaning, unlike questions. Following the inﬂuential ideas
in Jacobson (1995) and Caponigro (2004) a.o., the diﬀerence can be captured analytically
by dissociating the C○ head in free relative clauses from whatever will give rise to questionsemantics.
(14) English wh-constructions
a. Interrogative
[ whati [ C○ [+

] [ Mary bought ti ]]]

b. Free relative
[ D∅ [ whati [ C○ [+

] [ Mary bought ti ]]]]

On this view, then, free relatives are a hybrid between questions and ordinary restrictive relative clauses. Like questions, they involve movement of a wh-operator, but like nominals
restricted by relative clauses, the resulting object is a DP denoting an individual.
I argue that the diﬀerence between nominal and propositional ARs in Spanish also comes
down to a diﬀerence in the presence/absence of an interrogative core with question semantics.
Building on the proposed structure for lo que free relatives, I suggest the following syntactic
structure for Spanish nominal ARs.
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(15) Syntactic structure of nominal ARs in Spanish [with optional T-to-C movement]
DP
D
las

CP
DPi
Opwh manzanas

C’
C○
que[+

TP
DP

]

Juanj

T’
T○

vP

trajo

tj ti

Variation in just a few key pieces is able to capture the similarities and diﬀerences between
nominal ARs and the more transparent free relatives. The parallel external distribution of
nominal ARs and lo que and cuanto free relatives follows from the fact that nominal ARs are
a subtype of free relatives. If correct, then Spanish allows structures like (15) for clauses that,
on the surface, look like ordinary restrictive relative clauses. Moreover, this particularity of
Spanish is not shared by other languages like English, for it depends on idiosyncrasies related
to how free relatives may be constructed in the language.6
Let us recap. The desiderata we started this section with involved ﬁnding a syntactic
construction particular to Spanish and crucially absent from English, that would help us understand why Spanish allows nominal ARs so freely. I argued that nominal ARs are, despite
appearances, free relatives, sharing properties with other two existing free relative constructions in the language, lo que and cuanto free relatives. The next step is to explain how and why
6

For discussion on the full gamut of Spanish wh-constructions, see §4.2.4.
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attributing this syntax to nominal ARs can explain the contrasts in the availability of
interpretations between English and Spanish.

3.4

Nominal ARs as degree expressions

In Chapter §1 we saw that virtually all semantic analyses of ARs in the literature (e.g.
Carlson 1977a, Heim 1987, Grosu and Landman 1998, etc.) entertain analyses where the
CP in the embedded positions denotes a degree property. In this section I provide my own
analysis of Spanish nominal ARs on the basis of the same premises.
The semantic analysis that I propose for Spanish nominal ARs is built in two steps. First,
nominal ARs are argued to denote to a maximal degree (a deﬁnite description of a degree).
Then, the resulting degree description may take up the role of a Measure Phrase in an ordinary
pseudo-partitive construction (e.g. three kilos of tomatoes), where the head noun has undergone elision under identity. The resulting construction amounts to the property of individuals
denoted by the elided NP as measured by the maximal degree denoted by the nominal AR.
3.4.1

Step 1: Deriving a maximal degree

The ﬁrst step is to provide a semantics for the nominal AR itself. As mentioned above, I
assume that nominal ARs in Spanish–and cuanto free relatives, for that matter–denote maximal degrees. This is in accordance with traditional approaches to ARs, as well as Grosu and
Landman’s (1998). The derivation proceeds very similarly to what we saw with propositional
ARs. The relevant LF structure we start oﬀ is repeated below:
(16) [

1

las [

1

[

2

the

manzanas ]i [

2

apples

que Juan trajo

ti ]]]

that Juan brought

‘The apples that Juan brought’
As is common practice, we employ a silent

quantiﬁer, familiar from the literature on

comparative constructions.
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(17) ⟦

⟧ = λP⟨et⟩ .λQ⟨et⟩ .λd.∃x [P(x) ∧ Q(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]

The ﬁnal technical adjustment involves the deﬁnite determiner. In this case, I assume that
when the deﬁnite article in Spanish applies to a set of degrees, it returns its maximal element
(Gutiérrez-Rexach 1996, 1999, 2014). The operator

is deﬁned following Russell’s ι-

operator, and so it requires the existence of a unique maximal element. Thus, although I will
often use (18a) as a shorthand, bear in mind that the full deﬁnition of
(18) a. ⟦
b. ⟦

⟧ = λN⟨dt⟩ . ιn[N(n)]

is that of (18a).

[i.e. ιn[N(n)] ↔

(N)]

⟧ = λN⟨dt⟩ .ιd[d ∈ N ∧ ∀d′ [d′ ∈ N ∧ d ≠ d′ → d′ < d]]

From here, I follow Jacobson’s (1995) and Caponigro’s (2004) syntax-semantics mapping of
free relatives.
(19) a. ⟦DP ⟧ = λQ⟨et⟩ .λd.∃x [manzanas(x) ∧ Q(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]
b. ⟦CP ⟧ = λx. [trajo(Juan, x)]
c. ⟦CP ⟧ = λd.∃x [manzanas(x) ∧ trajo(Juan, x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]
d. ⟦DP ⟧ =

(λd. ∃x[manzanas(x) ∧ trajo(Juan, x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d])

= ιd[ ∃x[manzanas(x) ∧ trajo(Juan, x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]]
Semantically, the nominal AR denotes the maximal degree that holds of the individuals that
are in the extension of the two properties (being an apple and being brought by Juan). Intuitively, this is what we want: maximalization restricts the set of degrees to its maximal degree,
if there is one. So far, these results replicate Grosu and Landman’s (1998).
3.4.2

Step 2: Enter the Measure Phrase

The next step in the derivation is to ﬁx the sortal mismatch with verbs that take e-type
arguments. In §1.4.3 we described how this is one of the biggest challenges of ARs at large.
The solution that I suggest to solve the problem relies on thinking of nominal ARs as Measure Phrases. Given that nominal ARs only operate in the dimension of
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, i.e. they

only provide cardinalities, I will take them to be part of a NP where they attribute a certain
cardinality to the property denoted by the NP (although see Chapter 5 for an application to
Degree Neuter Relatives).
3.4.2.1

The syntax and semantics of cardinal numbers

The basic assumption about the syntax and semantics of cardinal numbers follows ideas
from Hurford (1975), Ionin and Matushansky (2006), Kayne (2005) and Solt (2015). As an
illustration, take the NP three apples; the basic structure that we are concerned with looks as
follows.
(20) Basic syntax of cardinal numbers
MeasP
DegP: d

Meas’

three M

NP: ⟨et⟩
apples

As the tree makes explicit, I assume a degree semantics for cardinal numbers, following a
similar treatment as Solt’s (2009) for quantity denoting words like many and few. On my
view, numerals are just names of degrees, syntactically occupying the speciﬁer of a Number
Phrase projection, whose task is that of measuring the cardinality of an individual. To do so,
it requires the mediation of a measuring function, represented as M

above. This M

function has been proven to be well motivated both on syntactic (Kayne 2005, Zweig 2005,
a.o.) as well as semantic grounds (e.g. Rett 2008, Wellwood 2015, Solt 2015 a.o.).7 There
are a number of ways M

can be deﬁned so that the composition of (20) succeeds. Here

7

Diﬀerent authors give diﬀerent names to the M
head. Ultimately, this way of mapping individuals to
cardinalities is a way of recasting old ideas by Cartwright (1975) and Cresswell (1976), who brought attention to
the necessity for a mechanism that would allow us to go back and forth between individual denoting expressions
and their cardinalities.
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I adopt a simple one: M

simply takes a degree d and returns the property of individuals

whose cardinality equals d.
(21) ⟦M

⟧ = λnd .λxe .∣x∣ ≥ n

The obvious issue with this simple deﬁnition of M
NP. Moreover, the motivation for introducing M

is that it cannot yet combine with the
is to create a gradable predicate–of type

⟨d, et⟩–that may later take a simplex degree of type d. That is, the resulting phrase [
NP] must be of type ⟨d, et⟩, and so other alternatives like existentially closing the denotation of the NP will not do. To solve the mismatch I appeal to a variant of Kratzer’s (1996)
Event Identiﬁcation rule (cf. Degree Argument Introduction in Solt 2015), call it Degree
Identiﬁcation:8
(22) D

I

(DI):

If α is a branching node, {β, γ} are the set of α’s daughters, and ⟦β⟧ = λxe .P(x),
⟦γ⟧ = λnd .λxe .Q(n)(x), then ⟦α⟧ = λnd .λxe .P(x) ∧ Q(n)(x).
That is, Degree Identiﬁcation is a mode of composition that makes it possible to identify any
two individuals with respect to a single degree description. It takes two functions g ∈ D⟨d,et⟩
and f ∈ D⟨et⟩ and returns a function h ∈ D⟨d,et⟩ . The parallelism with Event Identiﬁcation is
absolute. The semantic computation of an ordinary NP like three apples goes now as follows:
8

Notice that a second option is to provide two diﬀerent deﬁnitions of M
version.
(i)

a. ⟦
b. ⟦

attributive ⟧

= λP⟨et⟩ .λnd .λxe [P(x) ∧ ∣x∣ ≥ n]
⟧
predicative = λnd .λxe [∣x∣ ≥ n]
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, a predicative and an attributive

MeasP: ⟨et⟩

(23)

λxe . ∗apple(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = 
Meas’: ⟨d, et⟩

DegP: d

λnd .λxe . ∗apple(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = n

three
M

: ⟨d, et⟩

NP: ⟨et⟩
λx. ∗apple(x)
apples

3.4.2.2

Application to nominal ARs

We are now ready to calculate the meaning of a nominal AR. Given that nominal ARs
denote deﬁnite degrees, we can simply use them as inputs to Meas’ in structures like (20). An
AR like (16) above has now the meaning in (24b):
(24) a. [ las [
the

1

[

manzanas ]i [
apples

2

que Pedro trajo

ti ]]]

that Pedro brough

‘The apples that Pedro brought’
b. ιd[ ∃x[manzanas(x) ∧ trajo(Juan, x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]]
=

(λd. ∃x[manzanas(x) ∧ trajo(Pedro, x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d])

The unique maximal degree denoted by (24b) can now measure the cardinality of the NP in the
head position just like the numeral three did in the previous case. Critical for the calculation
to go through is the assumption that there is in fact a head identical to the head internal to the
nominal AR.
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MeasP: ⟨et⟩

(25)
λxe . ∗manzana(x) ∧ ∣x∣ =

(λd. ∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ trajo(x, Pedro) ∧ ∣x∣ = d])
Meas’: ⟨d, et⟩

DegP: d

λnd .λxe . ∗manzana(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = n

⟦(24b)⟧
M

: ⟨d, et⟩

NP: ⟨et⟩
λx. ∗manzana(x)
manzanas

While a full assessment of the full analysis will have to wait for later, we can already notice
some desirable features of (25): (i) maximalization happens at the degree level only, (ii) the
resulting object is not a degree and so no sortal mismatch arises when combining with other
verbal predicates, and (iii) no ad hoc elision of the deﬁnite article is required.
The property of this proposal that requires more discussion is the syntactic procedure that
elides the head NP. Schematically:
(26) NP elision in nominal ARs
MeasP
DegP
D
las

Meas’
CP

M

DP
Op manzanas

C’
que[+

]

trajo Pedro
Identity & Deletion
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NP
⟨manzanas⟩

This deletion operation is reminiscent of Comparative Deletion. Comparative Deletion is a
hallmark feature of comparative constructions like (27), which compare two quantities of the
same sort of stuﬀ (number of books, degrees of height, degrees of carefulness; Kennedy 1999,
Kennedy and Merchant 2000).
(27) a. Jill wrote more books than Sue read ⟨books⟩.
b. The table is wider than chair is ⟨wide⟩.
c. My sister drives as carefully as I drive ⟨carefully⟩.
What makes Comparative Deletion interesting is that it is obligatory if and only if there is
identity between the two objects of the comparison. That is, when it comes to Comparative
Deletion, you can only delete under identity, and if you can delete, you must.
(28) a.

Jill wrote more books than Sue read {*books / magazines}.

b.

The table is wider than chair is {*wide / tall}.

c.

My sister drives as carefully as I drive {*carefully / recklessly}.

The parallel between (28) and (26) above is clear: in (26) elision is obligatory and it must
happen under identity. But there is also an obvious diﬀerence: in comparatives, comparison
is possible when the objects that are being compared are diﬀerent; in such cases, deletion
simply does not take place. However, this is not a possibility for nominal ARs, as illustrated
in (29).
(29) a. * las manzanas que trajo
the apples

that brought Pedro apples

b. * las manzanas que trajo
the apples

Pedro manzanas

Pedro plátanos

that brought Pedro bananas

In nominal ARs, then, there are both (i) obligatory deletion under identity and (ii) obligatory
identity of the objects of comparison.
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3.4.2.2.1

More deletion under identity There is another corner of the Spanish grammar

where a similar elision process as in nominal ARs seems to take place. This is in comparative constructions that are formed with the standard marker de (see Brucart 1992b, Sáez and
Sánchez López 2013, Mendia 2017). The following is an example:
(30) Compré más libros
bought more book.

de los
.

of the.

que compraste tú.
.

that bought

you

‘I bought more books than (the books) you bought’
Typically, comparatives with de take a relative clause as their standard, as in (30), but it must
be a relative clause with a “missing head”. This makes it a rather remarkable comparative
construction, since it not only must there be elision, but the construction is ungrammatical
if the head of the relative clause does not match the restriction of the comparative quantiﬁer
más (“more”).
(31) a. * Compré más libros
bought more book.

de los
.

of the.

b. * Compré más libros de los
bought more books of the.

cómics
.

comic.

libros
.

book.

que compraste tú
.

that bought

you

que compraste tú
.

that bought

you

There is, to my knowledge, no satisfactory explanation for why this should be so. But, whatever elision process drives the restrictions on de comparatives in Spanish, it seems to be exactly
the same we observe in (26). I will take it then, that the elision of (26) is part of a general
process that is visible in other constructions.
3.4.2.2.2

Pronouncing diﬀerent copies The fact that we have two copies in the con-

struction in (26) raises the question as to whether there is optionality about which one of the
copies may be pronounced. In the case of nominal ARs, this optionality is not available in
modern Spanish, as shown in (32).
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(32) * las que trajo

Pedro manzanas

the that brought Pedro apples
But there are indications that this was not always so. The following is an example from the
th century by Teresa of Ávila.9
(33) Mas no le da licencia que reparta la fruta, hasta que él esté tan fuerte con
lo que ha comido de ella…
‘But He doesn’t give (her) permission to distribute fruit until she is strong from what
(fruit) she has eaten.’
The interest of the previous passage lies in the free relative lo que ha comido de ella (lit. “what
has eaten of it.

”), where ella (“she”) is a nominal referring to fruta (“fruit”). That is, this is a

nominal AR–it refers to an amount of fruits, not to any particular fruits–where the higher copy
of the Measure Phrase is realized. This is still quite not parallel to (26), since the presence of
the neuter variant of the deﬁnite article suggests that there never was a nominal head inside
the relative clause in the ﬁrst clause. Nevertheless, the fact that it was possible to build an
denoting lo que free relative that is modifying a subsequent nominal ﬁts well with the
syntactic account of nominal ARs suggested here. A tentative structural analysis of (33) may
go as follows.
(34) [

[ lo [ [

Op

]i [ que …ti ]]] [ M

fruta ]]

A second case suggesting that the head of the Measure Phrase may be overt involves Degree
Neuter Relatives. Degree Neuter Relatives are constructions similar to nominal ARs where
the head of the relative clause is not nominal, but some gradable predicate.

9

Passage from Libro de la vida, by Santa Teresa de Jesús, in García López (ed.), 2015, Penguin Clásicos.
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(35) Juan no es lo
Juan not is the.

alto que es Pedro
tall that is Pedro

‘Juan is not as tall as Pedro’
Foreshadowing the extension of the analysis proposed here to Degree Neuter Relatives, which
will be the object of Chapter 5, notice that Degree Neuter Relatives also allow a word order
where the gradable predicate is ﬁnal.
(36) Juan no es lo
Juan not is the.

que es Pedro de alto
that is Pedro of tall

At this point, one may wonder whether alto in (36) is really sitting in a higher Measure Phrase
(or Adjective Phrase in this case), or whether it is simply a lower copy of the CP internal
adjective that has been fronted. One argument in favor of the ﬁrst option comes from the
need to use the preposition de in (36). This preposition is obligatory in Spanish Measure
Phrases:10
(37) a. dos metros *(de) { cable / largo }
two meters of

wire

long

b. dos kilos *(de) { patatas / peso
two kilos of

potatoes

}

weight

Like in (37), dropping the preposition from (36) results in ungrammaticality, as does fronting
it together with the adjective.
10
This raises the question of why the preposition de cannot be overt in nominal ARs, as opposed to Degree
Neuter Relatives and other Measure Phrases.
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(38) a. * Juan no es lo

que es Pedro alto

Juan not is the.
b. * Juan no es lo

that is Pedro tall
de alto que es Pedro

Juan not is the.

of tall that is Pedro

The ungrammaticality above suggests that there is no place for a preposition inside the CP. As
a consequence, the adjective alto in (36) must be outside the CP. This suggests that sentences
like (35) must be taken to be genuinely ambiguous between two diﬀerent syntactic parses,
(39a) and (39b), but (39c) is not one of them.
(39) a. 3 Pronounce CP internal higher copy
[

[ lo [

[

Op alto ]i [ que …ti ]]] [ ⟨alto⟩ ]

b. 3 Pronounce external copy
[

[ lo [

[

Op ⟨alto⟩ ]i [ que …ti ]]] [ de alto ]

c. 8 Pronounce CP internal lower copy
[

[ lo [

Op ]i [ que …alto ]]] [ ⟨alto⟩ ]

[

Altogether, I take the outcome of this discussion to be that the elision pattern proposed in
(26) for Measure Phrases containing nominal ARs is both not only possible, but also attested
elsewhere in the language.
3.4.3

Step 3: The ﬁnal touch

We are not quite done yet. We have a semantics for nominal ARs that intuitively give us
the desired result, but which, being of type ⟨et⟩, cannot directly combine with predicates that
take e-type arguments. For concreteness, consider (2c), repeated below.
(40) [

Juan

[

trajo

[

las

manzanas que trajo Pedro ]]].

Juan brought the apples that brought Pedro
‘Juan brought the (amount of) apples that Pedro brought.’
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In (2c), the matrix predicate is seeking for a type of argument that does not ﬁt with the nominal
AR. Luckily, this kind of mismatch is well studied, and there are a number of possibilities
available.
For reasons that will become clear shortly, I favor the view where, rather than providing an
argument to the main predicate, nominal ARs in Spanish semantically restrict its denotation.
That is, instead of the predicate taking the object as its argument via Functional Application,
they combine via Restrict (Chung and Ladusaw 2004).
(41) R

:

If α is a branching node, {β, γ} are the set of α’s daughters, and ⟦β⟧ = λxσ .λyσ .P(y, x),
⟦γ⟧ = λzσ .Q(z), then ⟦α⟧ = λyσ .λxσ .[P(y, x) ∧ Q(x)].
This mode of composition has two main properties: (i) it does not saturate the argument slot
of the verb and (ii) and it demotes the lambda term corresponding to the modiﬁed argument
to the last position. That is, restricting a function f ∈ D⟨e,et⟩ by a function g ∈ D⟨et⟩ does not
reduce the valency of f, and the resulting object is a function h ∈ D⟨e,et⟩ . By adopting this
mode of composition, we allow the semantic computation to proceed as if the object slot of
the predicate were saturated, when in fact it is not. Existential closure at the TP level binds
the remaining free variable, bringing its valency to zero. I represent this closure in the tree by
means of the operator [∃].
(42) ⟦∃⟧ = λP⟨σ,t⟩ .∃σ[P(σ)]
The ﬁnal steps in the derivation of (40) are represented below.
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(43)

TP: t
∃x[trajo(x, Juan) ∧ ⟦(25)⟧(x)]
[∃]

TP: ⟨et⟩

λP⟨σ,t⟩ .∃σ[P(σ)]

λx.trajo(x, Juan) ∧ ⟦(25)⟧(x)
VP: ⟨e, et⟩

DP: e

λy.λx.trajo(x, y) ∧ ⟦(25)⟧(x)

Juan

V: ⟨e, et⟩
λx.λy.trajo(x, y)

MeasP: ⟨et⟩
⟦(25)⟧

trajo
Let us examine the resulting interpretation: the full denotation of (40)–in (44) below–states
that Juan brought apples in an amount d, where d is equal to the maximal amount of apples
that Pedro brought.
(44) ⟦(40)⟧ = ∃x[trajo(x, Juan) ∧ manzanas(x) ∧
∣x∣ =

(λd. ∃z[manzanas(z) ∧ trajo(z, Pedro) ∧ ∣z∣ = d])]

This is precisely the interpretation we are seeking.11 Recall the three points in the desiderata
of

interpretations of relative clauses we discussed earlier (see §1.3.1 for discussion).

11

(i)

The tree in (43) is somewhat of a simpliﬁcation: nominal ARs take low scope with respect to negation:
Juan no trajo las manzanas que trajo
Pedro.
Juan not bring the apples
that brought Pedro
‘Juan didn’t bring the (amount of) apples that Pedro brought.’

¬ > ∃; ∃ ≯ ¬

This means that, in accordance with Restrict, nominal ARs must take low scope with respect to negation. In turn,
this means that, in some cases at least, we will need to accordingly adjust the tree in (43), and either interpret
existential closure lower or negation higher than TP.
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(4) Desiderata for
a. Deﬁniteness: A

interpretations
interpretations refer to a deﬁnite amount.

b. Indeﬁniteness: The head of the relative clause in interpreted as an indeﬁnite.
c. Identity: A

interpretations require a comparison of two amounts of same stuﬀ.

The analysis presented here achieves all three points above. First, maximalization at the degree level is obtained by virtue of constructing a free relative headed by the deﬁnite article
that denotes a maximal degree of something. The indeﬁniteness nominal ARs is guaranteed
by taking them to be simple NPs modiﬁed by a Measure Phrase. Finally, the two distinct
copies of the nominal head that are required to establish the equation between the two relevant degrees is granted by assuming a particular kind of deletion under identity process,
independently existent in the language.
In practice, the semantics in (44) provides nominal ARs an interpretation identical to the
paraphrases below, which is in line with speakers’ intuitions.12
12
The LF in (44) has the meaning of an equative, so one might wonder if it shares other interpretive parallels
with genuine equatives (like as many as). For instance, equatives are notorious for receiving both “at least” and
“exactly” interpretations.

(i)

Liz is as tall a Bill is…
a. …so you were wrong to say that she is taller.
b. …in fact, she’s taller.
We see that in this respect, nominal ARs are the same.

[“exactly”]
[“at least”]

(ii) Pedro ha escrito los libros que escribió Tolstoy…
Pedro aux written the books that wrote Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote…’
a. …so you were wrong to say that he wrote more.
[“exactly”]
b. …in fact, he wrote more.
[“at least”]
The precise mechanisms by which we arrive at the weak readings for equatives is debated. For Horn (1972),
Soames (1982) and Russell (2006) a.o. they should be understood as scalar implicatures, whereas Cresswell
(1976), von Stechow (1984) and Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002) a.o. locate the source of the ambiguity at
the lexical level. The takeaway is that, whatever theory we pick about equatives, one can apply it to ARs as well.
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(45) a. Juan brought apples in the amount that Pedro brought apples.
b. Juan brought apples in that amount.
[where that amount refers to the amount of apples that Pedro brought]

3.5
3.5.1

Discussion
Impossible meanings

Recall the discussion in §3.2.2 about the impossibility of identity of

interpreta-

tions in the following contexts:
(2b) SV inversion
Pedro ha escrito los libros que escribió Tolstoy.
Pedro aux written the books that wrote

Tolstoy

‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.’

(11) No SV inversion
Pedro ha escrito los libros que Tolstoy escribió.
Pedro aux written the books that wrote

Tolstoy

‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.’
The contrast between the two sentences is that, although both allow nominal AR interpretations (as in (46b)), only (2b) accepts (46a)).
(46) a. Pedro has written down the number corresponding to the number of books that
Tolstoy wrote.
[True iff Pedro wrote down the number 12]
b. Pedro has written the same number of books that Tolstoy wrote.
[True iff Pedro wrote any 12 books]
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The naive answer to why (11) lacks a meaning like (46b) is that it is simply not a subordinate
question, i.e. it is not a propositional AR. And yet, it is possible to interpret (11) as a concealed
question, which would result in an identity of
is: why is it not possible to have

question interpretation. The puzzle, then,

concealed questions? After all, these are identity

questions as well, only about a number or amount, rather than an individual.13 This possibility
is further discussed in detail in §4.5 of Chapter §4: by deﬁning a type shifter that takes as an
input a deﬁnite description of a degree (or an “amount concept”, of type ⟨sd⟩), we can extract
a set of propositions equivalent to the denotation of a question like what is the cardinality
of books that Tolstoy wrote?. This would result in the identity of

interpretation, a

question not about individual books, but about amounts of books.
The absence of this interpretation for (11) receives a straightforward explanation under
the analysis presented in this chapter: although nominal ARs denote deﬁnite descriptions, the
full Measure Phrase does not, it denotes a property of individuals. Given the semantics of the
pair of type-shifters discussed in §4.5, the indeﬁnite meaning of the Measure Phrase is of the
wrong type. The diﬃculties to deﬁne type-shifters of the required type is discussed in Nathan
(2006) and Frana (2017). But even if we deﬁned a suitable type-shifter that allowed indeﬁnite
concealed question, we would face an overgeneration issue, for

interpretations can

only arise in the presence of the deﬁnite article. My analysis provides one way of ruling out
this option, as is desired.
3.5.2

Why Restrict?

In the previous section I suggested that the Measure Phrase and the verbal predicate combined via Restrict. There are, I believe, good reasons for doing so instead of any of the other
type-shifting or valency-reducing operations in the market. For instance, resolving the type
mismatch using the ι-operator would not work, since we need nominal ARs to be indeﬁnites.
13

Recall that concealed questions can only be identity questions (Nathan 2006).
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Introducing an ι-operator in the structure would furthermore lead to a presupposition failure
(see §1.4.3).
One of the signatures of nominals combining via Restrict is that they must always take
lowest scope with respect to other sentential operators (e.g. Chung and Ladusaw 2004, McNally 2004 a.o.). Usually, indeﬁnites may combine via Restrict, but not just any indeﬁnite
may. This is visible when we look at the scopal properties of diﬀerent indeﬁnites: in (47)
below, only (47a) may scope above the matrix predicate want.
[3want > ∃; 3∃ > want]

(47) a. Lisa wants to bring an apple.
b. Lisa wants to bring apples.

[3want > ∃; 8∃ > want]

c. Lisa wants to bring that amount of apples.

[3want > ∃; 8∃ > want]

The same is true of nominal AR in Spanish: the nominal AR rendition of (47) is also scopeless
(under its

interpretation, of course).

(48) Lisa quiere traer las manzanas que trajo
Lisa wants bring the apples

Pedro.

[3want > ∃; 8∃ > want]

that brought Pedro

This property eliminates the possibility of introducing other type-shifters. For instance, another independently motivated way to deal with attributive DPs such as nominal ARs is to
assume a null existential determiner, which eﬀectively lifts the type of the nominal ARs to a
generalized quantiﬁer type (⟨et, t⟩).14 This option is perfectly plausible for bare plurals and
mass nouns in general, which are very close to the ﬁnal denotation of nominal ARs (cf. Chierchia 1998a, Dayal 2004). But this strategy requires the nominal AR to QR at LF, thereby
predicting scope interactions like the one in (47a).
A second argument in favor of Restrict in Spanish nominal ARs comes from existential
sentences. Nominals combining via Restrict are compatible with existential constructions
14

For example: ⟦∅D ⟧ = λP⟨et⟩ .λQ⟨et⟩ .∃x[P(x) ∧ Q(x)].
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with the copulative verb haber. As López (2012) extensively argues, these objects must be
(semantically) incorporated to haber. This is shown in (49), where only the bare plural variant
in (49a) is grammatical.
(49) a.

Hay hombres
be

man.

.

‘There are men’
b. * Hay un
be

a.

hombre
.

man.

[ungrammatical without a locative coda]

.

‘There is a man’
c. * Hay los
be

the.

hombres
.

man.

.

‘There is a man’
In general, deﬁnite DPs incur Deﬁnitiness Eﬀects in this position (Milsark 1974, Carlson
1977a, a.o.), and Spanish is no diﬀerent. What we ﬁnd, however, is that deﬁnite DPs are
indeed compatible with haber predicates, but only with

and

interpretations.

(50) Hay los libros que había en la mesa
be

the boook that were on the table

‘There are the (kind/amount of) books that there were on the table’
This suggests that the deﬁnite DP headed by los libros is in fact an indeﬁnite in disguise, which
aligns with our expectations.
A remaining contender to Restrict is the type-shifter nom (or “∩ ”) from Chierchia 1984.
In Chierchia’s (1984) system nom is the operation involved in transforming common nouns
like dog into their bare plural form dogs. The type-shifter maps properties onto their entitycorrelates only if these exist. Recently, Scontras (2017) has argued precisely for this type of
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interpretation for the classiﬁer noun amount; see §2.3. The data we have seen so far does not
adjudicate between Restrict or nom.
One argument that speaks in favor of Restrict over nom is the inability of Spanish nominal
ARs to be in subject position, something that follows from Restrict but is unexpected under
nom. The relatives in (51) only admit an

restrictive interpretation, where the claim

is about what individual friends came to the party, and not about how many friends came.
(51)

Los amigos que vinieron a mi ﬁesta vinieron a tu
the friends that came

to my party came

ﬁesta.

to your party

‘The friends that came to may party came to your party’
The lack of amount interpretation in (51) is not so surprising if the interpretation of nominal
ARs relies on Restrict: it is well known that Restrict only very rarely aﬀects subjects (see
discussion in Werle 2000 on Lillooet, Chung and Ladusaw 2004 on Maori and Stvan 2009
on bare singular count nouns in English). There may be a number of explanations for such
behavior. In Spanish, the reason could be simply that the parse with

interpretations

is unavailable by virtue of the high position in the structure were subjects have been argued to
sit (Ordóñez 1997, Zagona 2002, a.o.). This position, usually a Topic Phrase, is higher than
the locus of Existential Closure on TP.
We can reverse this situation, however. Example (52) below is just a variant of (51)
with locative inversion, a construction where a locative PP is preposed and the logical subject
appears postponed after the verb. There is good evidence suggesting that the locative PP is in
[Spec,TP], or the usual position of subjects in the language (see Diercks 2014 for an overview
and discussion of the arguments). Thus, the subject of (52) occupies a syntactic position
analogous to direct objects in ordinary transitive sentences. The main diﬀerence between the
two variants in (51) and (52) is that in the latter the

107

interpretation is available.

(52)

A mi ﬁesta vinieron los amigos que vinieron a la tuya.
to my party came

the friends that came

to the yours

‘To my party came the friends that came to your party’
It would be hard to account for the contrast between (51) and (52) by means of nom. It has
been argued that Spanish is a language where nom is available both in subject and in object
position (in fact, it has been proposed that Spanish lexicalizes nom as the deﬁnite article; see
discussion in Chierchia 1998b and Dayal 2004), and so without further ado nom should be
expected to resolve the type mismatch in (51) and yield an

interpretation all the same.

That this is not so argues in favor of Restrict instead.
3.5.3

Nominal ARs are not numerals

I have provided a semantics of nominal ARs that echoes the interpretation of numerals in
Measure Phrases. Under this account, then, one could expect to ﬁnd nominal ARs in places
where numerals typically appear. This is not the case, however. Certain environments that
accept numerals are incompatible with nominal ARs. Numerals in predicative positions are
one such environment.
(53) a. El

número de planetas es ocho.

The number of planets is eight
b.* El

número de planetas es los planetas que dibujó Juan.

The number of planets is the planets that painted Juan
Suppose that Juan painted eight planets. Since nominal ARs in Spanish are degree expressions
similar to numerals, why is (53b) ungrammatical? I can only oﬀer a speculative note here,
leaving a deeper exploration of the issue for a further occasion. In the literature on the syntax
of numeral expressions number words are commonly considered syntactic heads, not phrases,
at least in some syntactic environments. On the contrary, nominal ARs can only be phrasal,
they are full DPs. Thus, even if we concede that both objects, numerals and nominal ARs,
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have denotations of the same type, this need not make them syntactically equivalent. My
hope, then, is that whatever lies at the source of the contrast above can be attributed to the
diﬀerent syntactic make-up of the two expressions.
3.5.4

A

s with vs. without degrees

The main conclusion of this dissertation so far is that there are two formally distinct strategies in order to generate

interpretations of relative clauses, and that the availability of

each strategy is language dependent. Thus, while in English relative clauses can only express
s via

interpretations, as argued in Chapter §2, this chapters shows that Spanish

does possess a dedicated Amount Construction whose exclusive role is to provide
interpretations. This is summarized below.
(54) Available strategies to generate

interpretations by language

via

via degrees

Spanish

3

3

English

3

8

One prediction of (54) is that in Spanish it should be easier to ﬁnd ARs in environments where
English does not allow them, namely whenever the

s as

s strategy is not available.

This is something we have already seen above: in the example below, only the Spanish variant
allows an

interpretation, rendering the English translation false (see also §3.1).

(2b) Pedro ha escrito los libros que escribió Tolstoy.
Pedro aux written the books that wrote

Tolstoy

‘Pedro has written the books that Tolstoy wrote.’
A further prediction of (54) is that we should see Spanish ARs showing opposed properties
depending on whether they are derived by the degree-less or the degree-based strategy. More
concretely, if a relative clause with an

interpretation in Spanish allows a

pretation, then it should also show the properties observed for English
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inter-

interpretations.

On the other hand, if a relative clause with an

interpretation does not allow for a

interpretation, only the degree-based derivation is available. As a baseline, consider (2b) and
(55) below.
(55) Perdimos la batalla porque no teníamos los soldados que tenía la Armada
lost

the battle because not have

the soldiers that had the Army

Imperial.
Imperial.
‘We lost the ﬁght because we didn’t have the (amount of) soldiers that the Imperial
Army had.’
As I show below, (2b)’s

interpretation rests solely on the degree-based derivation,

whereas (55) parallels its English counterpart and gets its

interpretation via

The ﬁrst indication in favor of this contrast, is that only (55) allows a

s.

interpretation.

That is, while (55) can be true if the reason for losing the battle was not having soldiers as
well trained/motivated/strong as the Imperial Army had, (2b) is not be true even if Pedro
wrote the same kind of books as Tolstoy (it only allows a false

interpretation and an

interpretation).
The next step is to ascertain what happens if we drop the relative clause. In §2.2 we saw
that English

interpretations do not necessarily require a relative clause, and so they

are available also with PP modiﬁers and with bare DPs. Thus, we expect that only variants
of (55) in Spanish will allow

interpretations in these cases. That this is the case is

shown below.
(56) PP modiﬁer
a. 8
Pedro ha escrito los libros de Tolstoy.
Pedro aux written the books of Tolstoy
‘Pedro has written the books of Tolstoy.’
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b. 3
Perdimos la
lost

batalla porque no teníamos los soldados de la

the battle because not have

Armada

the soldiers of the Army

Imperial.
Imperial.
‘We lost the ﬁght because we didn’t have the (amount of) soldiers of the Imperial
Army.’
(57) Bare DP
a. 8
Pedro ha escrito los libros.
Pedro aux written the books
‘Pedro has written the books.’
b. 3
Perdimos la batalla porque no teníamos los soldados.
lost

the battle because not have

the soldiers.

‘We lost the ﬁght because we didn’t have the (amount of) soldiers.’
Finally, we look at island-sensitivity. In §2.4.3 of Chapter 2 we saw that the English variants
of examples like (55) do not seem to display the same type of island-sensitivity that other
degree constructions do. The prediction, then, is that only Spanish examples like (2b) but not
(55) will show the this restriction. Below I show that this is the case with negative islands and
factive islands (the baseline examples were provided in §1.4.1 of Chapter 1, here I only show
the relevant contrasts).
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(58) Negative islands
a. 8
Pedro escribió los libros que Tolstoy no escribió.
Pedro wrote

the books that Tolstoy not write

‘Pedro wrote some particular books that Tolstoy didn’t write.’
b. 3
Ganamos la batalla porque teníamos los soldados que no tenía la Armada
won

the battle because have

the soldiers that not had the Army

Imperial.
Imperial.
‘We won the battle because we had the (amount of) soldiers that the Imperial Army
didn’t have.’
(59) Factives: response stance verbs
a. 8
Pedro escribió los libros que Juan admitió que Tolstoy escribió.
Pedro wrote

the books that Juan admitted that Tolstoy written

‘Pedro wrote the books that Tolstoy didn’t write.’
b. 3
Perdimos la
lost

batalla porque no teníamos los soldados que Juan admitió

the battle because not have

the soldiers that Juan admitted

que la Armada Imperial tenía.
that the Army

Imperial had.

‘We lost the battle because we didn’t have the (amount of) soldiers that Juan admitted that the Imperial Army had.’
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(60) Factives: surprise
a. 8
Pedro escribió los libros que es sorprendente que Tolstoy escribiera.
Pedro wrote

the books that is surprising

that Tolstoy write.

‘Pedro wrote the books that it was surprising that Tolstoy wrote.’
b. 3
Perdimos la batalla porque no teníamos los soldados que es sorprendente
lost

the battle because not have

the soldiers that is surprising

que la Armada Imperial tuviera.
that the Army

Imperial have.

.

‘We lost the battle because we didn’t have the (amount of) soldiers that it is surprising that the Imperial Army had.’
Altogether, these contrasts show that the predicted availability of the two diﬀerent ways of
getting at

s is present in Spanish. In contrast, English only has access to the degree-less

strategy described in Chapter 2.

3.6

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that Spanish possesses a mechanism to deliver amounts that
is absent in English. The main source of the diﬀerence between the two languages rests
on the availability in Spanish of relative clauses that denote deﬁnite descriptions of degrees
(understood as maximimalized sets of degrees), that can in turn be used as Measure Phrases.
The resulting state of aﬀairs is one where natural languages allow two diﬀerent strategies
for deriving

interpretations of relative clauses: a degree-based strategy and a degree-

less strategy, where degree semantics does not come into play at all. While some languages
like Spanish employ both strategies, languages like English only have the degree-less strategy.
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CHAPTER 4
PROPOSITIONAL AMOUNT RELATIVES

This chapter looks at Amount Relatives in Spanish when they appear as complements to
wh-embedding predicates, predicates that typically select for either interrogative or exclamative complements. I will refer to this type of Amount Relatives as Propositional Amount
Relatives (propositional ARs henceforth). These constructions are puzzling as they seem to
be DPs that are selected for by predicates that usually do not select nominal complements.
The task of this chapter is to understand why these ARs have the distribution that they do,
how sentences involving them receive their interpretation, and why analogous constructions
do not exist in languages like English.
The chapter begins by looking into the general properties of propositional ARs in Spanish. In §4.1 it will be shown that propositional ARs have the external distribution and show
other syntactic properties of wh-constructions like subordinate questions and exclamatives.
Section 4.2 presents a syntactic analysis that tries to account for the “hybrid” nature of these
propositional relatives by treating them as involving an interrogative core and a nominal functional layer above this interrogative CP. In §4.3 I present a compositional semantic analysis of
this structure. Finally, an appendix is included where I discuss how, despite their superﬁcial
resemblance, propositional ARs should not be understood as concealed questions.
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4.1

Properties of propositional ARs

4.1.1
4.1.1.1

Basic distribution
Question embedding predicates

Spanish, unlike languages like English, allows ARs to be embedded under a great variety
of wh-embedding predicates, like wonder, ask, know, say. etc. For ease of exposition, I will
refer to the ARs that appear under such predicates as “propositional ARs”, as they appear
where propositional expressions otherwise appear. These will be contrasted in §3 with “nominal ARs”, which serve as arguments to verbs requiring nominal complements. The following
examples provide the basic paradigm, illustrating how two types of question embedding predicates, rogatives and responsives (Lahiri 2002), embed ARs. In (1) and (2), we see the typical
distribution of subordinate questions, headed by a relative pronoun qué (“what”) and cuánto
(“how many”).
(1) Rogative predicates
a.

Me

pregunto { qué / cuántas

I.

wonder

what

} manzanas trajo

how-many.

.

apples

Pedro.

brought Pedro

‘I wonder {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
b.

Me

preguntó { qué / cuántas

I.

ask

what

} manzanas trajo

how-many.

.

apples

Pedro.

brought Pedro

‘He asked me {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’

(2) Responsive predicates
a.

Yo sé
I

know

{ qué / cuántas
what

how-many.

} manzanas trajo
.

apples

‘I know {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
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Pedro.

brought Pedro

b.

Yo te
I

dije { qué / cuántas

you said

what

} manzanas trajo

how-many.

.

apples

Pedro.

brought Pedro

‘I told you {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
Example (3) shows the distribution of propositional ARs, which parallels that of the subordinate questions in (1) and (2).
(3) Amount Relatives with question embedding predicates
a.

Rogative predicates
Me

{ pregunto / preguntó } las

I.

wonder

ask.3.

the.

manzanas que trajo
.

apples

Pedro.

that brought Pedro

i. ‘I wonder {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
ii. ‘He asked me {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
b.

Responsive predicates
Yo { sé
I

/ dije } las

know

said

the.

manzanas que trajo
.

apples

Pedro.

that brought Pedro

‘I {know / said} {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
In addition to the target

interpretation, the sentences can also be interpreted as in-

volving an identity question–equivalent to what we called an

interpretation in §1.2.2 of

the introduction. The two meanings are precisely the ones we see in the ordinary subordinate
questions in (1) and (2).
Moreover, as shown in (4), neither subordinate questions nor propositional ARs may be
embedded under anti-rogative verbs, i.e. verbs that take only declarative complements.
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(4) Anti-rogative predicates
a.

Subordinate Questions
* Yo { creo
I

believe

/ pienso / aﬁrmo } { qué / cuántas
think

claim

what

how many.

} manzanas trajo
.

apples

brought

Pedro
Pedro
‘I {believe/think/claim} {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
b.

Amount Relatives
* Yo { creo
I

believe

/ pienso / aﬁrmo } las
think

claim

the.

manzanas que trajo
.

apples

Pedro.

that brought Juan

‘I {believe / think / claim} that Juan brought d-many apples’
Thus, propositional ARs seem to behave like embedded questions (i) in having the same range
of interpretations, (ii) in being able to appear under the same types of verbs and (iii) in being
unable to appear under the same types of verbs.
4.1.1.2

Exclamation embedding predicates

In addition to rogative and responsive verbs, propositional ARs can also occur with predicates that take exclamative complements. These include emotive predicates such as surprise,
be amazing and other emotive locutions like tienes que ver (“you should see”). These predicates come in two syntactic frames: the post-verbal subject frame and the impersonal frame.
In the ﬁrst case, the subject of the emotive predicate must follow the predicate, yielding a VS
word order, rather than the canonical SV. The exclamative and propositional AR variants in
this frame are given in (5a) and (5b) respectively.
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(5) Post-verbal subjects
a. Me
I.

sorprendió { qué / cuántas
surprised

what

how many.

} manzanas trajo
.

apples

Pedro.

brought Pedro

‘It surprised me {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
b. Me
I.

sorprendió las
surprised the.

manzanas que trajo
.

apples

Pedro

that brought Pedro.

‘It surprised me the apples that Pedro brought’
A couple of notes are required about (5b). First, observe that there is an agreement mismatch
between the matrix predicate and the DP; usually, Spanish requires subject arguments to agree
with the verb in

and

, but this is not observed in (5b). This agreement mismatch

is studied in detail in §4.1.3.2. For the moment, it suﬃces to note that this is a property of
propositional ARs that comes in handy to tease them apart from ordinary DPs (see §4.1.3.2
and the minimal pair (31) below). Second, just like in its English translation, the interpretation
of (5b) is vague, and what surprised the speaker about the apples could be almost anything:
that there were many apples, that they were big, that they were Fuji apples, etc. This is also
true of the qué variant of (5a). (The cuánto variant is straightforward and uniformly refers to
the amount of apples.)
Both subordinate exclamations (6a) and propositional ARs (6b) may appear in the impersonal frame as well. As in the post-verbal case, the qué variant of (6a) and the propositional
AR in (6b) are vague with respect to the object of the emotive attitude.
(6) Impersonal
a. Es sorprendente { qué / cuántas
is surprising

what

how many.

} manzanas trajo
.

‘It is surprising how many apples Juan brought’
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apples

Juan.

brought Juan

b. Es sorprendente las
is surprising

the.

manzanas que trajo
.

apples

Juan.

that brought Juan

‘It is surprising the apples that Juan brought’

4.1.1.3

Ambiguities between questions and exclamations

There are environments that allow for both interrogative and exclamative complements,
sometimes leading to ambiguity as to the interpretation of the sentence as a whole. Consider,
for instance, the following sentence (from Gutiérrez-Rexach 1996).
(7) Bill found out how rich my parents are.
a. Bill found out exactly how much money my parents have.
b. Bill found out that my parents are much richer than (he) expected.
Sentence (7) may be interpreted as a subordinate question, where the speaker asserts that Bill
knows the (true) answer to the relevant question, (7a). But interpreted as an exclamative, (7)
describes an emotive attitude that holds between Bill and a proposition of the form my parents
are d-rich, (7b).
Propositional ARs may be embedded in similar environments as well, and give rise to the
same sort of ambiguities.
(8) No sabes
not know.2.

las
the.

manzanas que trajo
.

apples

Pedro el año pasado.

that brought Pedro the last year

Lit.: ‘You don’t know the apples that Pedro brought last year.’
The sentence in (8) may be interpreted as a subordinate

or

question, as in

(9a)/(9b). The same sentences, however, can be used exclamatively as well, expressing that
the apples that Pedro brought last year exceeded the speaker’s expectations, either with respect
to some property of the particular apples, (9c) or with respect to the amount of apples that
were brought (9d).
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(9) a. Subordinate

interrogative

You don’t know what are the apples that Pedro brought last year.
b. Subordinate

interrogative

You don’t know what is the amount of apples that Pedro brought last year.
c. Subordinate

exclamative

The amount of apples that Pedro brought last year exceeded the expectations of the
speaker with respect to some property of apples.
d. Subordinate

exclamative

The amount of apples that Pedro brought last year exceeded the expectations of the
speaker.
Furthermore, as ﬁrst discussed by Elliot (1971), exclamatives are factive and therefore incompatible with speaker ignorance regarding the content of the expression. In keeping with
this observation, the exclamative use of propositional ARs is not allowed when the speaker
must be taken to be ignorant, as in (10).
(10) No sé
not know.1.

las

manzanas que trajo

the.

.

apples

Pedro el año pasado.

that brought Pedro the last year

‘I don’t know {what/how many} apples Pedro brought last year’
For good measure, it is worth observing that the pattern is identical for sentences with overt
wh-pronouns:
(11)

No sé
not know.1.

{ qué / cuántas
what

how-many.

} manzanas trajo
.

apples

‘I don’t know {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
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Pedro.

brought Pedro

So, as the last two sections have shown, the wide range of interpretations allowed by propositional ARs follows closely the interpretation of bona ﬁde subordinate questions and exclamatives. Similarly, both types of construction are conﬁned to be the syntactic environments.
4.1.2

Constraints on propositional ARs

4.1.2.1

Restrictions on the determiner

Recall from the introductory that ARs obligatorily co-occur with the deﬁnite article (Carlson 1977a). Spanish propositional ARs are subject to the same restriction. In general, any
attempt to construct a propositional AR with a determiner other than the deﬁnite article results in ungrammaticality.
(12) a. * Me

pregunto { algunas / muchas / dos } manzanas que trajo

I.

wonder

some

many

two

apples

Pedro.

that brought Pedro

‘I wonder {some / many / two} apples that Pedro brought’
b. * Sé

{ algunas / muchas / dos } manzanas que trajo

know

some

many

two

apples

Pedro.

that brought Pedro

‘I wonder {some / many / two} apples that Pedro brought’
c. * Es sorprendente { algunas / muchas / dos } manzanas que trajo
is surprising

some

many

two

applesm

Pedro.

that brought Pedro

‘It is surprising {some / many / two} apples that Pedro brought’
This is true even of cases like (13), where the deﬁnite article is present, but further modiﬁed
by the universal quantiﬁer all. The attempts below are ungrammatical.1
(13) a. * Yo me
I

I.

pregunto todas
wonder all.

las
.

D.

manzanas que trajo
.

apples

Pedro.

that brought Pedro

Lit.: ‘I wonder all the apples that Juan brought’

1

The sentence in (13b) can be marginally acceptable under an acquaintance interpretation of the verb know.
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b. * Yo sé
I

todas

know all.

las
.

manzanas que trajo

D.

.

apples

Pedro.

that brought Pedro

Lit.: ‘I know all the apples that Pedro brought’

4.1.2.2

Obligatoriness of the relative clause

A second constraint on propositional ARs is that the relative clause is obligatory. Unmodiﬁed deﬁnite DPs are not usually grammatical as complements of rogative predicates–with
the exception of some “functional” nouns like price, time, etc. (Nathan 2006). Under responsive predicates some speakers may allow a concealed question interpretation, but the
interpretation is absent.2
(14) a. * Yo me
I

I.

b. ? Yo sé
I

pregunto las

manzanas.

wonder the.
las

know the.

.

apples

manzanas.
.

apples

‘I know which ones are the (relevant) apples’
Recall from (5b) that propositional ARs allow an agreement mismatch when they appear as
post-verbal subjects of emotive predicates. Even if we keep these properties the same, with
the goal that the

reading is facilitated and the

reading disallowed, dropping

the relative clause results in ungrammaticality all the same.
2

(i)

The same is true of other, such as reduced relatives clauses, participial phrases, etc.:
a. * Yo
I
b. *Yo
I

me
I.
me
I.

pregunto
wonder
pregunto
wonder

las
the.
las
the.

.
.

manzanas traídas por Juan.
apples
brought by Juan
personas jugando a
poker.
people playing poker
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(15) * Me
I.

sorprendió las
surprised

the.

manzanas
.

apples

On the variant where the subject nominal and matrix verb agree, the resulting sentence is
grammatical but lacks an

interpretation. The sentences in (16) simply states that the

apples themselves, not the quantity of them, were the source of surprise.
(16) a.

Me

sorprendieron las

I.

surprised.3.

the.

manzanas.
.

apples

‘The apples surprised me.’
b.

Me

sorprendieron las

I.

surprised.3.

the.

manzanas de Juan.
.

apples

of Juan

‘Juan’s apples surprised me.’
This property of propositional ARs is in stark contrast with the ARs usually discussed in the
literature, where the role otherwise played by the relative clause can be supplied by a rich
enough context (see §2.2.2 in Chapter 2). In both English and Spanish, sentences like (17)
may convey an

reading.

(17) a. We lost because we didn’t have the soldiers {(of the enemy) / (that the enemy had).}
b. Perdimos la batalla porque no teníamos los soldados (que nuestro enemigo
lost

the battle because not have

the soldiers that our

enemy

tenía).
had
I leave the discussion of further diﬀerences between Spanish propositional ARs and nominal
ARs in Spanish as well as English for Chapters 3 and 2 respectively.
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4.1.3

Further syntactic properties of propositional ARs

A number of additional syntactic properties of propositional ARs lead us to the conclusion
that they are not ordinary nominal modiﬁed by restrictive relative clauses. In many respects,
propositional ARs fail to show properties of ordinary DPs in Spanish and instead bear the hallmarks of wh-constructions, like subordinate interrogatives and exclamatives. In this section,
I discuss ﬁve syntactic properties of propositional ARs that diﬀerentiate them from surface
identical DPs involving relative clauses and other deﬁnite DPs like free relatives.
4.1.3.1

Subject Verb inversion

In Spanish, the canonical word order is SVO. However, Subject Verb inversion is a common, optional process, and in many environments subjects may vary freely between preverbal
and postverbal positions.
(18) Declarative sentences
a. Hoy Juan ha

traído

las manzanas.

today Juan aux. brought the apples
‘Today Juan brought the apples’
b. Hoy ha traído Juan las manzanas.
However, there are a number of constructions where SV inversion is obligatory (see Torrego
1984, Suñer 1994, Barbosa 2001 a.o.). The blueprint of such cases is that they all involve
movement of some operator–usually wh-operators, but also focus–to the left periphery of the
clause. This is illustrated by the examples in (19) through (23).
(19) Matrix wh-questions
a. { Qué / Cuántas

manzanas } ha

what / how many apples

traído

Juan?

aux. brought Juan

‘{What / How many apples} did Juan bring?’
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b.* { Qué / Cuántas manzanas } Juan ha traído?
(20) Matrix exclamatives
a. { Lo
the.

/ Cuántas

manzanas } que ha

how many apples

traído

Juan!

that aux. brought Juan

‘{The things / How many apples} Juan has brought!’
b.* { Lo / Cuántas manzanas } que Juan ha traído!
(21) Embedded wh-questions
a. Me pregunto { qué / cuántas
I

wonder

manzanas } ha

what / how many apples

traído

Juan.

aux. brought Juan

‘I wonder {what / how many apples} Juan brought.’
b.* Me pregunto { qué / cuántas manzanas } Juan ha traído?

(22) Embedded exclamatives
a. Es sorprendente { lo que / cuántas
is surprising

manzanas } ha

what / how many apples

traído

aux. brought Juan

‘It is surprising {what / how many apples} Juan has brought.’
b.* Es sorprendente { lo que / cuántas manzanas } Juan ha traído.

(23) Focus fronting
a. Manzanas ha
apples

traído

Juan, no plátanos.

aux. brought Juan, not bananas

‘Apples has brought Juan, not bananas.’
b.* Manzanas Juan ha traído, no plátanos.
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Juan.

Notice however, that A-bar movement to the left-periphery is not enough to trigger obligatory
inversion. As shown in (24)–(26), there are movement constructions–including headed and
free relatives as well as topicalization–where inversion is only optional.
(24) Relative clauses
a. Las manzanas que ha
the apples

traído

Juan.

that aux. brought Juan

‘The apples that Juan brought.’
b. Las manzanas que Juan ha traído.
(25) Topic fronting
a. El Quijote lo ha

leído Juan.

the Quixote it aux. read Juan
‘Don Quixote Juan has read.’
b. El Quijote Juan lo ha leído.

(26) Free Relatives
a. Juan ha

comido lo que ha

Juan aux. eaten

preparado Pedro.

the that aux. cooked

Pedro

‘Juan has eaten what Pedro has cooked’
b. Juan ha comido lo que Pedro ha preparado.
One generalization about when inversion is required versus not is due to Rizzi (1997), who
argues that inversion must take place whenever there is an operator-variable chain.
(27) T
Inversion is obligatory if the clause in question contains an operator-variable chain.
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For Rizzi, wh-words and focus are quantiﬁcational, unlike relative operators (which move
and merely trigger abstraction in a Heim and Kratzer 1998-style system) and topics (where
the value of the trace or lower copy is identical to the topic phrase and thus, the same across
all evaluations).3
Regardless of the possible analyses that may account for this generalization, what is important for our purposes is that SV inversion provides a good diagnostic of operator-variable
chains, understood à la Rizzi. With respect to movement constructions at large, the data in
(19) through (26) suggest a nominal/clausal divide: SV inversion seems to be obligatory those
constructions that are clausal in nature (interrogatives and exclamatives), whereas it does not
seem to be required with relative clauses and free relatives, both of which are nominal–in
the sense that their distribution follows more closely that of ordinary nominal phrases. This
property of SV inversion makes it a good test to probe the underlying syntactic properties of
propositional ARs. If inversion is optional in propositional ARs, this would lend support to
a view on which they share a common core with ordinary relative clauses yielding an
(intersective) interpretation. On the other hand, if inversion is obligatory, this would suggest that propositional ARs have a syntactic makeup that is categorically diﬀerent from such
nominals, and that they have a common underlying structure as wh-constructions.
Turning now to propositional ARs, they require inversion across diﬀerent types of embedding predicates, as shown below with rogative (28a), responsive (28b) and emotive factive
predicates (28c) (Plann 1984).
3

The author considers quantiﬁcational those phrases that make use of not just one, but a range of values that
get assigned to a variable (the trace of the focused constituent that has been fronted), and where calculating the
meaning of such chain requires reference to evaluations at diﬀerent values. This is true of both wh-operators
and focus. In turn, by claiming that topic is not quantiﬁcational, Rizzi assumes that the value which the trace
gets in the interpretation of the chain is invariable, since it receives the same value across all evaluations (i.e. it
is still assigned a value by the topic phrase, but that value remains constant). Rizzi (1997, 2004) refers to traces
of this kind as null constants.
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(28) Propositional ARs
a. Me
I.

pregunto las

manzanas que { comió Pedro / *Pedro comió }.

wonder the.

.

apples

that

ate

Pedro

‘I wonder {what/how many} apples Pedro ate’
b. Me
I.

dijo las
say the.

manzanas que { comió Pedro / *Pedro comió }.
.

apples

that

ate

Pedro

‘She told me {what/how many} apples Pedro ate’
c. Me
I.

sorprendió

las

surprised.3.

D.

manzanas que { comió Pedro / *Pedro comió}.
.

apples

that

ate

Pedro

‘It surprised me the (amount of) apples that Pedro ate’
For completeness, (29) shows that SV inversion is also required in nominal matrix exclamatives, which are also ambiguous between
(29)

and

interpretations.

Las manzanas que { comió Pedro / *Pedro comió }!
the apples

that

ate

Pedro

‘The apples that Pedro ate!’

4.1.3.2

Agreement

In Spanish, nominative subject arguments must agree with the verb in person and number,
whether pre- or post- verbal. Failure to agree results in ungrammaticality, as shown by the
contrast in (30).
(30) a. Me
I.

sorprendieron mis
surprised.3.

I.

amigos.
.

friends

‘My friends surprised me’
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b.* Me
I.

sorprendió

mis

surprised.3.

I.

amigos.
.

friends

Consider now the minimal pair in (31).
(31) a. Me
I.

sorprendió

los

surprised.3.

the.

amigos que invitó Pedro.
.

friends that invited Pedro

‘It surprised me {what/how many} friends that Pedro invited’
b. Me
I.

sorprendieron los
surprised.3.

the.

amigos que invitó Pedro.
.

friends that invited Pedro

‘The friends that invited Pedro surprised me’
At ﬁrst blush, the diﬀerence in agreement pattern between (31a) and (31b) may suggest that
agreement is optional with these emotive predicates. However, as the translations indicate,
these two sentences are not semantically equivalent. Only (31a) has an

interpretation,

and thus is a propositional AR. Crucially, in (31a), the verb does not seem to be agreeing with
the noun amigos (“friends”). What we have, at least superﬁcially, is an agreement mismatch
(see also Torrego 1988, Campos 1993, Brucart 2003).
Similar facts obtain in other types of propositional ARs. For instance, plurale tantum terms
in Spanish always trigger plural agreement irrespective of their number interpretation. But
when they form propositional ARs and the relative clause receives an

interpretation,

the verb can be marked singular, against expectations (32a). When the interpretation is not
about an amount, plural agreement resurfaces, as shown in (32b).
(32) a. Me
I.

sorprendió

los

surprised.3.

the.

víveres que trajo
.

Pedro.

supplies that brought Pedro

‘It surprised me {what/how many} supplies Pedro brought’
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b. Me
I.

sorprendiéron los
surprised.3.

the.

víveres que trajo
.

Pedro.

supplies that brought Pedro

‘The supplies that Pedro brought surprised me’
We ﬁnd similar agreement mismatches with psychological predicates with experiencer subjects, like olvidar (“forget”). The subject of such verbs are marked dative, and since dative
arguments in Spanish cannot be targeted for agreement, the verb instead agrees with the object. The basic facts, in (33), show that the verb agrees with the object, and failure to agree
with the object, as in (33b), results in ungrammaticality.
(33) Agreement pattern with DPs
a.

Se me

han

olvidado los

libros

reﬂ I.

aux.3.

forgotten the.

.

books

‘I forgot the books’
b. * Se me
reﬂ I.

ha

olvidado los

aux.3.

forgotten the.

libros
.

books

When olvidar takes a clausal complement, however, the verb bears default agreement (33),
presumably because clauses are not φ-feature bearers in Spanish (cf. Halpert 2015).
(34) Agreement pattern with clauses
a. * Se me
reﬂ I.

han

olvidado { qué / cuántos

aux.3.

forgotten

what

how many.

} libros
.

book.

leyó Juan
.

read Juan

‘I forgot {what/how many} books Juan read’
b.

Se me

ha

olvidado { qué / cuántos

reﬂ I.

aux.3.

forgotten

what

how many

‘I forgot {what/how many} books Juan read’
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} libros
book.

leyó Juan
.

read Juan

Let us now turn to propositional ARs when they occur as the object of such subject experiencer
verbs. As we see in (35), only the non-agreeing variant in (35b) has an
(35) a. Se le
reﬂ PR.

han

olvidado los

aux.3.

forget

the.

.

interpretation.

mejillones

que ha

mussel.

that aux. ordered Juan

.

‘He has forgotten the mussels that John ordered’

pedido Juan.

[restrictive RC]

# ‘He has forgotten how many mussels John ordered
b. Se le
reﬂ PR.

ha

olvidado los

aux.3.

forget

the.

.

[AR]

mejillones

que ha

mussel.

that aux. ordered Juan

.

# ‘He has forgotten the mussels that John ordered’

pedido Juan.

[restrictive RC]

‘He has forgotten how many mussels John ordered

[AR]

A ﬁnal note on these agreement facts. One could think that the presence of the relevant [ ]
φ-features on the matrix predicate is due to an elided classiﬁer noun cantidad (“quantity”), as
represented in (36) below.
(36)

{ Me
I.

pregunto / sé}
wonder

la

⟨cantidad de⟩ manzanas que trajo

know the.

amount of

apples.

Pedro.
that

‘I {wonder / know} (what is) the amount of apples that Pedro brought’
The ﬁrst issue with this idea is that cantidad de is not a constituent, and so it should not be
targeted by ellipsis (e.g. Merchant 2013 a.o.). This is shown by other cases of NP-ellipsis
where, in conﬁgurations like the one in (36), the elision never targets the preposition de.
(37) a.

He cogido [

las

⟨gafas⟩ de Pedro ]

aux. taken

the.

glasses of Pedro

‘I have taken Pedro’s glasses’
b. * He cogido [

las ⟨gafas de⟩ Pedro ]
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Moreover, Spanish does have an elliptical construction like (36) where cantidad is elided, but
in these cases too the preposition must remain, as illustrated by the contrasts in (38).
(38) a. { Me

⟨cantidad.

sorprendió / Es sorprendente } la

I.

surprised

plátanos
banana.

is surprising

que trajo
.

the.

. ⟩ de

.

of

Juan

that brought Juan

‘It {surprised me / is surprising} the amount of bananas that Juan brought’
b.* { Me sorprendió / Es sorprendente } la ⟨cantidad.

.

de⟩ plátanos que trajo

Juan
Finally, there are important diﬀerences between (36) and its overt variant that, again, would
be diﬃcult to account if the former were derived from the latter. For one, overt cantidad de
does not require a relative clause, as shown below.
(39) a.

b.

c.

Me

sorprendió

la

I.

surprised.3.

the.

Me

sorprendió

la

I.

surprised.3.

the.

Me

sorprendió

esa

I.

surprised.3.

that.

cantidad de manzanas.
.

amount of apples
cantidad de manzanas de Juan.

.

amount of apples

of Juan

cantidad de manzanas.
.

amount of apples

And second, unlike propositional ARs, the overt counterpart of (36) cannot be embedded by
question embedding predicates, suggesting that it is a diﬀerent type of construction altogether.
(40) * Yo { me
I

I.

pregunto / sé
wonder

know

} la

de plátanos

the.

.

of banana.

que trajo
.

Juan.

that brought Juan

I take it, then, that the agreement patterns reported above cannot be successfully accounted
for by alluding to hidden/null material in the relative clause.
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Before I conclude the section, let us see how the two properties of propositional ARs we
have seen so far hang together. In (31), for instance, the two examples–the agreeing and the
non-agreeing variants–were introduced with SV inversion. Thus, given the distribution of
propositional ARs reviewed in this section, we would expect that the ordinary SV word order
is compatible only with the agreeing variant. This is exactly what we ﬁnd:
(41) a. Me
I.

sorprendieron los
surprised.3.

amigos que Pedro invitó.

the.

.

friends that Pedro invited

‘The friends that invited Pedro surprised me.’
b.* Me
I.

sorprendió

los

surprised.3.

the.

amigos que Pedro invitó.
.

friends that Pedro invited

The same is true of the examples in (35): the canonical SV order is compatible only with
agreeing variants of the relative clause.
(42) a. Se le
reﬂ PR.

han

olvidado los

aux.3.

forget

the.

.

mejillones

que Juan ha

mussel.

that aux. ordered Juan

.

pedido.

‘He has forgotten how many mussels John ordered.’
b. * Se le
reﬂ PR.

4.1.3.3

ha

olvidado los

aux.3.

forget

the.

.

mejillones

que Juan ha

mussel.

that Juan aux. ordered

.

pedido.

Pre- vs. post-verbal clausal subjects

Propositional ARs pattern with interrogatives/exclamatives and unlike ordinary DPs with
restrictive relative clauses in certain positional constraints they are subject to. In Spanish, only
certain types of clauses can appear in the preverbal subject position, and embedded interrogatives and exclamatives are not among these. Subject interrogatives/exclamatives uniformly
appear in the post-verbal position. On the other hand, DPs, including concealed questions, are
not subject to this restriction and can occur in both pre and post-verbal subject positions. As
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illustration, consider the contrast between (43a) and (43b): though the sentences are intended
to convey the same meaning, only (43b), involving a concealed question, is grammatical.
(43) a.

Preverbal interrogative
* Qué hora era me sorprendió
what time is me surprised
‘What the time is surprised me’

b.

Preverbal concealed question
La hora me sorprendió
the time me surprised
‘The time surprised me’

We can also show that nominal constructions involving overt wh-expressions, i.e. free relatives, behave like DPs and not like interrogatives in being allowed in the preverbal subject
position. We can distinguish otherwise surface identical interrogatives and free relatives on
the basis of the type of wh-pronoun they select. Spanish has two variants of wh-pronouns, one
prosodically strong and one prosodically weak, a distinction reﬂected in the orthography as
well (e.g. quien for the weak variant of “who” and quién for the strong one, cuanto and cuánto
for “how many”, etc.). Crucially, depending on the construction, only one or the other variant
is permitted: strong wh-pronouns occur in propositional environments, i.e. true questions and
exclamatives, whereas the weak variant is used in nominal environments, i.e. free relatives.
Below, (44a) states that what is surprising is the fact that a certain person came to the party.
By contrast, (44b) claims that whoever came to the party, that person was surprising.
(44) a.

Embedded interrogative
Es sorprendente [

quién

vino a la ﬁesta].

is surprising

who.

came to the party

‘It is surprising who came to the party’
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b.

Free relative
Es sorprendente [

quien

vino a la ﬁesta].

is surprising

who.

came to the party

‘The person who came to the party is surprising’
Using wh-pronoun selection as a diagnostic, we can show that only free relatives–which require
the weak variant–are allowed in the preverbal subject position.4
(45) Strong Relative Pronoun quién
a.

3Post-verbal
Me

sorprendió

I.

surprised.3.

quiénes vinieron a la ﬁesta.
.

came

to the party

‘It surprised me who came to the party’
b.

8Pre-verbal
* Quiénes vinieron a la ﬁesta me
.

came

to the party I.

sorprendió.
surprised.3.

(46) Weak Relative Pronoun quien
a.

3Post-verbal
Me

sorprendieron quienes vinieron a la ﬁesta.

I.

surprised.3.

.

came

to the party

‘Those who came to the party surprised me’

4
Recall the agreement facts reported above in §4.1.3.2: subordinate questions/exclamations do not agree
with matrix predicates, whereas relative clauses and free relatives do.
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b.

3Pre-verbal
Quienes vinieron a la ﬁesta me
.

came

sorprendieron.

to the party I.

surprised.3.

‘Those who came to the party surprised me’
We can now turn to propositional ARs and ask whether they pattern like interrogatives or free
relatives. As shown in (47), the

reading is permitted only when the phrase in question

occurs post-verbally; the pre-verbal variant is ungrammatical.
(47) Amount Relatives
a.

3Post-verbal
Me

sorprendió

los

I.

surprised.3.

the.

estudiantes que vinieron a la ﬁesta.
.

students

that came

to the party

‘It surprised me how many students came to the party’
b.

8Pre-verbal
* Los
D.

.

estudiantes que vinieron a la ﬁesta me

sorprendió.

students

surprised.3.

that came

to the party I.

Again, we see that propositional ARs show pattern syntactically with interrogatives, and unlike
ordinary DPs, even those DPs that have a question interpretations.
4.1.3.4

Anaphora

DPs in Spanish require the same

and

features on anaphors that refer back

to them. However, it is also possible for anaphors to pick out non-nominal referents, like
clauses, measure phrases etc. In these cases, neuter pronouns like lo and ello must be used.
Here, we can use anaphora as a testing ground for the diﬀerence between propositional ARs
and nominal restricted by relative clauses. If propositional ARs are ordinary DPs modiﬁed by
relative clauses, anaphoric reference should only be available through the use of pronominal
forms that agree in φ-features with the nominal head. Once again, we will use the dual nature
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of wh-pronouns to set a baseline against which we compare the behavior of propositional
ARs. Because strong wh-pronouns can only occur in clauses, anaphors referring back to
those clauses will only take neuter forms, like the pronouns lo and ello. Free relatives with
weak pronouns, on the other hand, will require anaphors that agree with the DPs containing
the wh-pronoun in

/

. Consider ﬁrst the subordinate question in (48), with the

strong wh-pronoun.
(48) Strong wh-pronoun; subordinate question
a. With
Me

/

anaphor

sorprendió [ cuántos

I.dat surprised

how many.

artículosi escribió Raquel ]j , uno
.

.

tiene que admirarse

de ellosi/∗j .

must

of PR.

admire-

papers

wrote

Raquel

one

.

‘It surprised me how many papers Raquel wrote, one must admire her for them’
b. With
Me

anaphor
sorprendió [ cuántos

I.dat surprised

how many.

artículosi escribió Raquel ]j , uno
.

tiene que admirarse

de ello∗i/j .

must

of PR.

admire-

.

papers

wrote

Raquel

one

‘It surprised me how many papers Raquel wrote, one must admire her for it’
In this minimal pair, (48a), with a plural anaphor, only has an interpretation where the reason
for admiring Raquel is the particular articles that she wrote. On the other hand, (48b), with
the neuter anaphor ello, conveys that the reason for admiration is the number of papers that
Raquel wrote (and so it = the amount of papers in the translation).
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(49) Weak relative pronoun; free relative
a. With

/

anaphor

Me sorprendieron [ cuantos
I.dat surprised

artículosi escribió Raquel ], uno

how many.

tiene que admirarse

de ellosi .

must

of PR.

admire-

.

.

papers

wrote

Raquel

one

.

‘All the papers that Raquel wrote surprised me, one must admire her for them’
b. With

anaphor

* Me sorprendieron [ cuantos
I.dat surprised

artículosi escribió Raquel ], uno

how many.

tiene que admirarse

de elloi .

must

of PR.

admire-

.

.

papers

wrote

Raquel

one

‘The papers that Raquel wrote surprised me, one must admire her for it’
With the weak relative pronoun, we see a diﬀerent pattern. In (49), only the plural anaphor
ellos, as in (49a), is felicitous. The neuter anaphor ello in (49b) does not have a suitable antecedent and the sentence is therefore illicit. Thus, unlike embedded questions/interrogatives,
which permit anaphoric referece by neuter anaphors, free relatives are DPs that require their
anaphors to match with them in φ-features.
Propositional ARs, on the other hand, pattern with the wh-constructions that make use of
strong wh-pronouns. As we see in (50a), the use of the plural anaphor ellos forces an
interpretation of the relevant construction. The use of neuter ello, on the other hand, is both
grammatical and moreover yields an

interpretation.
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(50) Amount Relatives
a. With

/

anaphor

Me sorprendió [ los

artículosi que escribió Raquel ]j , uno tiene que

I.dat surprised

the.

.

admirarse

de ellosi/∗j .

admire-

of

papers

that wrote

Raquel

one must

.

‘The papers that Raquel wrote surprised me, one must admire her for them’
b. With

anaphor

Me sorprendió [ los

artículosi que escribió Raquel ]j , uno tiene que

I.dat surprised

the.

.

admirarse

de ello∗i/j .

admire-

of

papers

that wrote

Raquel

one must

.

‘It surprised me how many papers Raquel wrote, one must admire her for it’
Finally, notice that in the agreeing variant of (50b), ungrammaticality ensues only with the
neuter anaphor ello, but not with the agreeing ellos.
(51) a. * Me sorprendieron [ los
I.dat surprised

the.

admirarse

de elloi/j .

admire-

of

artículosi que escribió Raquel ]j , uno tiene que
.

papers

that wrote

Raquel

one must

.

‘It surprised me how many many papers Raquel wrote, one must admire her for it’
b. Me sorprendieron [ los
I.dat surprised

the.

admirarse

de ellosi/j .

admire-

of

artículosi que escribió Raquel ]j , uno tiene que
.

papers

that wrote

Raquel

one must

.

‘The papers that Raquel wrote surprised me, one must admire her for them’
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4.1.3.5

Diﬀerential Object Marking

Spanish is a language where direct objects that are both speciﬁc and human must be preceded by the preposition a (“to”). This is an instance of Diﬀerential Object Marking (DOM;
see Torrego 1998, Leonetti 2004 a.o.).
(52) a. María besó

*(a) Raquel

María kissed to
b. María besó

Raquel

(*a) el retrato

María kissed to

the portrait

In certain cases, speciﬁc and non-human animate objects may trigger DOM as well, depending
on the closeness or “relative humanity” attributed to them.
(53) María vió (a) la gata
María saw to the cat
Unlike this subset of nominals, clausal arguments do not show DOM. We can again construct
minimal pairs using the by now familiar strong/weak distinction of wh-pronouns. The strong
pronoun forms subordinate interrogatives, which, being clausal, do not trigger DOM; weak
pronouns, on the other hand, form free relatives, which, if animate and speciﬁc, must trigger
DOM.
(54) a. Strong wh-pronoun
María vió (*a) quién vino a la ﬁesta
María saw to

who came to the party

‘María saw who came to the party’
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b. Weak wh-pronoun
María vió *(a) quien vino a la ﬁesta
María saw to

who came to the party

‘María saw the person who came to the party’
We turn now to propositional ARs. If the animacy/speciﬁcity of the superﬁcial head noun in
propositional ARs were suﬃcient to trigger DOM, this would suggest that despite the variability in interpretation, propositional ARs are syntactically garden-variety DPs. However,
this is not what happens; propositional ARs do not trigger DOM, as shown in (55). Not only
is the variant without DOM in (55a) grammatical and has the

reading, the sentence

in (55b) with DOM cannot receive such an interpretation.
(55) a. Estudian
evaluate.3.

los
the.

delegados
.

que enviarán

representative.

.

that send

‘They are evaluating {what/how many} representatives they will send.3. ’
b. Estudian
evaluate.3.

a los
to the.

delegados
.

representative.

que enviarán
.

that send

‘They are evaluating the (individual) representatives they will send.3. ’

4.1.4

Interim summary & challenges

To sum up, Spanish propositional ARs look like ordinary DPs, yet seem to have the external distribution and bear the syntactic blueprints of wh-constructions. They can complement
verbs that otherwise do not take nominal complements, show syntactic constraints that do
not apply to ordinary DPs, and show mysterious agreement and case assignment patterns.
Yet, they look on the surface like ordinary nominals and seem to be headed by a deﬁnite
determiner, suggesting that they are categorically a DP. Thus, among our key desiderata in
the remainder of this chapter is to account for the mixed nature of propositional ARs. In
the following two sections, I propose a structure for propositional ARs that takes seriously
141

their syntactic and semantic parallels with interrogatives and exclamatives. In a nutshell, I
suggest that propositional ARs start their lives out, both syntactically and semantically, as a
wh-construction. Their nominal nature is derived by merging a special variant of the deﬁnite
article, which I call D , which combines with a question and returns a proposition. Not only
will this account explain the puzzling syntactic behavior of propositional ARs, it also oﬀers
insight into why other languages do not have analogous constructions.

4.2

Proposal: the syntax of propositional ARs

This section presents an analysis of propositional ARs as interrogative structures. Propositional ARs are not born as DPs, but as full clauses. The syntactic make-up of propositional
ARs is akin to interrogative clauses, which involve a [+

] speciﬁed C○ head with an inter-

rogative core. The resulting construction is a DP with an embedded CP providing question
semantics that is only superﬁcially identical to an NP modiﬁed by a relative clause.
Consider the example in (56) as a working case.
(56) … las
the.

manzanas que trajo
.

apples

Pedro.

that brought Pedro

The example in (56) looks like a restrictive relative clause, but, as I hope has been shown
throughout this chapter, there are reasons to believe that it cannot just be an ordinary relative
clause. The structure that I propose for DPs like (56) qua propositional ARs is represented
below.
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(57) Syntactic structure of propositional ARs
DP
D
las

CP
DP[

C’

]

Opwh manzanas
que[+

C○
]+

TP

[T○ +V○ ]i

Juanj

trajo

T’
ti

vP
tj ti twh

The structure in (57) is reminiscent of that proposed by Borsley (1997) and Bianchi (1999)
for restrictive relative clauses. For these authors, D directly takes a CP as its complement (see
also Kayne 1994), and the constituent targeted for movement is not an NP, but a DP headed
by a null determiner.
(58) [ the [ [ e books]i [ that [ you read ti ]]]
There are two main diﬀerences between their structures and mine: (i) the presence of a C○
head with a [+

] feature in (57) and (ii) that the null determiner in (57) is a wh-operator.

With these ingredients, the derivation proceeds as follows. The [+
element in its domain with matching [

] C○ head probes for an

] speciﬁcations, either a question or an exclamative,

and agrees with that element. Spanish is a wh-movement language, and this Agree relation
triggers movement of the wh-goal to the speciﬁer of CP. Moreover, ﬁnite verbs in Spanish
overtly move to T (Rizzi 1982) and when there is wh-movement, there is also accompanying
T-to-C movement, such that the verb is pronounced to the immediate right of the moved
wh-expression (Torrego 1984, Suñer 1994 and Gallego 2007 a.o.).
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Finally, the D introducing the deﬁnite article enters in the derivation with an unvalued
φ-feature, D[uφ]. In the current structure, unlike with restrictive relative clauses, the sister
of D lacks these features, but the DP in [Spec,CP], which is equidistant to CP and also in the
c-command of D[uφ] can serve as a suitable goal.
(59)

DP
D[uφ]

CP

Agree

las

DP[

C’

, ]

Opwh manzanas[

…

, ]

Summing up, the proposed structure for propositional ARs in Spanish. The key aspects of
(57) amount to (i) a [+

] feature on C○ , (ii) the presence of a null wh-operator generated in

VP internal position, and (iii) the ability of the deﬁnite article to combine with a non-relative
CP. These three aspects of the syntax of propositional ARs demand some more elaboration,
so I will discuss them in turn.
4.2.1

The nature of the [

] feature

The structure in (57) takes propositional ARs to involve a type of interrogative C○ , yet
propositional ARs and ordinary interrogatives diﬀer in a number of important ways. For one,
propositional ARs can never form matrix interrogatives.
(60)

Matrix interrogative
* Las
the.

manzanas que trajo
.

apples

Pedro?

that brought Pedro

‘What apples brought Pedro?
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Moreover, genuine embedded interrogatives are incompatible with the complementizer que,
which is obligatory in propositional ARs.
(61) a. Embedded interrogative
Me

pregunto cuántas

manzanas (*que) trajo

I.

wonder how many apples

that

Pedro.

brought Pedro

‘I wonder how many apples Pedro brought’
b. Propositional AR
Me

pregunto las manzanas *(que) trajo

I.

wonder the apples

that

Pedro.

brought Pedro

Given these diﬀerences, we are forced to ask: what is the nature of the [+

] C○ head in

propositional ARs? I would like to suggest that the C○ in propositional ARs is the same one as
in wh-exclamatives. The parallels between the two constructions are various (see §4.1.3). For
instance, propositional ARs, which, as we saw before, do not form good matrix interrogatives,
do nevertheless form grammatical and felicitous matrix exclamatives. Moreover, exclamatives
are compatible with the complementizer que.
(62) a.

Matrix exclamative
Las manzanas que trajo Pedro!
what apples

that aux brought

‘The apples that Pedro brought!
b.

Exclamatives with que
Cuántas

manzanas que trajo Pedro!

how many apples

that aux brought

‘How many apples Pedro brought!
These two examples show properties of Spanish exclamatives that, although relevant for
propositional ARs, fall out of the scope of this work and I will not address them here. For
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instance, sub-sentential exclamatives like (62a) rely on some form of null wh-operators to
be interpreted whose nature varies depending on particular views of exclamatives like (62a).
These have been argued to be either sentential (e.g. Zanuttini and Portner 2003, Portner and
Zanuttini 2005, Gutiérrez-Rexach 2014) or sub-sentential (e.g. Rett 2015 and the papers
in Bosque 2017). Here I will not discuss the exact nature of the operators involved in the
interpretation of (62a).
Lastly, it may seem that the structure proposed in (57) is in violation of the doubly ﬁlled
COMP ﬁlter (Chomsky and Lasnik 1977).5 I do not dwell on this issue for two main reasons.
First, if we admit that this is an issue, there are simple technical solutions, such as adopting
multiple CP layers (see e.g. Watanabe 1993, Benincà 1996, Gutíerrez-Rexach 2001, Goria
2002, Ambar 2003, You 2013 a.o.). Second, there are other structures in Spanish that also
seem to be in violation of this ﬁlter, including certain types of relative clauses, thereby calling
into question the role of the ﬁlter in the language (Plann 1982, Suñer 1984, Arregi 1998,
Lahiri 2002, a.o.).
4.2.2

The null wh-operator

I will assume that the null operator Opwh may come in two forms, as covert variants of
the overt wh-words qué (“what” or “how”) and cuánto (“how many”). That is, the only diﬀerences between Opwh and qué and cuánto are simply overtness vs. covertness; otherwise, Opwh
is identical to the wh-words we see overtly on exclamatives. The evidence for such covert
operators comes, once again, from exclamative constructions. Consider the ordinary matrix
exclamations below.
5

(i)

The Doubly Filled COMP Filter in (i) was proposed to rule out sentences like (ii).

Doubly Filled COMP Filter
*[
wh-phrase φ], φ ≠ e

[where e means “deleted”]

(ii) * the man [ who [ that met you]] is my friend
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(63) a. Qué listo

que es Pedro!

what intelligent that is Pedro!
‘How intelligent Pedro is!
b. Cuántas

ganas

how many eﬀort.

le
.

pone el tío!

him put

the dude

‘How much eﬀort the dude is putting in!’
As Hernanz (2006) and Hernanz and Rigau (2006) show, the wh-word can be dropped from
the wh-phrases in (63), resulting in the semantically equivalent variants of (64).
(64) a. Listo

que es Pedro!

intelligent that is Pedro!
‘How intelligent Pedro is!
b. Ganas
eﬀort.

le
.

pone el tío!

him put

the dude

‘How much eﬀort the dude is putting in!’

4.2.3

The role of the determiner

The proposed structure in (57)–repeated here–requires the deﬁnite article to select a CP.
(57) [

las [
the

[

[

]

Opwh manzanas]i [ que[+
apples

that

]

[trajo]j [

Juan tj ti ]]]]

brought

Juan

This is common practice under some variants of the raising analysis of relative clauses, originated in Kayne (1994) (cf. Borsley 1997 and Bianchi 1999). But there is a big diﬀerence in
terms of the featural speciﬁcation of C○ in relative clauses on the one hand and propositional
ARs on the other: the former is a C○ [+

] whereas the later is C○ [+

]. This diﬀerence is

crucial, as we saw above, to derive the SV inversion patterns reported in §4.1.3.1. But the
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distinction is also meaningful for the semantic composition of propositional ARs (as will be
clear in the next section).
The issue is the following: if we take for granted the results presented here so far, i.e. if
we are assuming that propositional ARs are syntactically questions up to CP, what is the role
of the deﬁnite article? From a syntactic stand-point, notice that the behavior of the deﬁnite
article is quite ﬂexible in Spanish in general. For instance, unlike in Germanic languages, it
can appear with tensed clauses.
(65) a. No me gusta el [
not me like

the

que tu

actúes

that you behave.

así ].
so

‘I don’t like your behaving like that’
b. El [
the

que Juan llegue

tarde ] no me importa

that Juan arrive.

late

not me care

‘I don’t care if Juan arrives late’
For the cases that occupy us, however, I want to defend the idea that the deﬁnite article we
see in propositional ARs is not the run-of-the-mill deﬁnite article. Instead, it is a variant
similar to the Answerhood operator proposed in Heim (1994) and Dayal (1996). Let us refer
to this variant of D as D . I will postpone the discussion of its semantic details until the next
section, and concentrate now on its syntactic properties.
Syntactically, I take D
forth I will use D

to be an impoverished variant of its ordinary cousin D

(hence-

to refer to the ordinary deﬁnite article). In section §4.1.3 we saw that

propositional ARs do not behave syntactically as other DPs do, including DPs with restrictive
relative clauses. A subset of that evidence, summarized below for convenience, shows that
propositional ARs establish grammatical relations, e.g. Agree, diﬀerently (see short description under each phenomenon, full discussion can be found in §4.1.3).
(31) SV agreement

[Subject DPs must agree in

sitional ARs trigger neuter agreement.]
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with the matrix predicate; propo-

a. Me
I.

sorprendió

los

surprised.3.

the.

amigos
.

friend.

que invitó Pedro.
.

that invited Pedro

‘It surprised me {what/how many} friends that Pedro invited’
b. Me
I.

sorprendieron los
surprised.3.

the.

amigos
.

friend.

que invitó Pedro.
.

that invited Pedro

‘The friends that invited Pedro surprised me’
These data suggest that the φ-features that are visible on the D heading the propositional AR
(e.g.,

.

in (31)) are nevertheless not visible to the agreeing V. Thus, the Agree mechanism

proposed in (59) above, where D

gets its φ-features valued by the wh-DP in [Spec,CP],

can only be part of the explanation. As I show below, the solution to this mismatch lies in the
particularities of D

and its own φ-featural composition.

It is well-known that Agreement, as a grammatical operation, is sometimes sensitive to
syntactic features and some other times to semantic features. But, as Corbett (2006) has
shown, occasionally it appears that Agreement is sensitive to both types of features simultaneously, within the same utterance. The consequence is that controllers of agreement must
carry two sets of φ-features. Recent examples of papers exploring and corroborating these
implications can be found in Danon (2013) and Landau (2016).
According to Corbett (2006, 155–157), “semantic agreement” is consistent with the meaning of the controller, whereas “syntactic agreement” is consistent with its form. This divergent
distribution of φ-features within the DP is very well attested attested across languages. The
cases that interest us are those where a mismatch occurs between the DP internal φ-features
and the φ-features that it controls outside the DP. The following are some such examples in
English (from Danon 2013, Landau 2016 and Rullman 2010).
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(66) Syntactic agreement
a. [

[ ]

Part of the residents ] has.

b. [

[ ]

The committee ] has.

c. [

[ ]

Each of us ] thinks.

opposed the plan.

decided on the issue.
that we can win the nomination.

(67) Semantic agreement
a. [

[ ]

Part of the residents ] have.

b. [

[ ]

The committee ] have.

c. [

[ ]

Each of us ] think.

opposed the plan.

decided on the issue.

that we can win the nomination.

The agreement patterns in (67) are the ﬂip-side of Spanish propositional ARs. In (67), a morphologically singular DP controls plural agreement on the verb, whereas in Spanish propositional ARs a morphologically plural DP controls singular agreement on the verb. Of course,
this state of aﬀairs raises questions about Agree. In the particular cases at hand, (67) and
propositional ARs in Spanish, are there multiple Agree operations, each targeting a diﬀerent set of φ-features bore by potentially diﬀerent heads? Moreover, in addition to making
the relevant Agree relationship available, we need to understand as well where the diﬀerence
between D

and D

exactly lies.

The solution that I propose is couched in terms of Wechsler and Zlatić’s (2003) original
distinction between

and

features, (partially) following Landau’s (2016) con-

ﬁgurational adaption. The gist of the idea is that morphologically-rooted features (
features) are hosted on the noun stem while semantically-rooted featuers (

features)

are hosted on higher functional heads. Following Danon (2013), I will assume that the only
φ-features that are accessible to agreement from outside of the DP are those in the highest
nominal projection, D in the case of DPs (this is accordance with phase-based conceptions
of agreement, but largely independent of it). As a consequence, D must somehow mediate
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between the DP-internal and DP-external φ-agreement. Graphically, this can be represented
as follows (cf. Landau 2016):
(68)

[ T○ [ V○ [ D [ . . . ]] ]]
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹¶ ´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹¶

External Agree Zone Internal Agree Zone

The low boundary of the External Zone is determined by D, which in turns determines the high
boundary of the Internal Zone. Here DP-external agreement takes place after D has carried
out all the Agree operations DP-internally. In Landau’s (2016) terms, D is the “contact point”
between external probes like v and T, and any nominal φ-features there may be inside the DP.
Both Wechsler and Zlatić (2003) and Landau (2016) show convincingly that Agree in the
External Zone almost exclusively targets

features.6 This means that inherently

(semantic or, in this case, “interpretable”) features, such as [
as valued features on D, since N is not speciﬁed for [

], will always be speciﬁed

]. In turn, D must have unvalued

(morphological) features that it will inherit from N. Thus, by the time that V is
merged and is probing for agreement, D has already probed into its Internal Agree Zone and
valued all the unvalued features it had.
We are now ready to look into the featural speciﬁcations of D
will begin with the more familiar D
(69) Feature array of D
⎡
⎡
⎢
⎢ u
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢ u
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
⎢
⎢ u
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢ u
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎣

:
:

:
:

and D

in Spanish. I

.7
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

6

Landau (2016) comments on two possible answers for why this must be the case, giving a locality-based
answer and a type-based answer. I refer the interested reader to the original paper.
7

Only the nominal
and
features are represented. (Un)valuation is marked with the privative
feature u, so that unvalued features are represented as [uF] and valued ones simply as [F].
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According to (69), all its features,

and

are unvalued. This means that D will

have to value them all in the Internal Agree Zone from some goal, N in this case, which only
contains valued

features.

(70) Feature array of N
⎡
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎣

⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

This is the most common situation, one where

and

features on D have the

same speciﬁcations. Schematically:

[uφ]
(71) [ V [

[ N[

D

,

… ]]]

]

[uφ]

The [uφ] features of D, both
its valued

and

, are valued by the [φ] features on N. With

[φ] features, D can serve as goal for a probing V. Thus, for (72) we have (73).

(72) Me sorpredieron las
me surprised.3.

the.

.

manzanas

que trajo

apple.

that brought Pedro

[uN
(73)

[ sorprendieron3. [

las.

.

, uG ]
[ manzana[

.
[uN

Let us look at D

Pedro.

, ]

… ]]]

, uG ]

now. I mentioned earlier the intuition that D

seemed to be “defective”, in

the sense that it rendered opaque the φ-features of the nominal in [Spec,CP] for DP-external
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probes. We can now formulate this intuition in a concrete way: D
with valued φ
D

features and unvalued

enters in the computation

φ-features. In this respect, it diﬀers from

precisely in that, although it can Agree with the nominal in [Spec,CP], it is not able to

“pass on” its features further up in the tree. Its feature speciﬁcation looks as in (74).
(74) Feature array of D
⎡
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
⎢
⎢ u
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢ u
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎣

⎤
: nt ⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
: sg ⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

:
:

⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

Given its feature conﬁguration, whenever D

is involved, only

and

φ-

features will be visible from any DP-external position. In a case with SV agreement mismatch
like (75) the agreement relationships are established as in (76).
(75) Me sorpredió
me surprised.3.

las
the.

.

manzanas

que trajo

apple.

that brought Pedro

[N
(76)

[ sorprendió3. [

las.

.

sg , G

Pedro.

nt ]

[ manzana[

.
[uN

, ]

… ]]]

, uG ]

This conﬁguration correctly captures the behavior of propositional ARs with respect to the
three phenomena mentioned earlier: SV agreement, anaphora and DOM.8 In the ideal case,
one will be able to tie in the valued
8

features of D

with the presence of a of a [+

I did not include case features in the exposition, but the system works all the same for case as well.
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]

C○ in its complement position. This would provide the ﬁrst step towards an explanation for
why D

but not D

must come with valued

features. I will leave this question open

for future study.9
4.2.4

Relation to nominal ARs

The structure proposed in (57) above for propositional ARs diﬀers from that of nominal
ARs discussed in §3 only in the speciﬁcation of the C○ -head. In nominal ARs, the structure
for which is repeated in (77), we have an interrogative C○ [+
have relative C○ [+

] head, whereas nominal ARs

]; as will be demonstrated shortly, only the former will give rise to a

question meaning.
(77) Syntactic structure of nominal ARs in Spanish [with optional T-to-C movement]
DP
D
las

CP
DPi
Opwh manzanas

C’
C○
que[+

TP
DP

]

Juanj

9

T’
T○

vP

trajo

tj ti

One may also wonder whether it is a coincidence that the
features on D are neuter and singular,
raising the question of whether this is some form of “default” in Spanish. But notice that, since we still need the
relevant φ-features to agree inside the DP, it is not clear how D could show default agreement in this sense.
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Thus, variation in just a few key pieces is able to capture the similarities and diﬀerences between propositional ARs and nominal ARs. The string-identity of propositional and nominal
ARs follows from the fact that much of their structural make-up is indeed the same. However,
because of diﬀerences in the nature of the C○ -head involved, the resulting phrases diﬀer in
meaning.
At this point it is useful to stop and look at the resulting landscape of wh-constructions in
Spanish. We can provide a comprehensive description of all the syntactic structures discussed
so far by looking at three moving pieces: (i) the pair of operators qué and cuánto, which (ii)
vary with respect to their overtness (i.e. overt in subordinate interrogatives and exclamatives
vs. covert in ARs) and (iii) with respect to the make up of the CP they come in, i.e. whether
they involve a [+

] or [+

C○
cuánto /
[+
qué
/
[+
cuanto FR
[+
lo que FR
[+
propositional AR [+
nominal AR
[+

] C○ head. The full paradigm is spelled out below.
Opwh
] overt
] overt
] overt
] covert
] covert
] covert

complementizer deﬁnite article nominal head
no
no
yes
no
no
yes
no
no
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

Table 4.1. Relation of features in ARs vs. overt wh-operator constructions.

As the table shows, the (c)overtness of the wh-operator, the presence of the complementizer
que and the deﬁnite article go hand in hand. As a consequence, going from a propositional
AR to a nominal AR involves just one change. Similarly, going from ordinary free relatives
to a structure like (77) simply amounts to inverting the overtness/covertness of the diﬀerent
pieces involved in constructing a free relative, as described above. This gives us a typology of
at least three possible structures for a sequence of the form the NP that in Spanish–ignoring
the possibility of a matching relative structure.
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(78) a. Relative clause:
[ las [ manzanasj [ Op tj ]i [C○ [+

]

que [ María compró ti ]]]]

b. Nominal AR:
[ las [ [ Op manzanas]i [C○ [+

]

que [ María compró ti ]]]]

]

que+[compró]j [ María tj ti ]]]]

c. Propositional AR:
[ las [ [ Op manzanas]i [C○ [+

4.3

Semantic analysis

As I hope has emerged throughout the chapter, there is a lot to gain by attributing to
propositional ARs the syntactic structure of wh-constructions like questions and exclamatives.
In this section, I show how we can also capture their semantic properties by interpreting them
as questions and exclamations.
The empirical landscape that we need to capture varies along two main axes: (i) the type
of predicate to which propositional ARs are complements (rogative, responsive and emotive
factives), and (ii) the two types of interpretations that propositional ARs may have (
and

interpretations).

4.3.1

Background: the basics of questions

In this section I lay out my assumptions about the semantics of questions. The baseline
theory of questions that I am assuming is a blend between the well-studied proposals by Hamblin (1973) and Karttunen (1977), with the incorporation of Dayal’s (1994, 1996) idea that
the truth requirement on question denotations is introduced by an answerhood operator.
4.3.1.1

Question as sets of answers

In Hamblin’s (1973) original proposal, questions denote sets of propositions. In particular
they denote the set of their possible answers. Thus, a question like (79a) below is interpreted
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as the set in (79b), often referred to as a Hamblin-set. The set in (79c) exempliﬁes one such
possible meaning.
(79) a. Which book did Liz read?
b. ⟦(79a)⟧ = λp.∃x[book(w)(x) ∧ p = λw′ .read(x, Liz)]
c.

{that Liz read The Hobbit, that Liz read Don Quixoje, that Liz read Crime &
Punishment…}

In questions, wh-phrases may range over singular as well as plural individuals. In order to
extend this account to plural questions, I adopt the ontology of plural individuals from Sharvy
(1980) and Link (1983): singular terms denote in the atomic domain whereas plural terms
may denote plural and singular individuals. Plural morphology (as well as the conjunction and
in one of its senses) signals the presence of a pluralization operation ‘∗’ denoting the summing
operation ⊕. This operator generates all the individual sums of members of the extension of
any 1-place predicate P.10 Thus, the denotation of ∗P is closed under the sum operation. The
consequence for the semantics of questions is that we now have diﬀerent Hamblin-sets for
plural and singular individuals.
(80) a. Which books did Liz read?
b. ⟦(80a)⟧ = λp.∃x[∗book(w)(x) ∧ p = λw′ .read(x, Liz)]

(81)

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
that Liz read
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ that Liz read
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
that Liz read
⎪
⎩

⊕

⊕ ,

⊕

, that Liz read

, that Liz read

⊕ , that Liz read

, that Liz read

⊕ ,

⎫
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎭

The ∗-operator denotes a function from D⟨et⟩ into D⟨et⟩ such that, for any f ∈ D⟨et⟩ and any x ∈ De , ∗f(x) ↔
[f(x) ∨ ∃y∃z[∗f(y) ∧ ∗f(z) ∧ x = y ⊕ z]].
10
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The resulting set of answers is order by entailment: if Liz read The Hobbit and Don Quixote,
it must be the case that Liz read The Hobbit.11
(82)

Ordering of the Hamblin-set in (128):
⊕ ⊕
⊕

⊕

⊕

.
The entailment relations may cause problems in embedded contexts. Karttunen (1977) observed that (83a) entails that for every book that Liz read, Bill knows that she read it. But this
does not follow from the embedded question if we assume that it denotes a Hamblin-set like
(81), since there is no reference to the propositions in (81) that are true in the actual world.
Thus, Karttunen argued that the denotation of questions must be limited to the set of their
true answers, as in (84); this is what is usually referred to as the truth requirement on question
denotations.
(83) a. Bill knows which books Liz read
b. ⟦(83a)⟧ = ⟦know(⟦(81)⟧)(Bill)⟧
(84) ⟦(83a)⟧ = λp.∃x[p(w) ∧ ∗book(x) ∧ p = λw′ .read(w′ )(x, Liz)]
This reading is referred to as the weakly exhaustive interpretation of questions. At this point, it
is useful to deﬁne the maximal element, i.e. the unique element that is true and entails the rest
11

A quick clariﬁcation. In Link’s (1983) system plural entities are just sums of individuals, as concrete as the
individuals that serve to deﬁne them and of the same logical type. Therefore, the question alternatives in (81)
denote distinct propositions, and are not ordered by entailment. This works when the predicate is collective (if
Sue and Liz are a good couple it does not follow that Sue is a good couple). For distributive interpretations, we
must order the propositions in the Hamblin-set by entailment. Following Link (1983), we can apply a distributive
operator ‘D ’ to the predicate. The distributive operator states that, if some property P is true of a (possibly) plural
individual x, then it must be true of any individual part of x as well. That is, D P(x) ↔ P(x) ∧ ∀y[y ≤i x →
P(y)]. Now the denotation of D (∗ P) forms a complete join-subsemilattice in the domain D of individuals that
P generates by operating over atoms, and the diﬀerent members are ordered by entailment.
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of the true answers. The reason is that questions about singular and plural individuals diﬀer
on the felicity of the possible answers. For instance, (85a) can felicitously answer both (79a)
and (80a). However, (85b) can only felicitously answer (80a), but not (79a). (Both answers
are possible for a question like (86).)
(85) a. Liz read The Hobbit.
b. Liz read The Hobbit and Don Quixote.
(86) What did Liz read?
This shows that the choice between a singular or a plural wh-phrase is reﬂective of speakers’
expectations regarding the number of entities that should be mentioned in the answer. The
problem is reminiscent of expectations raised by singular vs. plural deﬁnite descriptions.
Given (i) the structural parallelism between partially ordered sets of answers like (82) and
the domain of individuals in the Sharvy/Link tradition, and (ii) the similar felicity conditions
shared by deﬁnite descriptions and answers to questions, it is no surprise that a solution would
come from introducing maximality/uniqueness in the question denotations. Here I follow
Dayal (1996), who deﬁnes an operator A -Dw that essentially mimics the functions of a
deﬁnite determiner: it applies to a set of propositions (a Hamblin-set) and picks the maximum
of the true answers (see also Heim 1994 and Rullmann 1995).12
(87) ⟦A -Dw ⟧ = λQ⟨st,t⟩ .λw.ιp[p(w) ∧ Q(p) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧ Q(q) → p ⊆ q]]
Coming back now to the weakly exhaustive interpretation of (83a) as expressed in (84), it
is well known that this interpretation is sometimes too weak (but see discussions in Heim
1994 and Beck and Rullmann 1999). It was Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) who brought
attention to this issue in the context of questions embedded under cognitive factives. The
12

Notice that this operator applies to the full Hamblin-set and not just to the set of true answers. The truth
requirement on questions is introduced by the operator itself. See Dayal (1994, 1996, 2017) for arguments in
favor of this change.
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intuition is that, if Bill knows which books Liz read, he must know, for every book in the
domain, whether she read it or not. This is usually referred to as the strongly exhaustive
interpretation of questions. This is not what (84) means, however; (84) claims that for every
book that Liz actually read, Bill knows that Liz read that book. That is, (84) is compatible
with Bill believing of a book that Liz did not read that she actually read it. This seems too
weak.13 For this reason, Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982, 1984) argue for a strengthened
version of (84), where the alternatives that are not entailed are false. The authors propose a
system where this meaning is derived by assuming that questions denote equivalence relations
over sets of possible worlds:
(88) a. Bill knows who came
b. ⟦(88a)⟧ = λw′ .λw′′ [λx.came(w′ )(x) = λx.came(w′′ )(x)]
As Heim’s (1994) noted, however, the same results can be obtained by means of a second
answerhood operator. Then, the strengthening can be enforced either by establishing a partition of possible worlds out of the set of true answers, or by explicitly denying non-entailed
alternative answers:
(89) a. Partition based strongly exhaustive answers
⟦A S

p⟧

= λQ⟨st,t⟩ .λw.λw′ [A -Dw (Q)(w) = A -Dw (Q)(w′ )]

b. Negation based strongly exhaustive answers
⟦A S

n⟧

= λQ⟨st,t⟩ .λw.ιp[p(w) ∧ ∀q[[Q(q) ∧ p ⊈ q] → ¬q(w)]]

13

It is widely accepted that the strongly exhaustive reading of (83a) is possible and easily accessible. There
is debate, however, as to whether (83a) also has, in addition, a weakly exhaustive interpretation. One position,
held by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), George (2011) and Uegaki (2015), holds that that weakly exhaustive
readings are not accessible for cognitive factives (although they are for other veridical responsive predicates); in
turn, Karttunen (1977); Heim (1994); Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) and Klinedinst and Rothschild (2011) believe
that weakly exhaustive interpretations are also available under cognitive factives. Part of the evidence that the
latter present are sentences like (i) (from Guerzoni and Sharvit 2007), which would be rendered inconsistent
under a strongly exhaustive interpretation of the subordinate question who came.
(i)

Jack knows who came, but he does not know who did not come.
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4.3.1.2

The baseline theory

With the general background on questions introduced above, I brieﬂy explain here how to
obtain those results compositionally. The syntax-semantic mapping I assume follows the LForiented renditions of Karttunen’s (1977) semantics in Stechow (1996) and Bittner (1998).
First, wh-words denote existential quantiﬁers. For instance:
(90) a. ⟦who⟧ = λP.∃x[person(w)(x) ∧ P(x)]
b. ⟦what⟧ = λP.λQ.∃x[P(w)(x) ∧ Q(w)(x)]
Following Stechow (1996), I deﬁne the denotation of the operator Q as an identity relation
between propositions:
(91) ⟦Q⟧ = λp.λq[p = q]
I will assume, with Karttunen (1977), that the locus of the question operator is on C○ , akin to
his proto-question rule. With these pieces, the derivation of a simple question like (80a) is as
follows:
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(92) LF derivation of what books did Liz read?
CP1: ⟨st, t⟩
λp.∃x[∗book(x) ∧ p = λw′ .read(w′ )(x, L)]
CP2: t

λp

∃x[∗book(x) ∧ p = λw′ .read(w′ )(x, L)]
DP: ⟨et, t⟩

C’: ⟨et⟩

λP.∃x[∗book(x) ∧ P(x)]

λx[p = λw.read(w)(x, L)]
C’: t

λe

p = λw.read(w)(x, L)
C○ ∶ ⟨st, t⟩

TP: ⟨t⟩

λq[p = q]

read(x, L)

Liz: e

VP: ⟨et⟩

V: ⟨e, et⟩⟩

te

λx.λy.read(x, y)

The wh-word, a quantiﬁer, undergoes QR to [Spec,CP] and leaves an individual trace in TP.
The only departure from Karttunen (1977) is on the top level. Moved elements are coindexed
with their trace, in this case with a superscript that corresponds to the type of the trace. Notice
also that the type of a trace left by a moved element corresponds to the type this moved element
quantiﬁes over. Finally, a variable left by a trace is λ-abstracted over immediately before the
element is interpreted in its displaced position.
The CP level is the level at which “intensionalization” happens. This requires Intensional
Functional Application, to allow the combination of the C○ head which requires a propositional
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argument, with the TP, which provides a truth-value. The result is again a truth-value, but
now the world variable has been introduced and abstracted over the predicate.
As in Karttunen’s (1977), the free propositional variable in CP2 is bound by a lambda
operator, eﬀectively creating a set of propositions.14 The resulting interpretation of this LF
is the desired proposition-set denotation of the question what books did Liz read, i.e. the
Hamblin-set of propositions of the form “Liz read x”, where x is any book.15 The last step is
to ﬁlter out the false propositions. This is the task of the answerhood operator A -D, which
applies to the meaning in CP1 and returns the maximal true answer:
CP: ⟨s, st⟩

(93)

λw.ιp[p(w) ∧ ∃x[∗book(x) ∧ p = λw′ .read(w′ )(x, L)]]
A -D

CP1: ⟨st, t⟩
λp.∃x[∗book(x) ∧ p = λw′ .read(w′ )(x, L)]

With respect to how many questions, the derivation proceeds in a similar fashion. The strategy
I adopt is along the lines of Higginbotham (1993), Cresti (1995), Romero (1998) and others.
The idea is to decompose how many NP phrases a wh-operator part and a many NP part.
Thus, while the wh-operator takes scope, the nominal can be interpreted at diﬀerent parts
in the clause.16 This keeps the semantics of how many NP maximally similar to the scope
14

This is known as Karttunen’s (1977) “WH-Quantiﬁcation Rule”.

15

This is the de re reading: the extensional value of the wh-complement is evaluated under the actual world. I
will not consider other interpretations of questions here; see Sharvit (2002) for a treatment of de dicto readings
and Dayal (2017) for discussion.
16

(i)

This is required for ambiguities like the following (Kroch 1989, Cinque 1990):
How many books does Chris want to buy?
a. What is the number n such that there are n books that Chris wants to buy?
b. What is the number n such that Chris wants it to be the case that there are n books that he wants to
buy?
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splitting structures usually assumed in the semantics of comparative quantiﬁers (e.g. Hackl
2000 a.o.). I deﬁne the two moving parts of how many NP as follows:
(94) a. ⟦how⟧ = λD⟨dt⟩ .∃d[D(d)]
b. ⟦

⟧ = λP⟨et⟩ .λd.λQ⟨et⟩ .∃x [P(x) ∧ Q(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]

Thus, the LF for a question like how many books did Liz read is the following:
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4.3.2
λp
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TP: t

⟨et, ⟨d, ⟨et, t⟩⟩⟩

NP: ⟨et⟩

td NP: ⟨d, ⟨et⟩⟩

DP : ⟨et, t⟩

λe

read(x, L)

TP: t

λx.read(x, L)

TP: ⟨e, t⟩

λq[p = q]∃x [∗book(x) ∧ read(x, L) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]

C○ ∶ ⟨st, t⟩

p = λw′ .∃x [∗book(x) ∧ read(w′ )(x, L) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]

C’: t

λd[p = λw′ .∃x [∗book(x) ∧ read(w′ )(x, L) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]]

λDdt .∃d[D(d)]
λd

CP3: ⟨dt⟩

Opwh

∃d[p = λw′ .∃x[∗book(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d ∧ read(w′ )(x, L)]]

CP2: t

λp.∃d[p = λw′ .∃x[∗book(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d ∧ read(w′ )(x, L)]]

CP1: ⟨st, t⟩

(95) LF derivation of how many books did Liz read?

Compositional analysis of propositional ARs

We are now well equipped to dive into how to map structures like propositional ARs to

their semantic interpretation. Recall that the desiderata is to account for the wide range of

interpretations that propositional ARs are capable of delivering when they are complements to
wh-constructions. I repeat here the relevant paradigm: a sentence like (8) may be interpreted
in four diﬀerent ways:17
(8) No sabes

las

not know.2.

the.

manzanas que trajo
.

apples

Pedro el año pasado

that brought Pedro the last year

Lit.: ‘You don’t know the apples that Pedro brought last year

(9) a. O

interrogative

You don’t know what are the apples that Pedro brought last year.
b. A

interrogative

You don’t know what is the amount of apples that Pedro brought last year.
c. O

exclamative

The apples that Pedro brought last year exceeded the expectations of the speaker with
respect to some property of apples.
d. A

exclamative

The amount of apples that Pedro brought last year exceeded the expectations of the
speaker.
The plan for the rest of the section is the following: ﬁrst I will spell out my proposed meaning for the deﬁnite article in its propositional variant D , and then present my account for
propositional ARs when they are interpreted as subordinate questions. Then, I discuss the
case of exclamatives and how they tie in with the proposed semantics for interrogatives and
the deﬁnite article.
17

I am abstracting away from the

interpretation here and subsuming it under the
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reading.

4.3.2.1

The semantics of the deﬁnite article

I have argued so far that propositional ARs are syntactically questions (and so diﬀerent
in this respect from concealed questions). The obvious question, then, is what to do with
the deﬁnite article. This deﬁnite article, which I called D

earlier, must apply to a CP that

denotes a question.18 Its function, therefore, is similar to the Answerhood operators proposed
in Heim (1994) and Dayal (1996). The full lexical entry of D

is below.19

(96) ⟦D ⟧ = λQ⟨st,t⟩ .λw ∶ ∃p[Q(p) ∧ p(w) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧ Q(q)] → p ⊆ q]]
. ιp[Q(p) ∧ p(w) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧ Q(q)] → p ⊆ q]]
The semantic task of D

is the same as that of A 1 in Heim (1994) and A -Dw in Dayal

(1996): it applies to a question denotation, the Hamblin-set Q, it presupposes the existence
of a true proposition p in Q that entails all other true propositions, and returns that p. The
similarities with the ordinary deﬁnite article are hard to miss.
4.3.2.2

Propositional ARs as answered questions

I have laid out my assumptions about the semantics of questions, and proposed an entry
for the deﬁnite article that is compatible with question semantics. In what follows I put all the
pieces together to show how they derive the range of interpretations observed in propositional
ARs.
4.3.2.2.1

Basic meanings

The compositional semantics of question-embedding sentences

adopted here states that propositional ARs denote precisely that, propositions. The target interpretations of a sentence like (97) are in (98).

18

See examples in (65) above showing that the deﬁnite article can also combine with propositions.

19

I follow the convention of introducing presuppositions with a colon after the last lambda term.
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(97)

Juan sabe las
Juan know the.

manzanas que trajo
.

apples

Pedro el año pasado

that brought Pedro the last year

Lit.: ‘Juan knows the apples that Pedro brought last year
(98) a. O

interrogative

Juan knows what are the apples that Pedro brought last year.
b. A

interrogative

Juan knows what is the amount of apples that Pedro brought last year.
The derivation of the propositional AR las manzanas que trajo Pedro on its

interrogative

interpretation goes along the lines described above for constituent questions. Syntactically,
the only diﬀerence between propositional ARs and constituent questions is that (i) there is an
overt determiner playing the role of an answerhood operator, (ii) the wh-operator is covert,
and (iii) the complementizer is overt.

(99) [

1

las [ [

2

Opwh manzanas ]i [ ’ que[+

]

[ trajo ]j [ Juan tj ti ]]]]

From a semantic standpoint, however, there are no diﬀerences. The full derivation is summarized below.
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(100) O

interpretation of propositional ARs
DP: ⟨s, st⟩

λw.ιp[p(w) ∧ ∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ p = trajo(w)(x, P)]]
DP: ⟨⟨st, t⟩, ⟨s, st⟩⟩
D

CP1: ⟨st, t⟩

λp.∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ p = λw′ .trajo(w′ )(x, P)]
CP2: t

λp

∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ p = λw′ .trajo(w′ )(x, P)]
DP2: ⟨et, t⟩

C’: ⟨et⟩

λP.∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ P(x)]

λx[p = λw.trajo(w)(x, P)]

Opwh manzanas

λe

C’: t

p = λw.read(w)(x, L)
C○ ∶ ⟨st, t⟩

TP: ⟨t⟩

λq[p = q]

trajo(x, P)
[Juan trajo te ]

A similar derivation accounts for the

interpretations of propositional ARs. In this

case, the syntactic derivation echoes that of how many questions.

(101) [

1

las [ [

2

Opwh

manzanas ]i [ ’ que[+
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]

[ trajo ]j [ Juan tj ti ]]]]

At LF, the cluster how many NP–cuanto NP in Spanish–is decomposed in a wh-operator and
a many NP part. The derivation is summarized below: ﬁrst, consider the interpretation of the
how many NP phrase.
(102) A

interpretation of propositional ARs –Part I
CP2: t
∃d[p = λw′ .⟦TP⟧(w′ )]
Opwh

CP3: ⟨dt⟩

λDdt .∃d[D(d)]

λd[p = λw′ .⟦TP⟧(w′ )]
λd

C’: t
p = λw′ .⟦TP⟧(w′ )

C○ ∶ ⟨st, t⟩

TP: t

λq[p = q]

∃x [∗manzana(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d ∧ trajo(w′ )(x, P)]
DP : ⟨et, t⟩
td NP: ⟨d, ⟨et, t⟩⟩

TP: ⟨e, t⟩
λx.trajo(x, P)
λe

TP: t

manzanas
trajo(x, P)
The rest of the derivation proceeds as before: Karttunen’s (1977) WH-quantiﬁcation rule
applies ﬁrst, and D

applies to the resulting set of propositions.
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(103) A

interpretation of propositional ARs –Part II
DP: ⟨s, st⟩

λw.ιp[p(w) ∧ ∃d[p = ∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d ∧ trajo(w)(x, P)]]]
DP: ⟨⟨st, t⟩, ⟨s, st⟩⟩
D

CP1: ⟨st, t⟩

λp.∃d[p = λw′ .⟦TP⟧(w′ )]
CP2: t

λp

∃d[p = λw′ .⟦TP⟧(w′ )]
In each case, (100) and (103), the result is a function from worlds to propositions. The deﬁnite
article D

takes a CP denoting a set of propositions–either one of the CP1 in (100)/(102)–

and returns the intension of the maximally informative proposition from that set.
(104) ⟦DP⟧ = λw . ιp[p(w) ∧ ⟦CP1⟧(p) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧ ⟦CP1⟧(q)] → p ⊆ q]]
4.3.2.2.2

Embedding propositional ARs

Propositional ARs denote propositions, they

are of type ⟨st⟩. The kind of predicates that can typically embed questions, however, usually
take complements that denote sets of propositions. For instance, the usual lexical entry for
question embedding know looks like this:
(105) ⟦know⟧ = λQ⟨st,t⟩ .λxe .∀p[Q(p) ∧ p(w ) → ∀w′ ∈ Doxx (w )[p(w′ )]]
The obvious solution to solve the second logical option is to lift the type of propositional ARs
to a set of propositions. This lifting may be carried out by adapting Partee’s (1987) I
operator to operate over propositions.
(106) ⟦I ⟧ = λp⟨st⟩ .λq[q = p]
(107) ⟦I ⟧(⟦(100)⟧) = λq[q = λw.ιp[∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ p = trajo(w)(x, P)]]]
We can now work with standard deﬁnitions for rogative and responsive predicates. The full
interpretation of a propositional AR like (100) is as follows:
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(108) ⟦know⟧(⟦(100)⟧)(⟦Juan⟧) = ∀p[p = ιq[∃x[∗manzana(x)∧q = trajo(w )(x, Pedro)]
→ ∀w′ ∈ Doxw ,Juan [p(w′ )]]]
In the case of

interpretations, we have the following.

(109) ⟦know⟧(⟦(100)⟧)(⟦Juan⟧)
= ∀p[p = ιq[∃d[q = ∃x[∗manzana(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d ∧ trajo(w )(x, Pedro)]]
→ ∀w′ ∈ Doxw ,Juan [p(w′ )]]]
An obvious question that remains unanswered concerns anti-rogative predicates like think and
believe, which only take propositional (declarative) complements, and yet they are incompatible with propositional ARs.
(110) * Juan piensa las

manzanas que trajo

Juan thinks the.

.

apples

Pedro el año pasado

that brought Pedro the last year

In providing propositional ARs a propositional semantics we seem to lose the parallelism with
questions when it comes to embeddability.
: ⟨st, t⟩
rogative
(ask, wonder)
responsive
(know, tell)
anti-rogative
(think, believe)

: ⟨st⟩

propositional ARs: ⟨st⟩

3

8

3

3

3

3

8

3

8

Table 4.2. Distribution propositional ARs with embeddind predicates

The derivation of the diﬀerences between the three types of predicates has occupied semanticists at least since Karttunen’s (1977) work, and I will not be able to address the issue here
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with the level of detail that it deserves.20 Diﬀerent assumption about the semantics of interrogative will face diﬀerent aspects of this issue. An obvious alternative that goes around
this problem is to provide a semantics for propositional ARs where they simply denote sets
of propositions. This can be enforced either by incorporating I into D

or by giving D

a diﬀerent semantics altogether. Both these options however would take the meaning of D
away from its ordinary nominal counterpart D

. Another option, suggested to me by Seth

Cable (pc.) is to place the burden of explaining the restriction of propositional ARs to antirogative predicates on the [+ ] feature of the complementizer head. On this view, D

would

no longer be a syntactic head in the same way as other determiners are, and so it would not
block subcategorization into its sister node. I will leave the task of ﬁnding a better solution
than the one presented here for a future occasion.21
20
For recent discussions, see Uegaki (2015), Spector and Egré (2015), Xiang (2016), Theiler et al. (2016)
and Dayal (2017).
21

Predicates that embed exclamatives can also be explained in the terms of the analysis of propositional ARs
presented above. The price to pay, however, is the assumption that exclamative predicates can c-select for
propositions. Thus, what follows should be taken as a demonstration of one way to conciliate the semantics of
propositional ARs with exclamative predicates. As a case study, take factive emotive predicates with expletives like it is surprising/amazing, that can take both question and declarative embedding complements, but not
ordinary DPs.
(i)

a. It is amazing {who came to the party / that Liz came to the party / *the dog}.
b. It is surprising {who came to the party / that Liz came to the party / *the dog}.

With our current assumptions, we can make emotive predicates directly take propositional ARs. Assume for
instance a general entry for this type of predicates (where ExpSp,x stands for the set of worlds where the course
of events proceeds as expected by speaker Sp in the evaluation world).
(ii) ⟦EMO⟧ = λp⟨st⟩ .λw.p(w) ∧ ∀w′ [w′ ∈ Expw,Sp → ¬p(w′ )]
The target interpretation states that the proposition denoted by the propositional AR is true in the evaluation
world, but not in the “expectation” worlds of the speaker. This serves well as a basis for a subordinate exclamative. On top of this, we may want to add the emotive component of exclamations (cf. Castroviejo 2006,
Chernilovskaya 2014 a.o.). The main takeaway is that we can directly extend our semantics of propostional ARs
to (at least some) exclamative predicates by, (i) following the tradition that exclamations may be built up from
question semantics (see Lahiri 2002, D’avis 2002, Abels 2007), and (ii) assuming that exclamative predicates
c-select for propositions.

173

4.4

Conclusion

This chapter provides an account of ARs in Spanish when they appear as complements
to wh-embedding predicates. From a syntactic standpoint, I have argued that propositional
ARs are DPs with a full question embedded at the CP level. This conclusion is supported by
a number of criteria presented in §4.1.3 (which in turn speak against the superﬁcially more
straightforward analysis in terms of concealed questions discussed in §4.5). From a semantic
point of view, propositional ARs have the semantics of (answered) questions, in the spirit
of Heim (1994), Dayal (1996) a.o. (and Zanuttini and Portner (2003) and Gutiérrez-Rexach
1996 for exclamatives). What is special about Spanish, then, is the presence of D , a version
of the deﬁnite article that applies to questions (or propositional properties) and returns the
maximally informative true answer. The conclusion is that ARs in Spanish belong to its own
kind, but one that is not very far from other more familiar constructions.

4.5
4.5.1

Appendix: concealed questions?
An alternative approach

Propositional ARs are special in their “hybrid” nature: they seem to be DPs that nevertheless pattern with interrogatives. In these properties, they are reminiscent of concealed
questions. Concealed questions are DPs that can appear embedded under (certain) question
embedding verbs and have an interpretation equivalent to a question. As Baker (1968) originally noted, a sentence like (111a) is ambiguous between an acquaintance reading, which
states that John is familiar with Rome, and a concealed question reading, expressed by the
paraphrase in (111b).
(111) a. John knows the capital of Italy.
b. John knows what the capital of Italy is.
There are various tests showing that the DP in (111) in fact patterns with questions. For
example, the verb tell in English varies with respect to factivity depending on whether its
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complement is declarative or interrogative. Thus, whereas the embedded proposition in (112a)
may be true or false irrespective of the factual events, (112b) entails that John told Sue about
the actual state of aﬀairs.
(112) a. John told Sue that it was raining.
b. John told Sue whether it was raining.
Using the same test, we can show that concealed questions pattern together with interrogatives.
Thus, if (113a) is true, then neither (113b) nor (113c) can be true at the same time.
(113) a. John told Sue that London is the capital of Italy.
b. John told Sue the capital of Italy.
c. John told Sue what the capital of Italy is.
The property of concealed questions that is pertinent here is that they are ordinary DPs that
appear in positions where questions (and exclamatives, see e.g. Grimshaw 1979) are expected, much like propositional ARs. This parallel raises the possibility that propositional
ARs in Spanish are in fact concealed questions/exclamations. If so, we would need to posit
no out-of-the-ordinary structure for propositional ARs: they are, syntactically, ordinary DPs
restricted by relative clauses. If so, the same semantic machinery that is used to interpret
concealed questions can yield the diﬀerences in interpretation, and account for the unusual
external distribution of such nominals. In what follows, I will ﬁrst show that at least in terms of
the semantics, a concealed question analysis could derive the right interpretation for propositional ARs. However, such an account makes wrong predictions about the syntactic properties
of propositional ARs. As will be shown below, propositional ARs and concealed questions in
Spanish show very diﬀerent patterns, suggesting that an interrogative semantics is insuﬃcient
to capture the properties of propositional ARs; they must have the structural properties of
wh-constructions.
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4.5.2

Proof of concept

The goal of this subsection to show that a concealed question analysis for propositional
ARs can yield the right meaning for these constructions.
The general strategy of the approach I present proceeds in two steps: ﬁrst, an individual
concept meaning is generated for the propositional AR (of type ⟨se⟩, a function from indices
to individuals), and then a type-shifter extracts a proposition meaning out of the individual
concept.22 Take for instance a DP with a relative clause like the following, assuming a simple
raising analysis of the relative clause (Kayne 1994).
(114) Pedro sabe

[

Pedro knows

las [
the

1

[

2

manzanas ]i [

que [

Juan trajo

apples

that

Juan brought

ti ]]]]

The meaning of the highest NP is simply the property resulting from intersecting the NP
manzanas and the CP.
(115) ⟦NP⟧ = λx.λw[manzanas(w)(x) ∧ trajo(w)(x, Juan)]
Assuming an intensional variant of the deﬁnite determiner, we can close the above property
to get at the desired individual concept interpretation.
(116) a. ⟦las⟧ = λP⟨e,st⟩ = λw.ιx[P(x)(w)]
b. ⟦DP⟧ = λw. ιx[manzanas(w)(x) ∧ trajo(w)(x, Juan)]
The denotation of the DP consists of functions from world indices to plural individuals of
apples that Juan brought, where the apples that Juan brought vary from world to world.
Individual concepts cannot directly combine with wh-embedding predicates because there
is a sortal diﬀerence: these predicates cannot take complements of type ⟨se⟩ (nor type e either).
For instance, assume the following meaning for the predicate know:
22

Employing type-shifters is not the only way to analyze concealed questions. For instance, evidence from
quantiﬁed and indeﬁnite concealed questions suggests that the type-shifter analysis is at best insuﬃcient. Those
matters do not concern us here however; see Nathan (2006) and Frana (2017) for discussion.
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(117) ⟦knowQ ⟧ = λQ⟨st,t⟩ .λxe .∀p[Q(p) ∧ p(w ) → ∀w′ ∈ Doxx (w )[p(w′ )]]
Thus, we need some kind of repair. In this case, a type-shifter can do the job. We deﬁne a
function that applies to individual concepts and returns sets of propositions (Nathan 2006).
(118) ICtoP Shift ⟨se⟩ → ⟨st, t⟩:
λy⟨se⟩ .λp⟨st⟩ .∃xe [p = λw.[y(w) = x]]
Now the meaning of know above can be applied to the output of the application of ICtoP to
the DP.
(119) ⟦ICtoP⟧(⟦DP⟨se⟩ ⟧) = λp.∃x[p = λw.⟦las manzanas que Juan trajo⟧w = x]
= λp.∃x[p = (λw.ιy[manzanas(w)(y) ∧ trajo(w)(y, Juan)] = x)]
The meaning of the resulting expression amounts to a set of propositions that vary only in the
speciﬁcation of the apples that Juan brought in each evaluation world.
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
(120) ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩

⎫
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
The apples that Juan brought are d ⊕ e ⊕ f ⊕ g ⊕ h in w , ⎪
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎪
⎪
The apples that Juan brought are i ⊕ j in w ,
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
…
⎪
⎭
The apples that Juan brought are a ⊕ b ⊕ c in w ,

Applied to the meaning of know in (117), we get at the desired interpretation:
(121) ⟦ Pedro sabe ICtoP([ las manzanas que trajo Juan]⟧w )
′

= ∀p[∃x[p = (λw′ .⟦las manzanas que trajo Juan⟧w = x) ∧ p(w )
→ ∀w′ ∈ DoxJ (w )[p(w′ )]]]
= ∀p[∃x[p = (λw′ .ιy[manzanas(w′ )(y) ∧ trajo(w′ )(y, Juan)] = x) ∧ p(w )
→ ∀w′ ∈ DoxJ (w )[p(w′ )]]]
The resulting expression above is true iﬀ for every proposition p of the form the apples that
Juan brought are x that is true in w , p is also true in all the worlds compatible with Pedro’s beliefs. That is, Pedro knows the answer to the question: what are the apples that Juan
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brought? This strategy interprets the relative clause as a concealed speciﬁcational copular
question (Romero 2005, Frana 2017).
This accounts for the
to

interpretation of propositional ARs, but a minimal extension

interpretations is possible as well. Intuitively, we need an “amount concept” to

achieve this result, a function from indices to degrees–of type ⟨sd⟩–from which we can extract
a question about an amount.
To do so, assume the presence of a silent

predicate. This null

applies to

properties and measures them along some dimension. For our purposes, it suﬃces to set
to measure individuals and return their cardinality.
(122) ⟦
Here

⟧ = λP⟨e,st⟩ .λQ⟨e,st⟩ .λd.λw.∃x [P(w)(x) ∧ Q(w)(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]
is a higher-order predicate modiﬁer that takes any two properties P and Q and

returns a function from degrees to propositions such that there is an x in the extension of
P and Q and x is of cardinality d. Syntactically,

raises from the CP internal position

together with the NP and leaves a trace of the same type as the object it quantiﬁes over (type
e in this case).
(123) [ Pedro [ sabe [ las [

1

[

2

manzanas ]i [ que [ Juan trajo ti ]]]]]

We must provide now versions of the deﬁnite article and the type-shifter that are parametrized
to degrees, rather than individuals.
(124) ⟦las⟧ = λP⟨d,st⟩ .λw.ιd[P(w)(d)]
(125) ACtoP Shift ⟨sd⟩ → ⟨st, t⟩:
λd⟨sd⟩ .λp⟨st⟩ .∃d′ [p = λw[d(w) = d′ ]]
Taking these adjustments into consideration, the meaning of the full DP before the application
of the shifter ACtoP is represented below.
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(126) a. ⟦NP⟧ = λQ⟨e,st⟩ .λd.λw.∃x [manzanas(w)(x) ∧ Q(w)(x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]
b. ⟦NP⟧ = λd.λw.∃x [manzanas(w)(x) ∧ trajo(w)(Juan, x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]
c. ⟦DP⟧ = λw.ιd[∃x[manzanas(w)(x) ∧ trajo(w)(Juan, x) ∧ ∣x∣ = d]]
After the application of the shifter, we arrive at (127b):
(127) a. ⟦ACtoP⟧(⟦DP⟨sd⟩ ⟧) = λp.∃d[p = λw.⟦las manzanas que Juan trajo⟧w = d]
b. λp.∃d[p = λw.(ιd′ [∃x[manzanas(w)(x) ∧ trajo(w)(x, Juan) ∧ ∣x∣ = d′ ]]) = d]
As before, the meaning of this expression is a set of propositions:23

(128)

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩

⎫
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
The number of apples that Juan brought are , ⎪
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎪
The number of apples that Juan brought are , ⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
…
⎪
⎭
The number of apples that Juan brought is ,

This meaning can be taken by predicates like know, as deﬁned in (117).
(129) ⟦ Pedro sabe ACtoP([ las manzanas que trajo Juan]⟧w )
′

= ∀p[∃d[p = (λw′ .⟦las manzanas que trajo Juan⟧w = d) ∧ p(w )
→ ∀w′ ∈ DoxJ (w )[p(w′ )]]]
= ∀p[∃d[p = (λw′ .ιd′ [manzanas(w′ )(y)∧trajo(w′ )(y, Juan)∧∣y∣ = d′ ] = d) ∧ p(w )
→ ∀w′ ∈ DoxJ (w )[p(w′ )]]]
In this case, what Pedro knows is the answer to the question: what is the cardinality of the
apples that Juan brought? This is the correct target meaning for the

interpretation, a

question not about individual apples, but about amounts of apples.
23

The type shifters that we have introduced above in (118)/(125) rely on the semantics that Romero (2005)
provides for the copula in speciﬁcational copular sentences. Thus, in the set of propositions of (128), the number
after the copula cannot be predicative, it must be a number name. This is accordance with the fregean view that
noun phrases like the number of planets and simple numerals like eight are singular terms referring to numbers
as abstract objects (Frege 1884). There are, however, many criticisms to this position; see Knowles (2015) and
Moltmann (2016) for two recent ones.
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4.5.3

Assessment

A concealed question analysis, however feasible semantically, is not empirically adequate
in Spanish, as a comparison of propositional ARs and genuine concealed questions in Spanish
reveals. Syntactically, concealed questions are nothing more than the DP they outwardly seem
to be, and consequently, pattern with nominals and not with wh-constructions in the environments we had seen in §4.1.3. For instance, a DP that is interpreted as a concealed question
nevertheless triggers number agreement in the expected way, in contrast to propositional ARs,
where we ﬁnd agreement mismatches.
(35b) Agreement mismatch in propositional ARs
Se le

ha

olvidado los

reﬂ PR.

aux. 3.

forgotten the.

.

mejillones

que ha

mussel.

that Juan ordered

.

pedido Juan.

‘He has forgotten how many mussels John ordered

(130) No agreement mismatch in concealed questions
Se le

{ han

reﬂ PR.

/ *ha

aux.3.

aux.3.

} olvidado las
forgotten the.

capitales
.

capital.

de Europa.
.

of Europe

‘He has forgotten what are the capital cities of Europe
In addition, concealed questions, unlike propositional ARs and genuine interrogatives, do not
require obligatory inversion, as shown by the contrast below.
(131) a. SV inversion
Yo sé
I

las

know the.

manzanas que trajo
.

apples

Pedro

that brought Pedro

‘I know {what/how many} apples Pedro brought’
b. No SV inversion
Yo sé
I

las

know the.

manzanas que Pedro trajo
.

apples

that Pedro brought
180

‘I know {what/#how many} Pedro apples brought’
These divergences in syntactic behavior suggests that a proper treatment of propositional ARs
involves not just a question interpretation, but also the internal structure of a wh-construction.
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CHAPTER 5
DEGREE NEUTER RELATIVE CLAUSES

In the previous two chapters, I discussed two types of ARs in Spanish that share a common core, but diﬀer in whether they are propositional or nominal in nature. The duality of
ARs in Spanish, I argued, is reminiscent of the connection between wh-constructions and free
relatives. This chapter discusses yet another construction in Spanish which can be characterized as having dual forms, one propositional and one nominal. The construction in question is
a diﬀerent sort of quantity-oriented relative clause, where the clause is headed by a gradable
predicate of any syntactic category and the form lo.1 Sentences involving such constructions
uniformly have a

interpretation.2

(1) Juan admiró lo hermosa
Juan admired

beautiful.

que era la novela
.

that was the novel.

.

‘Juan admired how beautiful the novel was’

1

The morpheme lo has received a great deal of attention in the Spanish literature. Its form, reminiscent
of the deﬁnite articles el and la, suggests that it is simply a neuter variant of the deﬁnite article. The lack of
neuter declensions in Spanish nominals, however, raises questions about why the language would have a neuter
determiner in the ﬁrst place. There are at least three main analyses of lo that have been proposed:
(i)

a.

Lo is a deﬁnite article used as a nominalizer of adjective, adverb, prepositional and propositional phrases
(Gil y Gaya 1964, Alarcos Llorach 1967, Álvarez Martínez 1986, a.o).
b. Lo is a deﬁnite article that speciﬁcally applies to null heads (Contreras 1973, Plann 1980, a.o.).
c. Lo is a pronoun (Bello 1847, Ojeda 1982, Bosque and Moreno 1990, a.o.).

I will not take a stance on the best syntactic characterization of lo, glossing it simply as
throughout. What
is important for our purposes is that the morpheme has deﬁnite semantics, which is something that all analyses
take for granted (for discussion, see Bosque and Moreno (1990), Ojeda 1993 and especially Gutiérrez-Rexach
(1999, 2014) with respect to Degree Neuter Relatives.
2

Recall from the introductory chapter that
and
interpretations are two sides of the same coin:
amounts are simply
interpretations in the cardinality scale.
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Following Rivero (1981) and Ojeda (1982), I refer to these constructions as Degree Neuter
Relatives (DNRs for short).
DNRs are interesting both for their cross-linguistic rarity and for their distribution within
Spanish. Regarding the ﬁrst point, many languages, for instance English, lack DNRs altogether, as exempliﬁed by (2), and can only express the intended meaning using overt whpronouns, as in (3).
(2) a. * Jose admired the beautiful the novel was.
b. * Jose did not understand the idiot that Mariano is.
(3) a. Jose admired how beautiful the novel was.
b. Jose did not understand what an idiot Mariano is.
Notice that Spanish also has the variant with overt wh-pronouns.
(4)

Jose admiró cuán hermosa
Jose admired how beautiful.

era la novela
.

was the novel.

.

‘Jose admired how beautiful the novel was’
Secondly, DNRs appear not only in positions where adjectival and nominal predicates can
ordinarily appear, but also in some environments where such expressions are normally illicit,
e.g. as complements to wh-embedding predicates. In raising this distributional puzzle, DNRs
are reminiscent of propositional ARs (vs. nominal ARs) and this parallelism will be my starting point. The main goal of this chapter is to show that given the machinery I argued Spanish
must possess so as to construct ARs, the existence of DNRs in the language is unsurprising,
and DNRs can in fact be understood as a species of ARs. The only diﬀerence between DNRs
and the ARs discussed in Chapters 4 and 3 lies in what pieces of the structure get pronounced.
The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows. Section 5.1 will discuss the internal
make-up and distribution of DNRs. In §5.2, I will argue that DNRs come in two varieties,
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much like ARs, and show in Section 5.3 how my previous analyses for nominal and propositional ARs can be readily extended to DNRs.

5.1

The basics

5.1.1

Two distinctive properties

Two syntactic properties of DNRs make them stand out among relativization strategies
found in natural languages, including Spanish. The ﬁrst is the surprising determiner-noun
agreement pattern they show. Ordinarily in Spanish, deﬁnite articles that appear with headed
relative clauses must agree in number and gender with the head noun, as illustrated in (5).
(5) Juan admiró { las
Juan admited

the.

/ *la
.

the.

/ *los
.

the.

} fotografías
.

que mostró

photograph.

.

that showed

Jose
Jose
‘Juan admired the photographs that Jose showed’
DNRs, however, do not seem to abide by this requirement. They uniformly require lo, irrespective of the gender and number features on the fronted predicate.
(6) a. Juan admiró { lo / *la
Juan admired

} hermosa

the.

.

b. Juan admiró { lo / *el
Juan admited

the.

que era la

beautiful.

.

} hermoso
.

beautiful.

novela

that was the.

.

que era el
.

that was the.

novel.

.

cuadro
.

painting.

.

The predicate heading the relative clause, however, must agree with material internal to the
relative clause, suggesting that agreement is not altogether disrupted in these constructions.
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(7) a. Juan admiró

lo { hermosa

Juan admired

/ *hermoso

beautiful.

.

} que era el

beautiful.

that was the.

.

cuadro
painting.

.

b. Juan admiró lo { hermosas
Juan admited

beautiful.

/ *hermoso
.

} que eran las

beautiful.

that was the.

.

novelas
novel.

.

Rather, the patterns suggest that the head predicate has its origins inside the relative clause
and is, for some reason, inaccessible for φ-agreement for elements outside of that clause, like
the deﬁnite article.
The second unique property of DNRs is their syntactic ﬂexibility: it is possible to construct
DNRs headed by predicates belonging to a variety of syntactic categories, as illustrated by (8)
below.
(8) a. Adjectival
Juan no entendió

lo hermosa

Juan not understood

beautiful.

que era la
.

that was D.

‘Juan did not undestand how beautiful the novel was’
b. Adverbial
Juan admiró lo rápidamente que llegó
Juan admired

rapidly

María.

that arrived María

‘Juan admired how fast María arrived’
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novela.
.

novel.

.

c. Nominal
Juan vió lo idiota que es Mariano.
Juan saw

that

idiot is Mariano

‘Juan saw what an idiot Mariano is’
d. Prepositional
Me

molestó lo en punto que llegó

I.

annoyed

Juan.

on point that arrived Juan

‘It annoyed me how punctually Juan arrived’
Restrictions, where they exist, seem to be semantic in nature. Whereas adjectives that are
predicative in nature can form good DNRs, non-predicative adjectives like alleged and former
cannot:
(9) a. * No me
not I.

creo

lo supuesto que es el asesino del

believe

alleged

that is the killer

presidente.

of the president

‘I do not believe how alleged is the killer of the president’
b. * Lo { anterior / ﬁnal } que está ese hombre en la ﬁla.
former

ﬁnal

that is

that man

in the line

‘How {former / ﬁnal } is that man in the line’
Moreover, as suggested by Contreras (1973) and Gutiérrez-Rexach (1999), another necessary
factor for forming DNRs is the gradability of the predicate in question. In general, any predicate phrase that is coercible into a gradable interpretation is grammatical, like, for instance,
American and red in the examples below.
(10) a.

Es gracioso lo Americano que se
be funny

ha

vuelto

desde su viaje.

American that reﬂ. aux. become since his trip

‘It’s funny how American he has become since her trip’
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b.

No vi lo rojo que se
not see

puso.

red reﬂ. turn

‘I didn’t see how red he turned’
However, even predicative expressions cannot form DNRs if they are not easily coercible into
a gradable predicate.
(11) a. * lo ayer

que hemos llegado

yesterday that aux.

come

‘How yesterday we have arrived’
b. * lo casa que me
cous that I.

parece esta constructión
seem this construction

‘How house this building looks to me’
c. * lo desde la ventana que cayó la botella
from the window that fell the bottle
‘How from the window this bottle fell’

5.1.2

Syntactic distribution

DNRs can chieﬂy appear in two environments, in predicational copular sentences and as
complements to wh-embedding predicates. Henceforth, I will refer to DNRs appearing in
predicative positions as “predicative DNRs” and those appearing with wh-embedding verbs
as “propositional DNRs”.
In predicative DNRs, the DNR is predicated of some individual in a predicational copular
sentence, as in (12).
(12) a. Juan no es lo alto que Pedro es.
Juan no is

tall that Pedro is

‘Juas isn’t as tall as Pedro’
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b. El segundo libro es lo entretenido que fue el primero.
the second book is

entertaining that was the ﬁrst

‘The second book is as entertaining as the ﬁrst one’
But by far the more common use of DNRs is when they appear as complements to whembedding predicates. They may appear with rogative and responsive predicates, but not
with anti-rogative predicates. As illustrated below, the meaning of DNRs in these constructions is equivalent to that of their counterparts with overt wh-elements.3
(13) Rogative predicates
a.

Subordinate questions
Me

{ preguntó pregunto }

I.

asked

cuán alto es el ediﬁcio.

wondered

how tall is the

‘{He asked me / I wonder} how tall the building is’
b.

Degree Neuter Relative
Me

{ preguntó pregunto }

I.

asked

lo alto que es el ediﬁcio.

wondered

tall is the building

(14) Responsive predicates
a.

Subordinate questions
Yo { sé
I

know

/ te
you.

dije } cuán alto es el ediﬁcio.
told

how tall is the building

‘I {know/told you} how tall the building is’

3

Throughout this chapter I use the wh-pronoun cuán for subordinate questions. This pronoun is more commonly used in American variants of Spanish; in Peninsular Spanish it is more often found in literary texts, and
the more common variant of the wh-pronoun is cómo de (cf. qué tanto in Central American varieties).
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b.

Degree Neuter Relative
Yo { sé
I

/ te

know

dije } lo alto que es el ediﬁcio.

you.

tell

tall that is the building

(15) Anti-rogative predicates
a.

Subordinate Questions
* Yo { creo
I

believe

/ pienso / aﬁrmo } cuán alto es el ediﬁcio
think

claim

how tall is the building

Int.: ‘I {believe/think/claim} how tall is the building’
b.

Degree Neuter Relative
* Yo { creo
I

believe

/ pienso / aﬁrmo } lo alto que es el ediﬁcio
think

claim

tall that is the building

Finally, DNRs are also grammatical and felicitous as complements to predicates that embed
exclamatives (16).
(16) a. Post-verbal subjects
Me

sorprendió { cuán alto / lo alto que } es el ediﬁcio.

I.

surprised

how tall

tall that

is the building

‘It surprised me how tall the building is’
b. Impersonal
Es sorprendente { cuán alto / lo alto que } es el ediﬁcio.
is surprising

how tall

tall that

‘It is surprising how tall the building is’
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is the building

5.2

Distributional puzzle

DNRs raise the same problems of composition that we grappled with in the previous chapters with ARs: how does the same expression appear in positions that require fundamentally
diﬀerent semantic objects? I suggest the problem with DNRs and ARs is one and the same,
and in the next section, a parallel solution is applied to DNRs.
There are several reasons to treat DNRs on par with ARs. First, DNRs, like ARs, require
the deﬁnite article, as shown in (17). Recall that the restriction to the deﬁnite article is a
deﬁnitional property of ARs generally (see e.g. Carlson 1977a and Chapter 1).
(17) a.

Me

pregunto { lo / *esto

I.

wonder

/ *mucho / *algo

this.

much.

some.

} alto que es el
tall that is the

ediﬁcio.
building
‘I wonder how tall the building is’
b. * Me

pregunto todo lo alto que es el ediﬁcio.

I.

wonder all

tall that is the building

Second, the relative clause is obligatory in DNRs, as it is in ARs. In the case of DNRs,
what is left after dropping the relative clause is a nominalized gradable predicate, which is
ungrammatical either as a complement to a wh-embedding predicate or in predicative position.
(18) a.

Yo me

pregunto lo alta

I

wonder

I.

high.

*(que es la casa).
.

that

is the house

‘I wonder how high is the house’
b.

El segundo libro es lo entretenido
the second book is

entertaining.

*(que fue el primero).
.

that

‘The second book is as entertaining as the ﬁrst one’
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was the ﬁrst

Propositional DNRs, furthermore, behave much like propositional ARs showing obligatory
SV inversion in the same environments.
(19) a. * Me
I.

pregunto lo difícil
wonder

diﬃcult.

que { *el examen es / es el examen} .
.

that

the exam

be

‘I wonder how diﬃcult the exam is’
b. * Me
I.

sorprendió lo travieso
wonder

naughty.

que { *ese niño es / es ese niño}.
.

that

that child is

‘It surprised me how naughty that child is’
Unsurprisingly, the counterpart to DNRs with overt wh-pronouns shows the same requirement.
(20) a.

Me

pregunto cuán difícil

I.

wonder how diﬃcult.

{ *el examen será
.

the exam

/ será el examen} .

be.

‘I wonder how diﬃcult the exam will be’
b.

Me

sorprendió cuán travieso

I.

surprise

how naughty.

{ *ese niño es / es ese niño}.
.

that child is

‘It surprised me how naughty that child is’

5.3

Extending the analysis to Degree Relatives

Previous analyses of DNRs, most notably Ojeda (1982, 1993) and Gutiérrez-Rexach
(1999), have treated DNRs as syntactically and semantically uniform and as ordinary relative clauses, which are then interpreted as a maximalized object of either type e (Ojeda
1982, 1993) or type d (Gutiérrez-Rexach 1999). In contrast to these analyses, and echoing
my take on ARs in the previous chapters, I suggest that DNRs come in two closely-related
but also fundamentally diﬀerent variants: those that complement verbs that take nominal
complements, and those that complement verbs that typically take wh complements. In what
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follows, I show that the analysis of nominal ARs extends directly to predicative DNRs, and
the analysis of propositional ARs can be adopted wholesale to explain the distribution and
interpretive properties of propositional DNRs.
5.3.1

Predicative DNRs

For predicative DNRs in Spanish I propose a syntactic structure that is completely analogous to the one defended in the previous chapter for nominal ARs. Thus, for a DNR like lo
alto que Juan es (“the tall that Juan is”), we have the structure in (21). Note that this structure
is very similar to the one proposed by Gutiérrez-Rexach (1999, 48) on his analysis of DNRs.
(21) Syntactic structure of predicative DNRs in Spanish
DP
D
lo

CP
APi
Opwh alto

C’
C○
que[+

TP
DP

]

Juanj

T’
T○

vP

es

tj ti

From a semantic standpoint, I adopt a fairly standard degree approach to gradable predicates
where they denote relations between degrees and properties, of type ⟨d, et⟩ (for an extensive
overview, see Morzycki 2016). The meaning of tall can be represented as follows.
(22) ⟦tall⟧ = λd.λx.tall(d, x)
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Following the long tradition on ARs, we can take the CP in (21) to denote the set of degrees
d such that Juan is d-tall.
(23) ⟦[ Juan is d-tall]⟧ = λd.tall(d, Juan)
This result can be achieved in a number of ways. For simplicity, I will assume that the gradable
predicate is always interpreted in its base position, thus combining ﬁrst with the trace of Opwh ,
of type d. This is schematized below:
CP: ⟨dt⟩

(24)

λd.tall(d, Juan)
TP: t

λd

tall(d, Juan)
DP: e

T’: ⟨et⟩

Juan

λx.tall(d, x)

The last step is simply to interpret lo. In this case, I will give lo a semantics that applies to
sets of degrees (already deﬁned in Chapter 3, §3.4). Following the lead of Gutiérrez-Rexach
(1996, 1999, 2014), I assume that lo has the semantics of the maximality operator discussed
earlier (see §3.4.1).
(25) ⟦

⟧ = λN⟨dt⟩ . ιn[N(n) ∧ ∀n′ [N(n′ ) → n′ < n]]

The interpretation of the LF corresponding to (21) amounts to the maximal degree d to which
Juan is d-tall.
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(26) ⟦DP⟧ = ⟦

⟧(⟦CP⟧) =

(λd.tall(d, Juan))

So far these results reproduce the results obtained by previous studies, which stop here
and do not consider how DNRs should further combine with the matrix predicate. That is,
what should we do with the maximal degree in (26) in a sentence like (12)?
(27) Pedro es lo alto que es Juan.
Pedro is the tall that is Juan
‘Pedro is as tall as Juan’
The solution I propose is the same as that we saw for nominal ARs. Thus, I suggest that the
role DP is to provide the degree that saturates the degree slot of a second, unpronounced
adjective.
(28) AP elision in predicative DNRs
AP
DP
D
lo

AP
⟨alto⟩

CP
DP
Opwh alto

C’
que[+

]

es Juan

Identity & Deletion

The role of the DP can be regarded as the contribution of a Measure Phrase, like in sixfeet tall.4 The existence of the unpronounced AP gains support from the fact that they are
sometimes pronounced, as pointed out earlier in §3.4.2.2 and repeated below.
4
A common assumption in the literature is that measure phrases like six feet are names of degrees, of type
d. Under this view, the meaning of a simple sentence like Liz is six feet tall is straightforward with our current
assumptions.
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(29) Juan no es lo que es Pedro de alto.
Juan not is

that is Pedro of tall

‘Juan is not as tall as Pedro’
Moreover, the matching between the two copies of the gradable predicate must absolute.
For instance, since predicative adjectives must agree with their subjects in Spanish, it is easy
to create a

mismatch in examples like (12). These mismatches, however, result in

ungrammaticality:
(30) a. * Juan no es lo { alto
Juan not is

/ alta

} que es María.

tall.

that is María

/ alta

} que es Juan

tall.

that is Juan

tall.

‘Juan is not as tall as María’
b. * María no es lo { alto
María not is

tall.

‘María is not as tall as Juan’
What is important for us is that the present structure, independently motivated by nominal
ARs, does not require any further ado to derive the right semantics for predicative DNRs.
The full derivation is sketched below.

(i)

a. ⟦six-feet tall⟧ = ⟦tall⟧(⟦′′ ⟧) = λx.tall(′′ , x)
b. ⟦Liz is six-feet tall⟧ = ⟦is ′′ tall⟧(⟦Liz⟧) = tall(′′ , Liz)
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(31) Interpretation of predicative DNRs
TP: t
(λd.tall(d, Juan), Pedro)

tall(

AP: ⟨et⟩

DP: e
λx.tall(
Pedro

(λd.tall(d, Juan)), x)
AP: ⟨d, et⟩

DP: d
(λd.tall(d, Juan))
D: ⟨dt, d⟩

λd.λx.tall(d, x)

CP: ⟨dt⟩

⟨alto⟩

λd.tall(d, Juan)
Opwh alto que es Juan

According to (31) Pedro is (at least) as tall as Juan. This is the right interpretation, since
(27) is compatible with both weak and strong interpretations (just like other equatives). In
addition, notice that (31) does not entail that Juan is tall, only that Juan has some height.
This is correct: even if both Juan and Pedro were 5 feet tall–a rather low height–, one could
truthfully utter (27).
5.3.2

Propositional DNRs

Analogously, propositional DNRs can be given an analysis along the same lines as propositional ARs. Consider the sentence (14b) again:
(14b) Yo sé
I

know

lo alto que es el ediﬁcio.
tall that is the building

‘I know how tall the building is’
The syntactic structure that I propose for the DNR lo alto que es el ediﬁcio is the following.
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(32)

DP
D

CP

lo

DP[

C’

]

C○

Opwh alto
que[+

]+

TP

[T○ +V○ ]i
es

DP
el ediﬁcioj ti

T’
vP
tj ti twh

The syntactic structure is identical to subordinate degree questions formed with overt whpronouns. That is, both (14b) and and (14a) share the same structure up to the CP level.
(14a) Yo sé
I

cuán alto es el ediﬁcio.

know how tall is the building

Intuitively, the semantic interpretation of both (14a)/(14b) can be paraphrased as: I know
for what degree d, the height of the building is d. Following the same proposal discussed
extensively in §4.3.2 of Chapter 4, the interpretation of the CP in (32) proceeds as follows.
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(33) Interpretation of propositional DNRs
CP1: ⟨st, t⟩
λp.∃d[p = λw′ .tall(w′ )(d, the-building)]
λp

CP1: ⟨t⟩

∃d[p = λw′ .tall(w′ )(d, the-building)]
Opwh

CP2: ⟨dt⟩

λDdt .∃d[D(d)]

λd[p = λw′ .tall(w′ )(d, the-building)]
λd

C’: t

p = λw′ .tall(w′ )(d, the-building)
C○ ∶ ⟨st, t⟩

TP: t

λq[p = q]

tall(d, the-building)
DP: e

VP: ⟨et⟩
AP: ⟨et⟩

the building

λx.tall(d, x)
td

AP: ⟨et⟩
λx.tall(d, x)

The meaning obtained in (33) is the set of propositions of the form the building is d-high.
These, of course, are many degrees. We have to weed out the propositions that are neither
true nor maximally informative. This is the task for D , the variant of the deﬁnite article
modeled after Heim’s (1994) and Dayal’s (1996) answerhood operator introduced in §4.3.2.1.
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(34) ⟦D ⟧ = λQ⟨st,t⟩ .λw ∶ ∃p[Q(p) ∧ p(w) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧ Q(q)] → p ⊆ q]]
. ιp[Q(p) ∧ p(w) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧ Q(q)] → p ⊆ q]]
Applied to (33), the deﬁnite article D

takes a CP denoting a set of propositions–the CP1 in

(33)–and returns the maximally informative proposition from that set.
(35) ⟦DP⟧ = ⟦lo⟧(⟦CP1⟧) = λw . ιp[⟦CP1⟧(p) ∧ p(w) ∧ ∀q[[q(w) ∧ ⟦CP1⟧(q)] → p ⊆ q]]
This proposition now picks the only degree d such that the building is d-high in the evaluation
world and entails all other propositions with a degree d′ such that the building is also d′ -high
in the evaluation world.5
The semantics provided here is in accordance to our intuitions. I have not commented
on two aspects of propositional DNRs: their interpretation under exclamative embedding
predicates, and how to ﬁx their denotation so that it can be taken as complements by predicates
selecting for sets of propositions (e.g. rogative predicates like ask and wonder). These two
issues are discussed in §4.3.2.2 and, since every aspect of the proposal presented there can be
maintained as is, I will not repeat them here.

5.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed an unusual type of degree-related relative clause construction
in Spanish and argued that they should be thought of as a subspecies of ARs. Like the more
familiar ARs discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, DNRs were shown to come in two varieties,
5

Recall that the change from maximality (e.g. Rullmann 1995) to maximal informativity (Beck and Rullmann 1999, Abrusán 2014 a.o.) is necessary for examples with upward entailing predicates.
(i)

Bill knows…
a. …how tall you have to be in order to get on the roler coaster.
b. …how fast you are not allowed to drive on this road.

None of the subordinate questions above require a maximal degree, but a minimal one: if you are not allowed
to drive at 80mph, then it is most likely that you are not allowed to drive at 81mph, or at 82mph, and so on.
Thus, there is no maximal degree to which you are not allowed to drive. Of course, similar examples can be
constructed with propositioal DNRs.
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predicational DNRs, which received a similar analysis as nominal ARs, and propositional
DNRs, which were given the same treatment as propositional ARs.
Thinking of DNRs in this way accounts for many of their syntactic properties. First, the
fact that they can only surface with lo is unsurprising if they are also ARs, which uniformly
require the deﬁnite article. On this analysis the superﬁcial “head” of the relative clause is
in fact a displaced phrase embedded within a complex wh-phrase, which explains both the
agreement paradigm as well as the syntactic ﬂexibility. The neuter article is uniformly required
because the underlying fronted DP is degree-denoting (not a nominal) and as such, it does not
constitute a goal for D. The syntactic ﬂexibility reﬂects the ﬂexibility in wh-question formation:
if a given category can be moved as part of an interrogative wh-phrase, it can be expected to
be able to form DNRs (modulo orthogonal semantic considerations).
The resulting general state of aﬀairs is one where DNRs, like ARs, require a covert whoperator and lo which, on the surface, resembles a deﬁnite article and semantically conveys
deﬁniteness. Unlike ARs, however, the gradable predicate introducing the measuring function
is overt. From a syntactic point of view, both ARs and DNRs make use of the same ﬂexibility
of the deﬁnite article and lo, either to combine with clausal CPs–in propositional ARs/DNRs–
or to overtly show in free relatives–as in nominal ARs and predicative DNRs.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This dissertation argues that languages arrive at

interpretations of relative clauses

in at least two, fundamentally diﬀerent ways. Amount Relatives, understood as constructions
involving syntactic and interpretive means ear-marked for constructing degree or amount expressions, exist in languages like Spanish. However, the term “Amount Relative” can be a
misnomer for languages such as English, where relative clauses receiving

interpre-

tations constitute a subtype of more general kind-referring relative clauses–at least the ones
discussed in this work. This is not to say that English lacks relative clauses with
interpretations, but that they should not be analyzed as appealing to degree semantics.

6.1

Summary

The second chapter oﬀers a new perspective on

interpretations of relative clauses

in English that does not appeal to degree semantics. Taking seriously the commonalities
between

and

interpretations and the lack of evidence for degree abstraction in

so-called English ARs, I proposed that they are all in fact

interpretations, where the

particular subkind referenced are entities that are of a certain quantity or amount.
The third chapter looks into nominal ARs in Spanish, AR that appear as complements
to predicates that take nominal arguments. It argues that ARs constitute relative clauses that
denote maximalized sets of degrees, formally very close to cuanto (“how many”) free relatives.
The maximalized degrees serve the role of a Measure Phrase, in turn allowing reference to
particular degrees/amounts.
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In the fourth chapter I argue that when Spanish ARs appear as complement to wh-embedding
predicates they have the properties of subordinate questions and exclamatives. The chapter
develops an analysis of this type of ARs, which I dubbed propositional ARs, where their “hybrid” nature is explained: their wh-like properties come from the fact that they involve an
interrogative C○ and movement of a quantity wh-phrase, but their superﬁcial DP-like appearance comes from the fact that the deﬁnite article involved is akin to an Answerhood operator
and can therefore apply to sets of propositions. The syntactic structure required to obtain this
result is moreover very similar to that of nominal ARs, diﬀering only in the speciﬁcation of
the C○ head.
The ﬁfth and last chapter extends the analyses of the previous two chapters to Degree
Neuter Relatives, which I argued are a kind of AR. As ARs, Degree Neuter Relatives come
in two varieties that diﬀer exactly in the ways that propositional and nominal ARs are diﬀerent, and so the analyses of nominal and propositional ARs presented above can be applied
wholesale.
A comparison of the two languages shed light on the pieces required to form “genuine”
ARs and potential sources of variability in the availability and distribution of relatives with
interpretations. Spanish, for instance, has both overt and covert variants of the quantity wh-expression how many, which, moreover, can be used to form free relatives. These
properties, in addition to the fact that Spanish possesses a ﬂexible deﬁnite article that can
apply to propositional objects, accounts for the distribution of ARs in the language. None of
this pieces are available in English, and if this analysis is on the right track, ARs are predicted
to be unavailable in English. I have argued that this prediction, in the strict sense, is borne
out. English relative clauses with

interpretations are a diﬀerent species altogether

and, unsurprisingly, do not share the same distribution and availability of Spanish ARs.
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6.2

Open questions & future work

6.2.1

Amount Relatives across languages

This dissertation is focused on a very speciﬁc type of relative clause–relative clauses that
permit

interpretations–and argues that even within this narrow class, we ﬁnd het-

erogeneity when we look at diﬀerent languages. One of the goals of this dissertation was to
understand this variation in terms of the syntactic and interpretive tools independently made
available in a given language. But a more in-depth cross-linguistic examination of ARs is
needed. Future work might focus on closely inspecting a broader group of languages within
the Romance and Germanic language families. More interestingly, perhaps, an examination
of languages without degree morphology might shed light on the various ways that a language
might extract quantity-oriented interpretations without direct appeal to quantity-denoting elements.
6.2.2

The nature of degrees

ARs are, on the face of it, constructions that describe amounts, quantities or degrees. As
such, one hope is that analyzing these constructions also bear on our understanding of degrees.
In this dissertation, I have referred to degrees in two ways. In Chapter 2 I used a conception
of degrees where they can be referenced as equivalence classes of individuals, i.e. as sets of
individuals that have the same measure along some dimension (height, size, spiciness, etc.).
Chapters 4, 3 and 5, however, make use of the standard view that degrees are atomic types, i.e.
they are points on a scale abstractly representing some measurement.1 An obvious question
arises: how are these two notions of degrees related? Could there be “one degree to rule them
all”?
My answer to the question depends on what counts as a degree. In some ways, the
equivalence-class view is not, strictly speaking, a degree-based theory: degrees are just names
1

A popular alternative is to represent degrees as intervals on a scale; for the purposes of this discussion, I
will treat it together with the view of degrees as atomic types.
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for certain kinds of sets, a handy shortcut. If my approach to English ARs is on the right track,
this approach to degrees is empirically necessary. Moreover, it is metaphysically parsimonious, in the sense that we need add nothing to a degree-less system so that we can talk about
degrees qua equivalence classes. On the other hand, there are many semantic tasks for which
equivalence classes of individuals are not well suited: adding and substracting degrees, modifying them with measure phrases, accounting for antonyms, cross-dimension and cross-world
degree comparisons, all are problematic if we do not have degrees proper in our language
(for discussion, see Cresswell 1976, Klein 1980, 1991, Rullmann 1995 and Morzycki 2016).
In general, the arguments for including degrees in our ontology seem well grounded. Now,
if equivalence classes do not count towards the tally of degree theories, there is no reason to
choose between the two. We can have a single theory of degree semantics while still maintaing
that degrees can be represented as equivalence classes. One contribution of this dissertation
to our understanding of degrees is showing that this mode of representing degrees is better
suited for certain tasks than degree semantics proper. This result suggests that we need to
have both notions of degrees in our semantic toolbox.
The explanandum on such a view, however, is to understand how simplex degrees and
their complex, equivalence class counterparts are related. In my view, this question is a restatement of the old problem that degrees should include information about the objects they
are measuring. That is, the way we use degree expressions in natural languages, degrees are
always degrees of something, and oftentimes we require that information in order to write
their proper interpretation in our metalanguage. The way degree theories are built, however,
the type of d of degrees is opaque and this information is rendered inaccessible (with the
notable exception of Grosu and Landman 1998). But in a world were we have both, atomic
degrees and the ability of representing them as equivalence classes, there must be ways to get
from one to the other, oﬀering a new venue to understand the behavior of degree expressions
in natural languages.

204

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abels, K. (2007). Deriving selection restriction of surprise-predicates. In Spät, A., editor,
Interface and Interface condititions, pages 115–140. De Gruyter.
Abrusán, M. (2014). Weak island semantics. OUP.
Alarcos Llorach, E. (1967). El artículo en español. In To honor Roman Jakobson, volume 1,
pages 18–24. Mouton.
Álvarez Martínez, M. Á. (1986). El artículo como entidad funcional en el español de hoy.
Gredos, Madrid.
Ambar, M. (2003). Wh-asymmetries. In Di Sciullo, A. M., editor, Asymmetry in grammar,
pages 209–249. John Benjamins.
Anderson, C. and Morzycki, M. (2015). Degrees as kinds. Natural Language and Linguistic
Theory, 33:791–828.
Arregi, K. (1998). Spanish el que relative clauses and the doubly ﬁlled comp ﬁlter. Manuscript,
MIT.
Baker, C. L. (1968). Indirect questions in English. PhD thesis, University of Illinois.
Bale, A. (2006). The Universal Scale and the Semantics of Comparison. PhD thesis, McGill
University.
Bale, A. (2008). A universal scale of comparison. Linguistics and Philosophy, 31(1):1–55.
Barbosa, P. (2001). On inversion in wh-questions in Romance. In Hulk, A. C. and Pollock,
J.-Y., editors, Subject Inversion in Romance and the Theory of Universal Grammar, pages
20–59. Oxford University Press.
Beck, S. and Rullmann, H. (1999). A ﬂexible approach to exhaustivity in questions. Natural
Language Semantics, 7:249–298.
Bello, A. (1847). Gramática de la lengua castellana destinada al uso de los americanos,
volume IV of Obras completas. Imprenta del Progreso, Caracas, La Casa de Bello, 3rd
edition.
Benincà, P. (1996). La struttura della frase esclamativa alla luce del dialetto padovano. In
de Mauro, T., Benincá, P., Cinque, G., and Vincent, N., editors, Saggi di grammatica per
Giulio C. Lepschy, pages 23–43. Bulzoni, Roma.
205

Bhatt, R. (2002). The raising analysis of relative clauses: evidence from adjectival modiﬁcation. Natural Language Semantics, 10(1):43–90.
Bianchi, V. (1999). Consequences of Antisymmetry. Headed Relative Clauses. Mouton de
Gruyter.
Bittner, M. (1998). Cross-linguistic semantics for questions. Linguistics and Philosophy,
21(1):1–82.
Borer, H. (2005). The normal course of events. Oxford University Press.
Borsley, R. D. (1997). Relative clauses and the theory of phrase structure. Linguistic Inquiry,
28(4):629–647.
Bosque, I., editor (2017). Advances in the analysis of Spanish exclamatives. The Ohio State
University Press.
Bosque, I. and Moreno, J. C. (1990). Las construcciones con lo y la denotación del neutro.
Lingüística, Revista de ALFAL, 2(1):5–50.
Brucart, J. M. (1992a). Sobre el análisis de las construcciones enfáticas con artículo y cláusula
de relativo. Gramma-Temas, 1:36–63.
Brucart, J. M. (1992b). Some asymmetries in the functioning of relative pronouns in spanish.
Catalan Working Papers in Linguistics, pages 113–143.
Brucart, J. M. (2003). Adición, sustracción y comparación. In Sánchez Miret, F., editor,
Actas del XXIII Congreso Internacional de Lingüística y Filología Románica, pages 11–60.
Tubingen: Max Niemeyer.
Campos, H. (1993). De la oración simple a la oración compuesta. Georgetown University
Press, Washington, DC.
Caponigro, I. (2002). Free relatives as dps with a silent d and a cp complement. In Samiian,
V., editor, Proceedings of WECOL 2000, pages 140–150.
Caponigro, I. (2004). The semantic contribution of wh-words and type shifts: Evidence from
free relatives crosslinguistically. In Young, R. B., editor, Proceedings of SALT XIV, pages
38–55, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. CLC Publications.
Carlson, G. (1977a). Amount relatives. Language, 53:520–542.
Carlson, G. (1977b). Reference to kinds in English. PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts
at Amherst.
Cartwright, H. (1975). Amounts and measures of amounts. In Pelletier, J., editor, Mass terms:
some philosophical problems, pages 179–198. Dordrecht.
Castroviejo, E. (2006). Wh-exclamatives in Catalan. PhD thesis, University of Barcelona.

206

Cecchetto, C. and Donati, C. (2015). (Re)labelling heads. MIT Press.
Chernilovskaya, A. (2014). Exclamativity in discourse: exploring the exclamative speech act
from a discourse perspective. LOT.
Chierchia, G. (1984). Topics in the Syntax and Semantics of Inﬁnitives and Gerunds. PhD
thesis, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Chierchia, G. (1998a). Plurality of mass nouns and the notion of “semantic parameter”. In
Rothstein, S., editor, Events and Grammar, pages 53–104. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Chierchia, G. (1998b). Reference to kinds across languages. Natural Language Semantics,
6(4):339–405.
Chierchia, G. and Turner, R. (1988). Semantics and property theory. Linguistics and Philosophy, 11:261–302.
Chomsky, N. and Lasnik, H. (1977). Filters and control. Linguistic Inquiry, 8(3):425–504.
Chung, S. and Ladusaw, W. A. (2004). Restriction and Saturation. MIT Press.
Cinque, G. (1990). Types of A′ -dependencies. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Contreras, H. (1973). Spanish non-anaphoric lo. Linguistics, 11:5–29.
Corbett, G. G. (2006). Agreement. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Cresswell, M. J. (1976). The semantics of degree. In Partee, B. H., editor, Montague grammar, pages 261–292. Academic Press, New York.
Cresti, D. (1995). Extraction and reconstruction. Natural Language Semantics, 3(1):79–122.
Danon, G. (2013). Agreement alternations with quantiﬁed nominals in Modern Hebrew.
Journal of Linguistics, 49:55–92.
D’avis, F.-J. (2002). On the interpretation of wh-clauses in exclamative environments. Theoretical Linguistics, 28:5–31.
Dayal, V. (1996). Locality in Wh-Quantiﬁcation: Questions and Relative Clauses in Hindi.
Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht.
Dayal, V. (1997). Free relatives and ever: Identity and free choice readings. In Lawson, A.,
editor, Proceedings of SALT VII, pages 99–116, Ithaca, NY. CLC Publications.
Dayal, V. (2004). Number marking and (in)deﬁniteness in kind terms. Linguistics and Philosophy, 27(4):393–450.
Dayal, V. (2017). Questions. Oxford University Press.
Dayal, V. S. (1994). Scope marking as indirect wh-dependency. Natural Language Semantics,
2(2):137–170.
207

Diercks, M. (2014). Locative inversion. To appear in Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Syntax,
Second Edition.
Elliot, D. (1971). The grammar of emotive and exclamatory sentences in English. PhD thesis,
Ohio State University.
Fox, D. and Hackl, M. (2007). The universal density of measurement. Linguistics and Philosophy, 29(5):537–586.
Frana, I. (2017). Concealed questions. Oxford University Press.
Frege, G. (1884). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung
über den Begriﬀ der Zahl. W. Koebner, Breslau. Translated as The Foundations of Arithmetic: A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number, edited by J.L. Austin,
Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd revised edition, 1974.
Gajewski, J. (2002). L-analycity in natural language. Unpublished manuscript: MIT.
Gallego, Á. (2007). Phase theory and parametric variation.
Autónoma de Barcelona.

PhD thesis, Universidad

George, B. (2011). Question Embedding and the semantics of answers. PhD thesis, UCLA.
Gil y Gaya, S. (1964). Curso superior de sintaxis española. Bibliograf, Barcelona.
Gillon, B. S. (1987). The readings of plural noun phrases in English. Linguistics and Philosophy, 10(2):199–219.
Goria, C. (2002). The complexity of the left periphery: evidence from piedmontese. Syntax,
2:89–115.
Grimshaw, J. (1979). Complement selection and the lexicon. Linguistic Inquiry, 10:279–326.
Groenendijk, J. and Stokhof, M. (1982). Semantic analysis of wh-complements. Linguistics
and Philosophy, 5(2):175–233.
Groenendijk, J. and Stokhof, M. (1984). Studies on the Semantics of Questions and the Pragmatics of Answers. PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam.
Grosu, A. and Landman, F. (1998). Strange relatives of the third kind. Natural Language
Semantics, 6(2):125–170.
Grosu, A. and Landman, F. (2017). Amount relatives. To appear in Everaert, Martin and
Henk van Riemsdijk (eds.), The Companion to Syntax, 2nd Edition, Chapter 7; WileyBlackwell, Oxford.
Guerzoni, E. and Sharvit, Y. (2007). A question of strength: on NPIs in interrogative clauses.
Linguistics and Philosophy, 30(3):361–391.

208

Gutiérrez-Rexach, J. (1996). The semantics of exclamatives. In Garret, E. and Lee, F.,
editors, Syntax at sunset: UCLA working papers in Linguistics. Department of Linguistics,
UCLA, Los Angeles.
Gutiérrez-Rexach, J. (1999). The structure and interpretation of Spanish degree neuter constructions. Lingua, 109:35–63.
Gutíerrez-Rexach, J. (2001). Spanish exclamatives and the interpretation of the left periphery.
In Roorick, J., D’Hulst, Y., and J., S., editors, Romance Languages and Linguistic Theory
1999. Selected papers from Going Romance 1999, Leiden. John Benjamins.
Gutiérrez-Rexach, J. (2014). Interfaces and domains of quantiﬁcation. Ohio State University.
Hackl, M. (2000). Comparative Quantiﬁers. PhD thesis, MIT.
Halpert, C. (2015). Argument licensing and agreement. Oxford University Press.
Hamblin, C. (1973). Questions in Montague grammar. Foundations of Language, 10(1):41–
53.
Heim, I. (1987). Where does the deﬁniteness restriction apply. evidence from the deﬁniteness of variables. In Reuland, E. and ter Meulen, A., editors, The Representation of
(In)deﬁniteness, pages 21–42. MIT Press.
Heim, I. (1994). Interrogative semantics and karttunen’s semantics for know. In Buchalla, R.
and Mittwoch, A., editors, IATL 1, pages 128–144, Jerusalem. Akademon.
Heim, I. (2006). Little. In Gibson, M. and Howell, J., editors, Proceedings of SALT XVI,
pages 35–58, Ithaca, NY. Cornell University.
Heim, I. and Kratzer, A. (1998). Semantics in generative grammar. Blackwell, Malden, MA.
Herdan, S. (2008). Degrees and Amounts in Relative Clauses. PhD thesis, UConn.
Hernanz, M. (2006). Emphatic polarity and C in Spanish. In Brugè, L., editor, Studies in
Spanish Syntax, pages 105–150. Università Ca’Foscari, Venecia.
Hernanz, M. and Rigau, G. (2006). Variación dialectal y periferia izquierda. In Fernández,
B. and Laka, I., editors, Andolin gogoan. Essays in honour of Professor Eguzkitza, pages
435–452. Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Gipuzkoa.
Higginbotham, J. (1993). Interrogatives. In Hale, K. and Keyser, S. J., editors, The View
from Building 20, pages 195–228. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Hoeksema, J. (1983). Negative polarity and the comparative. Natural Language and Linguistic
Theory, 1(3):403–434.
Honcoop, M. (1998). Dynamic excursions on weak islands. Holland Academic Graphics, The
Hague.

209

Horn, L. (1972). On the Semantic Properties of Logical Operators in English. PhD thesis,
University of California, Los Angeles.
Hulsey, S. and Sauerland, U. (2006). Sorting out relative clauses. Natural Language Semantics,
14(2):111–137.
Hurford, J. (1975). The linguistic theory of numerals. Cambridge University Press.
Ionin, T. and Matushansky, O. (2006). The composition of complex cardinals. Journal of
Semantics, 23:315–360.
Jacobson, P. (1995). On the quantiﬁcational force of English free relatives. In Bach, E.,
Krazer, A., and Partee, B. H., editors, Quantiﬁcation in natural language, pages 451–486.
Kluwer.
Karttunen, L. (1977). Syntax and semantics of questions. Linguistics and Philosophy, 1(1):3–
44.
Kayne, R. S. (1994). The Antisymmetry of Syntax. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Kayne, R. S. (2005). On the syntax of quantity in English. In Movement and silence. Oxford
University Press.
Kennedy, C. (1997). Projecting the adjective: the syntax and semantics of gradability and
comparison. PhD thesis, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz.
Kennedy, C. (1999). Projecting the Adjective: The Syntax and Semanticsof Gradability and
Comparison. Garland, New York.
Kennedy, C. (2002). Comparative deletion and optimality in syntax. Natural Language and
Linguistic Theory, 20(3):553–621.
Kennedy, C. and Merchant, J. (2000). Attributive comparative deletion. Natural Language
and Linguistic Theory, 18(1):89–146.
Klein, E. (1980). A semantics for positive and comparative adjectives. Linguistics and Philosophy, 4(1):1–45.
Klein, E. (1991). Comparatives. In von Stechow, A. and Wunderlich, D., editors, Semantik/semantics: An international handbook of contemporary research, pages 673–691. de
Gruyter, Berlin.
Klinedinst, N. and Rothschild, D. (2011). Exhaustivity in questions with non-factives. Semantics and Pragmatics, 4:1–23.
Knowles, R. (2015). What “the number of planets is eight” means. Philosophical studies,
172(10):2757–2775.
Kratzer, A. (1996). Severing the external argument from its verb. In Rooryck, J. and Zaring,
L., editors, Phrase Structure and the Lexicon, pages 109–137. Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
210

Kratzer, A. (2005). Indeﬁnites and the operators they depend on: From Japanese to Salish. In
Carlson, G. N. and Pelletier, F. J., editors, Reference and Quantiﬁcation: The Partee Eﬀect,
pages 113–142. CSLI Publications.
Krifka, M. (1995). Common nouns: a contrastive analysis of Chinese and English. In Krifka,
M., Pelletier, F. J., Carlson, G. N., ter Meulen, A., Chierchia, G., and Link, G., editors,
The generic book, pages 398–411. Chicago University Press.
Krifka, M., Pelletier, F. J., Carlson, G. N., ter Meulen, A., Chierchia, G., and Link, G. (1995).
Introduction to genericity. In Carlson, G. N. and Pelletier, F. J., editors, The Generic Book,
pages 1–1124. Chicago University Press, Chicago.
Kroch, A. (1989).
Amount quantiﬁcation, referentiality, and long wh-movement.
University
of
Pennsylvania;
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.53.8124&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
Lahiri, U. (2002). Questions and Answers in Embedded Contexts. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Landau, I. (2016). DP-internal semantic agreement: A conﬁgurational analysis. Natural
Language and Linguistic Theory, 34:975–1020.
Leonetti, M. (2004). Speciﬁcity and Diﬀerential Object Marking in Spanish. Catalan Journal
of Linguistics, 3:75–114.
Link, G. (1983). The logical analysis of plurals and mass terms. In Bauerle, R., Schwarze, C.,
and von Stechow, A., editors, Meaning, use and interpretation of language, pages 302–323.
De Gruyter.
López, L. (2012). Indeﬁnite objects. MIT Press.
McNally, L. (2004). Bare plurals in spanish are interpreted as properties. Journal of Catalan
Linguistics, 3:115–133.
McNally, L. (2008). DP-internal only, amount relatives and relatives out of existentials. Linguistic Inquiry, 39(1):161–169.
Meier, C. (2015).
Amount relatives as generalized quantiﬁers.
uni-frankfurt.de/~cecile/PDF-files/AmountRelsNEW.pdf.

http://user.

Mendia, J. A. (2017). One more comparative: the de/que alternation in Spanish comparatives.
Ms, UMass Amherst.
Merchant, J. (2013). Diagnosing ellipsis. In Cheng, L. L.-S. and Corver, N., editors, Diagnosing syntax, pages 537–542. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Milsark, G. (1974). Existential Sentences in English. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

211

Moltmann, F. (2016). The number of planets, a number-referring term? In Ebert, P. and
Rossberg, M., editors, Abstractionism, pages 109–133. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Morzycki, M. (2016). Modiﬁcation. Key topics in Semantics and Pragmatics. Cambride
University Press.
Nathan, L. (2006). On the interpretation of concealed questions. PhD thesis, MIT.
Ojeda, A. (1982). Degree relatives and the neuter article in spanish. In Chicago Linguistics
Society 20, pages 407–418.
Ojeda, A. (1993). Linguistics individuals. CSLI.
Ordóñez, F. (1997). Word order and clause structure in Spanish and other Romance languages.
PhD thesis, City University of New York, New York.
Partee, B. (1987). Noun phrase interpretation and type-shifting principles. Studies in Discourse Representation Theory and the theory of generalized quantiﬁers, 8:115–143.
Partee, B. H. (1973). Some transformational extensions of Montague Grammar. Journal of
Philosophical Logic, 2:509–534.
Pelletier, F. and Schubert, L. (1989). Mass expressions. In Gabbay, D. and Guentnher, F.,
editors, Handbook of philosophical logic, volume 4, pages 327–407. Kluwer, Dortrecht.
Plann, S. (1980). Relative clauses in Spanish without overt antecedents and related constructions. University Of California Press.
Plann, S. (1982). Indirect questions in Spanish. Linguistic Inquiry, 13(2):297–312.
Plann, S. (1984). The syntax and semantics of más/menos... que versus más/menos... de in
comparatives of inequality. Hispanic Linguistics, 1:191–213.
Portner, P. and Zanuttini, R. (2005). Nominal exclamatives in English. In Stainton, R. and
Elugardo, R., editors, Ellipsis and Non-Sentential Speech, pages 57–67. Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Dordrecht.
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Rett, J. (2008). Degree Modiﬁcation in Natural Language. PhD thesis, Rutgers University.
Rett, J. (2015). The semantics of evaluativity. OSTL. Oxford University Press.
Rivero, M. L. (1981). Wh-movement in comparatives in Spanish. Linguistic Symposium on
Romance Languages, 9:177–196.
Rizzi, L. (1982). Issues in Italian syntax. Foris Publications, Dordrecht, Holland.
Rizzi, L. (1997). The ﬁne structure of the left periphery. In Haegeman, L., editor, Elements
of grammar, pages 281–337. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.

212

Rizzi, L. (2004). Locality and left periphery. In Belletti, A., editor, Structures and Beyond:
The Cartography of Syntactic Structures, volume 3, pages 223–251. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Romero, M. (1998). Focus and reconstruction eﬀects in wh-phrases. PhD thesis, UMass
Amherst.
Romero, M. (2005). Concealed questions and speciﬁcational subjects. Linguistics and Philosophy, 28:687–737.
Rullman, H. (2010). Number, person and bound variables. Slides for a talk given at Radboud
Universiteit, Nijmegen.
Rullmann, H. (1995). Maximality in the semantics of wh-constructions. PhD thesis, University
of Massachusetts at Amherst.
Russell, B. (2006). Against grammatical computation of scalar implicatures. Journal of
Semantics, 23(4):361–382.
Sáez, L. and Sánchez López, C. (2013). Las construcciones comparativas. estado de la
cuestión. In Las construcciones comparativas. Visor.
Saﬁr, K. (1982). Syntactic chains and the Deﬁniteness Eﬀect. PhD thesis, MIT, Cambridge,
Mass.
Sauerland, U. (2004). The interpretation of traces. Natural Language Semantics, 12:63–127.
Schwarz, B. and Simonenko, A. (2016). Two accounts of factive islands. In Prickett, B. and
Hammerly, C., editors, Proceedings of 46th Meeting of the North East Linguistic Society,
volume 3, pages 169–178, Amherst. GLSA, University of Massachusetts.
Schwarzschild, R. (1996). Pluralities. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Schwarzschild, R. and Wilkinson, K. (2002). Quantiﬁers in comparatives: A semantics of
degree based on intervals. Natural Language Semantics, 10:1–41.
Scontras, G. (2014). The semantics of measurement. PhD thesis, Harvard University.
Scontras, G. (2017). A new kind of degree. Linguistics & Philosphy, 40:165–205.
Sharvit, Y. (2002). Embedded questions and ‘de dicto’ readings. Natural Language Semantics,
10(2):97–123.
Sharvy, R. (1980). A more general theory of deﬁnite descriptions. Philosphical review,
89:607–64.
Soames, S. (1982). How presuppositions are inherited: a solution to the projection problem.
Linguistic Inquiry, 13(3):483–545.
Solt, S. (2009). The Semantics of Adjectives of Quantity. PhD thesis, The City University of
New York.
213

Solt, S. (2015). Q-adjectives and the semantics of quantity. Journal of semantics, 32(2):221–
273.
Spector, B. and Egré, P. (2015). A uniform semantics for embedded interrogatives: An
answer, not necesarily the answer. Synthese, 192(6):1729–1784.
Stechow, A. v. (1996). Against LF pied-piping. Natural Language Semantics, 4(1):57–110.
Stvan, L. S. (2009). Semantic incorporation as an account for some baresingular count noun
uses in English. Lingua, 119:314–333.
Suñer, M. (1984). Free relatives and the matching parameter. The linguistic review, 3:363–
387.
Suñer, M. (1994). V-movement and the licensing of argumental wh-phrases in Spansih. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 12:335–372.
Szabolcsi, A. and Zwarts, F. (1993). Weak islands and an algebraic semantics for scope
taking. Natural Language Semantics, 1(3):235–284.
Theiler, N., Roelofsen, F., and Aloni, M. (2016). A uniform semantics for declarative and interrogative complements. http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DEMQZ/paper.
pdf.
Torrego, E. (1984). On inversion in Spanish and some of its eﬀects. Linguistic Inquiry,
15(1):103–129.
Torrego, E. (1988). Operadores en las exclamativas con artículo determinado de valor cuantitativo. NRFH, 36(1):109–122.
Torrego, E. (1998). The Dependencies of Objects, volume 34. The MIT Press, Cambridge.
Uegaki, W. (2015). Interpreting questions under attitudes. PhD thesis, MIT.
von Fintel, K. (1999). Amount relatives and the meaning of chains. MIT. http://web.mit.
edu/fintel/fintel- -amount.pdf.
von Fintel, K. (2000). Whatever. In Jackson, B. and Matthews, T., editors, Proceedings of
SALT X, pages 27–39, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. CLC Publications.
von Stechow, A. (1984). Comparing semantic theories of comparison. Journal of Semantics,
3(1–2):1–77.
Watanabe, A. (1993). Larsonian CP recursion, factive complements, and selection. In
Schafer, A. J., editor, Proceedings of the North East Linguistic Society 23, pages 523–537,
University of Ottawa. Graduate Linguistic Student Association.
Wechsler, S. and Zlatić, L. (2003). The many faces of agreement. CSLI, Stanford.
Wellwood, A. (2015). On the semantics of comparison across categories. Linguistics and
Philosophy, 38(1):67–101.
214

Werle, A. (2000). Semantic incorporation in Lillooet. Paper presented at ICSNL 35.
Wilkinson, K. (1995). The semantics of the common noun kind. In Carlson, Gregory, N. and
Pelletier, F. J., editors, The generic book, pages 383–397. The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
Xiang, Y. (2016). Interpreting Questions with Non-exhaustive Answers. PhD thesis, Harvard
University.
You, E. (2013). La partícula enfática que en las oraciones exclamativas: el análisis sintáctico
en el marco teórico minimista. Argos, 30(59):159–183.
Zagona, K. (2002). The syntax of Spanish. Cambridge University Press.
Zamparelli, R. (1998). A theory of kinds, partitives and of/z possessives. In Alexiadou, A.
and Wilder, C., editors, Possessors, predicates and movement in the determiner phrase, pages
259–304. John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam.
Zanuttini, R. and Portner, P. L. (2003). Exclamative clauses: At the syntax-semantics interface. Language, 79(1):39–81.
Zweig, E. (2005). Nouns and adjectives in numeral nps. In Bateman, L. and Ussery, C.,
editors, Proceedings of the thirty-ﬁfth annual meeting of the North East Linguistic Society,
pages 663–676.

215

